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Introduction
“What kind of research are you doing, sir?” a seriously looking
border police agent at San Francisco Airport inquired. The
answer “Real Estate Finance” immediately ended the immigra-
tion interrogation. I got my passport back with a smile and
instead of takingmyﬁngerprints, the oﬃcer switched to pri-
vate chatter, asking for advice andmarket insights as he was
planning tobuyanewhome. Thiswas themoment I realized:
Housing is big!
Housingmatters
Housing is a massive factor in people’s consumption. For
industrialized nations, it is the biggest component in the
basket of goods used for calculating the consumer price in-
dex. TheBureau of Labor Statistics (BLR2010) estimates that
American home owners spent about 23.8 percent of their to-
tal consumption on housing.
Buying a house to live in is the largest investment many
households make. For The Netherlands, home owners had
60.5 percent of their total wealth in 2010 tied up in their
home (CBS Statline, 2010). Households invest into housing
early in their investment life-cycle. Only later they accumu-
late the ﬁnancial fat needed to invest into other asset classes.
For households headed by a person aged 25-45, the share of
housing in all investments is 72.0 percent, for households
aged46-64, the share iswatereddown to 58.2, and for house-
holds older than 64, 52.2 percent of allwealth still remains in
the home.
Housing not only dominates the asset side of households’
balance sheets. It is also the most prominent chunk within
the liabilities. ForDutchhouseholds aged 25-45, the residen-
tialmortgage isworth 62.0 percent of total wealth (CBS Stat-
line, 2010). This huge exposure is eased in time asmortgages
are paid oﬀ. For households beyond the age of 64, the mort-
gage only plays aminor role (8.6 percent of total wealth).
Housing is big enough to leave a sizable footprint on the
economy in general. The value of all owner occupied Dutch
housing is estimated to be 1.7 trillion Euros in 2009 (CBS,
2010), which is more than two times the value of the gross
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domestic product (GDP) and easily exceeds the total capital-
ization of all companies listed at the Amsterdam stock ex-
change. All outstanding residential mortgages in the United
States amount to 76.2 percent of the American GDP in 2006,
while the Danish and Dutch counterparts even reached a ra-
tio of one hundred percent (IMF, 2008).
During the last years of the Greenspan era, the United
States pulled themselves out of the dot-com crisis and the
economic shock following the terrorist attacks on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, by fueling the housing sector with easy credit.
The total new investment into US residential real estate had
grown from 405.8 billion USD in 2001 to 653 billion USD in
2006before collapsing to ameager 288.8 billionUSD in 2009
(Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2010). House prices were
perceived to enjoy never-ending growth. Between February
2000 and February 2006, the Case/Shiller home price in-
dex for 20 American cities increased by a breathtaking 105
percent. This price rally heated up the rest of the economy.
Homeequity loans and secondmortgages channeled thenew
housing wealth into general consumption. We all know the
end of this story: Collapsing home values in the US were
the starting point of a global ﬁnancial crisis that paralyzed
the ﬁnancial industry and grew into a full-ﬂedged economic
recession. This crisis has painfully demonstrated: Housing
matters.
This dissertation comprises of 4 individual studies that
analyze the fundamentals andmechanisms of housingmar-
kets from two diﬀerent directions. Chapters 1 and 2 research
housing bubbles and house price volatility, while Chapters 3
and 4 look at the impact of demographic dynamics on hous-
ingmarkets.
Chapter 1 examines the long run relationship between
prices and rents forhouses inAmsterdamfrom1650 through
2005. It estimates the deviation of house prices from funda-
mentals andﬁnds that these deviations canbepersistent and
long-lasting. Furthermore, it looks at the feedback mecha-
nisms between housing market fundamentals and prices. It
ﬁnds thatmarket correction of themispricing occursmainly
through prices, not rents. This correction back to equilib-
rium, however, can take decades.
The underlying factors of house price volatility are at the
focus of Chapter 2. It is the ﬁrst study that tests how the dy-
namics of house prices are aﬀected by the option to rebuild
or enlarge existing dwellings. It incorporates this option in
a standard hedonic regressionmodel, and shows howneigh-
borhoods and houses with unrealized renovation potential
can be identiﬁed. It uses an unexplored dataset of housing
transactions in West Berlin, covering thirty years between
1978 and 2007. The empirical results show that house value
has an elasticity of about 0.15 with respect to development
potential, measured by the ratio between the square meters
allowed by zoning and the existing house size. For high op-
tion value properties the elasticity increases to 0.23.
The evidencepresented inChapter 2 suggests that thehigh
uncertainty and high growth period between 1989 and 1994
14
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was associated with a signiﬁcant increase in option value
for the properties with substantial redevelopment potential;
about 40 percent of the boom was due to increase in option
value. During the 10 year bust after 1994, about 50 percent
of the decline was due to change in option value. Volatility
of this magnitude applies to about 10 percent of all proper-
ties sold during the sample period. More than 68 percent of
all sales have increased volatility over the cycle due to unre-
alized option value.
Demographic trends shape housingmarkets
Demographic contraction is one of the key challenges many
industrialized countries will face in the future or already ex-
perience today. To give a brief example, the United Nations
PopulationDivision (2007) estimates thatRussiawill lose 24
percent of its current population by the year 2050. For Bul-
garia, the expected decline in total population is 35 percent
in the same period, while neighboring Turkey will experi-
ence an impressive population growth of 29 percent (see Fig-
ure 1). The populations of Japan andGermanywill both drop
by 18 percent. Within countries, huge regional diﬀerences
can be observed. In Germany, for example, all Eastern states
exceptBrandenburgexperienceddoubledigitpopulationde-
cline rates since 1990. Beside the rapid changes in total pop-
ulation numbers, societies age dramatically. In South Korea,
for instance, the median age is increasing three years every
ﬁve years and the share of inhabitants older than 60 years
will increase from 14 percent now to 42 percent in 2050. The
second part of this dissertation analyses how these changing
demographics shape housingmarkets.
Will greying populations demand less housing or diﬀer-
ent kinds of housing services? Chapter 3 answers this ques-
tion based on very detailed 2001 cross-sectional data of En-
glish households. It reﬁnes the existingmethodology by dis-
tinguishing between life cycle variables that are expected to
change with age for each household, and cohort variables
that are determined by the household’s birth-cohort and not
by age.
The chapter’s key results are that housing demand is
mainly driven by human capital and that it does not decline
with age. A scenario analysis with diﬀerent population pro-
jections shows that in the case of stagnating household num-
bers total demand can still increase as the population grows
older. These ﬁndings are relevant to many European coun-
tries that already experience population shrinkage.
Chapter 4 researches within-city home price dynamics in
bullish and bearish residential real estate markets and dif-
ferent demographic environments. It contributes to the lit-
erature addressing the urban layout of cities by formulat-
ing and empirically testing a novel idea for changes in the
price gradients across neighborhoods under diﬀerent mar-
ket regimes. The study ﬁnds that the combination of city-
wide falling home prices and declining population numbers
hurts low-value neighborhoods most, while falling home-
prices in citieswith robustdemographicsdonot lead to shifts
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in the within-city distribution of housing wealth.
A new level of spatial detailedness is achieved by combin-
ing a high-quality data-set for TheNetherlandswith estima-
tion techniques borrowed from the geoscience domain. The
data comprise of 1.8million single family home transactions
and 0.8 million apartments sold by members of the Dutch
Realtor Association (NVM). This is the ﬁrst paper that esti-
mates home price index surfaces for an entire country based
on a spatial error model.
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Figure 1: Projected change of total population for European countries
Notes: Map is based on the population forecasts developed by the United Nations Population Division (2007).
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Chapter 1
House Prices and Fundamentals: 355 Years of Evidence
This chapter is joint work with
Brent Ambrose (Pennsylvania State University) and
Piet Eichholtz (Maastricht University).
1.1 Introduction
The debate over whether a “housing bubble” existed recently
in the U.S. and many other countries in the world is still
not fully resolved. Numerous academic articles and popular
press accounts point to mounting evidence of a U.S. hous-
ing bubble as house prices increased on average more than
ﬁve percent per year from 2000 to 2006. On the local level,
some markets experienced yearly price increases of more
than 20 percent. As a result, even the former chairman of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Alan
Greenspan, noted that some local markets showed signs of
speculative activity.1 The same holds for other countries.
Spain and Ireland, for example, saw average house prices in-
crease between 1997 and 2007 of nearly 190 percent and 240
percent, respectively. These countries have seen their house
prices fall rapidly since then. More recently, the rapid rise
in property values in China has raised concerns of a bubble
forming there.2 However, the housing market experiencing
one of the biggest rises of all, South Africa, hasmerely stabi-
lized.
The worry of economists and policy makers is that asset
1For example, see Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan to the Amer-
ican Bankers Association Annual Convention, Palm Desert, Califor-
nia (via satellite), September 26, 2005 (http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boardDocs/Speeches/2005/200509262/default.htm).
2For a discussion of current Chinese housingmarkets, seeMufson (2010).
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price bubbles may quickly turn into busts, resulting in eco-
nomic contraction. In the last few years, the world has seen
that such fears canbe justiﬁed. HelblingandTerrones (2003),
and Claessens et al. (2009) investigate the eﬀects housing
market declines have on recessions. Helbling and Terrones
(2003) document 20 severe housing market declines in 14
countries over the period 1970 to 2002. For the period from
1960 to 2007, Claessens et al. (2009) look at 122 recessions
and 114 episodes of house price decline, of which 28 were
characterized as busts. Both papers show that these housing
market declines generally overlapped or coincided with re-
cessions, and that recessions coinciding with housing mar-
ket declines resulted in output losses roughly two to three
times as big as other recessions. Claessens et al. (2009) con-
clude that the extent of the house price decline most consis-
tently inﬂuences the depth of a recession, even after taking
into account other ﬁnancial variables like credit availability
and equity prices.
Recognizing an asset price bubble prior to a price crash
is notoriously diﬃcult. A number of academic studies con-
ducted in the early 2000s questionedwhether theU.S. hous-
ingmarket was experiencing the characteristics of a housing
price bubble. For example, Case and Shiller (2003) compared
U.S. house price growth with income growth since 1985 and
concluded that income growth could explain nearly all of the
house price increase for over 40 states. Thus income growth,
combinedwith low interest rates,madehouses inmost states
more aﬀordable than they had been in 1995. In addition,
McCarthy and Peach (2004) presented a critical analysis of
the data and methods commonly used to support the claim
of a housing bubble. After adjusting common housing mar-
ket metrics (such as the ratio of the median price of existing
homes to the median household income) to account for the
eﬀects of interest rate changes, McCarthy and Peach (2004)
found little evidence supporting a bubble in the U.S. housing
market.
The problem with identifying the presence (or lack
thereof) of bubbles in assetmarkets is the lack of suﬃciently
long termdata that would allow researchers to identify cases
where asset prices signiﬁcantly deviate from fundamental
values. Furthermore, market price deviations from funda-
mental values over a short time period do not guarantee
that market prices will decline – the often-predicted bubble
crash. Rather, it may be possible that bubble conditions are
sustained, followedbygradual restorationof the equilibrium
relationship.
The purpose of this paper is to utilize a 355-year time se-
ries of real house prices and rents to demonstrate that sub-
stantial deviations of market prices away from market fun-
damental values can be persistent. In addition, we show that
these “bubble condition” periods do not necessarily endwith
thebubbleburstingbut couldaswell be resolvedbyslowcon-
vergence of prices and fundamentals.
The following section presents a brief review of recent
studies that have examined possible asset bubbles. Section
2 then presents the housing market data as well as the data
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concerningconsumerprices and interest rates,whileSection
3presents themethods and results of our investigationof the
relationship between house prices and fundamentals. This
analysis of the Amsterdam housing market reveals that sig-
niﬁcant and long-lasting price deviations are possible, fol-
lowedbycorrections that caneitherbegradual or sharp. Sec-
tion 4 examines the way these corrections transpire by ana-
lyzing themechanismsof price and rent adjustment. Finally,
Section 5 provides conclusions.
1.2 Literature review
Much of the popular press takes for granted that the recent
house price increases seen around the world are evidence of
a “bubble” in housing markets. For example, in a recent sur-
vey, McCarthy and Peach (2004) found that the high ratio of
homeprices relative tohousehold incomeandofhomeprices
relative tomarket rents for theequivalentpropertywere “the
most widely cited evidence of a bubble.”
But the existence of house price “bubbles” remains a con-
troversial topic in economics. For example, Case and Shiller
(2003), using housing market fundamentals as proxied by
state-level Per Capita Personal Income and house price in-
dices fromFiservCSWfor theperiod 1985 to2002, concluded
that house prices inmost U.S. cities reﬂect fundamental val-
ues. Nevertheless, additional survey data from four cities
showed evidence of speculative activity.3
However,McCarthyandPeach (2004)usingdata from1977
to 2003 suggested that the evidence based on common fun-
damental value ratios is not conclusive because these ratios
ignore the dramatic decline in mortgage interest rates dur-
ing the 1990s and the growth in housing demand resulting
fromdemographic shifts in thepopulation. After controlling
for recent developments in themortgagemarkets,McCarthy
andPeach (2004) concluded that thebeneﬁts of thedecline in
mortgage interest rates during the 1990s oﬀset the increases
in home prices.
Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) also examined the
traditionalmetrics of housingmarket fundamentals, includ-
ing the house price growth rates, price-to-income ratio, and
rent-to-price ratio, and noted that the absence of interest
rates in such analysis can lead to false conclusions. Their
main conclusion, based on the OFHEO repeated sales hous-
ing indices from 1980 to 2004, was that the cost of home
ownership rose moderately relative to the cost of renting,
even though larger deviations from fundamentals occurred
in some markets. Thus, the analyses of Himmelberg, Mayer
and Sinai (2005) and McCarthy and Peach (2004) supported
the conclusion of Case and Shiller (2003) that prices in most
U.S. housingmarkets appeared to be in linewithmarket fun-
damentals.
A number of recent studies have explored the connection
3In addition, Higgins and Osler (1998) provide additional evidence that re-
gional housing bubbles occurred around 1989.
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between prices and fundamentals. For example, Brunner-
meier and Julliard (2008) studied the link between inﬂation
andhouse prices,mainly based onquarterly data for theU.K.
from 1966 to 2004. They examined the relations between the
rent-price ratio, interest rates, and inﬂation. Thecentral idea
of their paper is that potential home buyersmay be suﬀering
frommoney illusion and take insuﬃcient account of the fact
that inﬂation lowers future real mortgage costs. They found
that the nominal interest rate, as opposed to the real rate, af-
fects thehouseprice-rent ratio. Afterdecomposing this ratio
into a rational and a mispricing component, they concluded
that the latter component is strongly driven by movements
in inﬂation. In addition, Gallin (2008), using U.S. data from
1970 to 2003, showed that long-horizon regressions support
theuse of the rent-price ratio as an indicator of housingmar-
ket value.4
Other papers that studied the rent-price ratio as the yard-
stick for fundamentalvaluationareAyusoandRestoy (2006),
Zhou and Sornette (2003), Chung and Kim (2004), Black,
Fraser andHoesli (2006), Lai and vanOrder (2006), andHott
andMonnin (2008). In general these papers found some evi-
dence supporting thenotion that (local) housingmarkets can
deviate from fundamentals. This conclusion is in line with
themainﬁndings ofClayton (1996),who studied theVancou-
4The use of the rent-price ratio as a measure of price movement relative to
fundamental value ismotivatedby the similaruseof thedividend-price ra-
tio in stock market research (e.g. Leamer, 2002; and Campbell and Shiller,
2001)
ver housingmarket for the period from 1979 to 1991.
On the theoretical front, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003)
derivedamodel indicating that assetbubbles canpersist over
substantial periods of time, even in the presence of ratio-
nal arbitrageurs. In theirmodel, the inability of arbitrageurs
to coordinate selling combined with individual incentives
to time the market lead to bubble persistence. A more re-
cent theoretical model developed by Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003) showed that when short sales are constrained, as is
the case in the housing market, signiﬁcant asset price bub-
bles can occur even when traders have small diﬀerences in
beliefs regarding asset fundamental values.
Furthermore, Glaeser and Gyourko (2009) argue that ar-
bitrage between the housing rental market and the owner
occupied market is diﬃcult. Rental homes tend to be very
diﬀerent from owner occupied ones, both in terms of lo-
cation and in terms of the building itself, and households
only rarely switch from the one housing type to the other.
They conclude that the no arbitrage assumption is diﬃcult
tomaintain in the short run.
To conclude, the current literature concerning house
prices and fundamentals suggests that prices may deviate
from fundamentals over longer periods of time, and that ﬁ-
nancial arbitrage between owning and renting is diﬃcult in
the short run. This suggests that it is meaningful to investi-
gate the relation between house prices and fundamentals in
the (very) long run. However, nobody has been able to inves-
tigate this issue for a time period long enough to provide di-
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rect empirical evidence of these long-run relationships: the
typical time series used in the studies cover atmost 40 years.
In contrast, we use a data series spanning more than three
centuries to analyze the long-run relation between house
prices and fundamentals.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Sources and description
We use housingmarket data frommultiple sources covering
theperiod from1650 through2005. First,weuse an index for
Amsterdam house prices based on the same data source as
Eichholtz (1997). These data are from Van Eeghen, Bisschop,
andWijnman (1976), covering the period from 1650 through
1965. The dataset covers all transactions of dwellings on the
Herengracht, one of the central canals in Amsterdam. As
noted in Eichholtz (1997), the Herengracht was constructed
between 1585 and 1660. By 1680, most of the lots on the
canalweredeveloped and from1616until thepresent day, the
Herengracht has remained one of the most prestigious ad-
dresses in Amsterdam. The price index is computed based
on the estimated coeﬃcients from the followingmodel:
yi = XG+ i (1.1)
where y is the real log house price diﬀerence between trans-
action pairs, X is a matrix of time dummy variables, G is a
coeﬃcient vector, and i is the error term. We follow meth-
ods outlined in Bailey,Muth andNourse (1963) and Case and
Shiller (1987) to create the matrix X. Eichholtz (1997) esti-
mated a biennial index based on housing and commercial
property transaction data, and then included a dummy for
property use to control for the switch from residential to
commercial use. Moreover, Eichholtz (1997) used the period
1634 through 1973, thus including the tails of the sample pe-
riod, inwhich transactiondatawere relatively thin. We focus
on the housing transactions alone, and disregard the begin-
ning and end of the Eichholtz’ (1997) sample period to com-
pute an annual repeat sales index.
The annual averagenumber of transactions per year is 10.9
and the standard deviation is 6.8. The annual number of
transactions is relatively high in the latter half of the nine-
teenth century and in the twentieth century. For 1945, we do
not have any transactions, and the index observation for that
year is an interpolated value.
We augment this index with house price data from the
CBS, the Dutch national statistics bureau, and the NVM, the
national organization of Dutch realtors, covering the period
from 1965 through 2005. The CBS/NVM series covers ap-
proximately 60 percent of all housing transactions in the
country, with relatively more weight in the western part of
the Netherlands. The numbers denote median house prices
for the year.
The rental index is also constructed frommultiple sources.
For the ﬁrst 200 years, from 1650 through 1850, we use data
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concerning residential rents for Amsterdam from Eichholtz
and Theebe (2007). This series is a repeat market rent in-
dex, based on data reported in Lesger (1986) for a broad set of
rental houses, varying in location and structural quality, and
owned by the institutional investors of that time: orphan-
ages, hospitals, and poor-relief boards. In all, this dataset
covers 7,670 market rent observations for 1,055 properties
scattered across an area that is currently the center of Am-
sterdam. The market rents are observed at the beginning of
new rent contracts. For the period from 1650 to 1850, the av-
erage number of annual observations is 24.1, and the mini-
mum is 4.
The sample of individual rent observations could not be
extended beyond 1850, unfortunately, since to our knowl-
edge no suﬃcient number of rent records is available in the
archives forAmsterdamafter that year. Thus,weuse twona-
tionalhouse rent indices from1851. Theﬁrst series covers the
period 1851 through 1913 and is from van Riel (2006). In the
Netherlands, tax authorities estimated the potential rental
income that could be generated from owner occupied resi-
dential real estate, since the imputed rents were treated as
income and taxed. The rent capacity is not a percentage of
the value of house, which would make the rent index a di-
rect function of prices. Instead, the average rent of compa-
rable houses in the vicinity was taxed, providing informa-
tion on the development ofmarket rents. The second dataset
spans the remaining period 1914 through 2005, and is based
on a range of publications from the Dutch Central Bureau of
Figure 1.1: Consumer price index, 1650-2005
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Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
Notes: Over theﬁrst250years, theDutchcurrencywasbasedongold, leading
to stable consumer prices throughout the 18th and 19th century. At the be-
ginning of World War I, however, the gold standard could not be sustained
anymore and money supply massively increased. As a consequence, con-
sumer prices tripled until 1918. In the years after the war, the banking sec-
tor suﬀered from the only banking crisis in its long history, caused by non-
performing loans originating from thewar time. WhenTheNetherlands re-
turned to the gold standard in 1925, prices gradually reverted to their histor-
icalmeans. In 1936, TheNetherlandsagainhad tomoveaway fromgold–and
prices trended upwards since then. Graph is scaled in logarithms.
Sources: Please refer to Table 1.2.
24
CHAPTER 1. HOUSE PRICES AND FUNDAMENTALS
Statistics (CBS, 1939, 1948, 1999, 2008).
Rent control was introduced in theNetherlands in 1916/17,
as part of a broader government policy concerning prices of
basic needs. The 1916 “Distributiewet” regulated distribution
and prices of basic foods, while the “Huurcommissiewet” of
1917 introduced rent control, ﬁxing rents at the 1916 level,
but later allowing controlled house rents to rise with inﬂa-
tion. Interestingly, while nominal rents had indeed been go-
ing up before that, causing public pressure for government
intervention, rents in real termshad in fact beengoingdown.
Between 1914 and 1916, real rents declined 22 percent. Most
Dutch housing rents have been under the control of the gov-
ernment since then, so from 1916 onwards the rent index
mostly reﬂects controlled rents, and partly rents freely set
in themarket.
Overall, these price and rent series provide a yearly pic-
ture of the developments and growth in the Amsterdam
housing market over a 355-year period from 1650 to 2005.
In order to make adjustments for the cost of living, we use
a long-run consumer price index, again based on diﬀerent
sources. Nusteling (1985) is the source for the development
of the general consumer price level until 1850. This index is
based on a basket of consumer goods, including rye bread,
beer, butter, meat, potatoes, peas, diﬀerent types of ﬁsh, and
various textiles. The basket changes with broad use of the
products. For the period between 1850 and 1913 we employ
VanRiel (2006), who uses a similar basket of goods, and adds
housing rental expenses. From 1914 onwards, we use the CPI
calculated by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics.
1.3.2 Summary Statistics
Over the ﬁrst 250 years of the sample period, the Dutch
Guilderwas based on gold, leading to stable consumer prices
throughout the 18th and 19th century. At the beginning of
World War I, however, the gold standard could not be sus-
tained. TheDutchcentral bank tried to stabilize theexchange
rate of theGuilder bymaintaining stable interest rates. Nev-
ertheless, money supply massively increased due to (still
unregulated) private banks providing excessive loans to the
economy. Consequently, consumer prices tripled until 1918.
In theyears after thewar,manyof theseprivatebank loans
defaulted resulting in a severe crisis for the Dutch banking
sector. When TheNetherlands returned to the gold standard
in 1925, adecadeofdeﬂationbegan. During thisperiodprices
gradually reverted to their historical means. However, after
itsmain trading partnersGermany andGreat Britain left the
gold standard, TheNetherlands againmoved away fromgold
in 1936 – and prices directly trended upwards (Hart; Jonker,
and van Zanden, 1997). This was the beginning of a long
period in which inﬂation, though not constant, became the
norm.
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 provide graphs of the house price and
rent indices, in nominal and in real terms. The graphs show
that most of the increase in nominal house prices and rents
occurred in the twentieth century. The indices follow each
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Figure 1.2: Nominal rents and house prices, 1650-2005
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Notes: Graph is scaled in logarithms.
Sources: Please refer to Table 1.2.
other closely over time, especially in their long-run move-
ments, but often also in their year-by-year behavior. The se-
ries appear both stationary and volatile in the seventeenth
and eighteenth century, showing a downward trend in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and are rather
stable throughout the remainder of that century.
The twentieth century ismost volatile for both series, with
large swings in real rents and prices, especially during the
two world wars and in the inter-war period. Ironically, a
Figure 1.3: Real rents and house prices, 1650-2005
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Notes: Neither the real price nor the real rent index increases dramatically
in 355 years. The real price and rent indices, starting both at 100 in 1650,
reach respective levels of 197.1 and 203.2 in 2005. However, for most of the
sample period the indices vary around 100. The upward climb of real rents
and house prices started only in the 1950s, and they have now both reached
the highest levels in history.
Sources: Please refer to Table 1.2.
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government measure aimed at keeping rents at stable lev-
els is the cause for the high volatility in real rents. In 1917,
the Dutch government ﬁxed rents in the lower and middle
housing market segments to 1916 levels. Due to high inﬂa-
tion at the end ofWorldWar I, these ﬁxed nominal rents re-
sulted in a severe drop in real rents, before a period of de-
ﬂation, caused by a return to the gold standard, drove real
rents up to unprecedented levels (Nijssen, 2000). In 1934,
real rents peaked at 3 times their 1918 level. It is interest-
ing to observe that, although rent regulation was oﬃcially
suspended in the period from 1927 through 1940, rents did
not adjust downward despite the Dutch government’s poli-
cies to deﬂate wages and prices. During the German occupa-
tion, rents were again ﬁxed. AfterWorldWar II rents stayed
highly regulated with maximum annual increases being de-
termined by law– a system still in place today. This has coin-
cidedwith the longest consistent rise in the level of real rents
in Amsterdam’s history.
In sum, the year 1916 can be seen as the beginning of a new
regime. Before, rentswere determinedby themarket and re-
mained relatively constant in real terms. With substantial
governmental intervention thereafter, rents developed very
smoothly in nominal terms but displayed high volatility in
real terms.
Realhouseprices appearmorevolatile thanrents,withpe-
riods of large ﬂuctuations when rents are stable. For exam-
ple, in the early 1670s, a very volatile decade for theDutch re-
public, rents declined, but prices fell much further. Another
example is the large peak in house prices around 1780, which
corresponds to the fourthAnglo-Dutchwar (Eichholtz, 1997).
Also a notable price movement occurs in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. At the time the Dutch housing market experi-
enced a house price bubble followed by a bust, but rents re-
mained stable, as Figure 1.3 shows.
The second strikingobservation fromFigure 1.3 is thatnei-
ther the real price nor the real rent index increases dramat-
ically in 355 years. The real price and rent indices, starting
both at 100 in 1650, reach respective levels of 197.1 and 203.2
in 2005. However, for most of the sample period the indices
vary around 100. The upward climb of real rents and house
prices only started in the 1950s; they have now both reached
their highest levels ever.
Shiller (2007) provides an interesting comparison of our
Netherlands price index with indexes for Norway and the
U.S. over the period 1890 to 2010. His analysis reveals that
real prices in The Netherlands and Norway have substan-
tially higher volatility than prices in the U.S. However, it is
interesting to note that the three indices clearly show signif-
icant real price appreciation during the last decade such that
by2010, real houseprices in these countries are signiﬁcantly
higher than their respective long-termmean.
Besides house rents,we also use themarket interest rate as
a fundamental. Unfortunately,wedonothave a single source
covering the complete 355-year sample of housing market
data, thus we combine several sources that allow us to go
back to 1783. For the period 1783 through 1795, we calculate
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bond yields on the basis of information regarding prices and
coupons forbonds issuedby theProvinceofHollandas stated
in van Zanden (2000). From 1796 through 1813, we rely on
price-quotes of interest bearing government bonds issuedby
theTreasuryof theCityofAmsterdam, asprovidedby theof-
ﬁcial price list of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange.
In 1814, the debt of the Dutch government was restruc-
tured, and in that year, a perpetual government bondwas is-
sued. Twomoreperpetual bondswere issued in 1900. Weuse
the government yield index createdbyEichholtz andKoedijk
(1996) on the basis of these bonds for the period from 1814
through 1955. Since the Dutch government has been buying
back these bonds in the last decades, their current market
prices no longer reﬂect market interest rates, and therefore,
we augment this data with a series of long government bond
yields from the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) from 1956
onward. The nominal bond yields (Figure 1.4) show twoperi-
ods of relatively high yields: theNapoleonic era, and the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century. In 1813, the Dutch govern-
ment defaulted requiring a restructuring of its government
debt. As a result, the default risk premium on Dutch gov-
ernment debt rose substantially at that time. However, since
then the Dutch government has never defaulted on its debt,
resulting in a gradual decline in the default risk premium.
The high yields observed beginning in the late 1960s reﬂect
an increasing inﬂation premium resulting from inﬂationary
pressures in the 1960s and 1970s. The peak in interest rates
reﬂects the Dutch government’s monetary policy actions for
Figure 1.4: Nominal bond yields, 1783-2005
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ﬁghting inﬂation in 1980-1982. The implementation of those
policies resulted in a signiﬁcant reduction in inﬂation, and
has led to a gradual reduction in the inﬂation risk premium.
Table 1.1 shows the mean annual change and volatility of
house prices, rents, bond yields, and consumer prices over
the period from 1650 through 2005. We also provide this in-
formation for various sub-periods identiﬁed as having simi-
lar demographic and economic conditions in the city of Am-
sterdam. The majority of the growth in prices and rents oc-
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curred in the decades afterWorldWar II. In the period before
that, including two world wars and the Great Depression,
real houseprices and rentsﬂuctuatedmore than in anyof the
other sub-periods. Inﬂation during and directly afterWorld
War I ﬁrst halved real values, followed by a unique period of
deﬂation that led both prices and rents to peak in the 1930s.
The sub-period that had the strongest decline in real house
prices andrentswas from1781 to 1814,whichwas theonlyex-
tended period in Amsterdam’s recorded history with a con-
sistently declining population. This period saw real prices
decline on average by approximately 3.9 percent per year (or
-0.0385 in logarithmic terms). In contrast to bubble periods,
we see a 33-year period of sustained price declines, imply-
ing amarket implosion. Interestingly real rents decline also,
but at a slower 1.9 percent per year (or -0.0186 in logarithms)
pace. This evidence clearly contradicts the popular percep-
tion that housing prices only go up, and that even if they do
go down, it will only be for short periods.
Regarding the interest rate, two striking features are evi-
dent in Table 1.1. First is the very high real interest rate from
1815 through 1850. During this period, the real interest rate
averaged over 5 percent per year. This period followed a sus-
tained economic and political crisis, which resulted in a re-
structuring of government debt. As a result, Dutch govern-
ment debt was probably not regarded as risk-free. The sec-
ond striking feature is the extremely low real interest rate for
the post-World War II period. We ﬁnd an average interest
rate of 0.24 percent between 1946 and 1973.
Table 1.2 provides more information regarding the statis-
tical behavior of the indices and sub-indices. This table gives
sources for each of the indices and their components, and
also provides nominal means, standard deviations, and per-
centiles. These statistics show substantial diﬀerences be-
tween sub-indices, so the question is whether this is caused
by diﬀerences in measurement, or by the fact that the sub-
indices reﬂect diﬀerent time periods and market regimes.
We calculated the same statistics for sub-periods before and
after the break points between sub-indices.
Concerning house prices, the statistical moments of the
1965-2005 sub-index diﬀer strongly from those of the 1650-
1965 index. However, the mean and standard deviation for
house price changes between 1945 and 1965 are 0.065 and
0.300, respectively. This mean lies very close to the one for
the 1965-2005period,whichsuggests that this shift inmeans
in not caused by the index break point, but by real underly-
ing changes in the economy. For example, inﬂation became a
structural factor after the SecondWorldWar, which is likely
to have been a cause of higher nominal mean house prices.
On the other hand, the standard deviation between 1945 and
1965 is much higher than in the subsequent period, possibly
reﬂecting measurement error of the index, and the fact that
the level of aggregation switches from a canal in Amsterdam
to the country as a whole.
For rents, Table 1.2 shows that the standard deviations for
each of the three sub-indices are in the same range. When
looking at smaller sub-periods around index change points,
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Table 1.1: Amsterdam’s housing market throughout the centuries
 Period Period characterization 1ln(Price) 1ln(Rent) ln(bond yields) 1ln(CPI)
1650-2005 – 0.0116 0.0111 0.0457 0.0096
(0.1973) (0.0434) (0.0158) (0.0688)
1650-1670 Strong economy, 0.0054 0.0007 - -0.0081
rapid urbanization, expanding city (0.2676) (0.0479) (0.1045)
1671-1720 Economic slowdown, -0.0032 0.0037 - 0.0027
slow population growth (0.2058) (0.0302) (0.0797)
1721-1780 Economic slowdown, 0.0056 0.0013 - 0.0011
stable population (0.1719) (0.0327) (0.0731)
1781-1814 Economic crisis, -0.0293 -0.0094 0.0449 0.0092
shrinking population (0.1911) (0.0620) (0.0181) (0.0812)
1815-1850 Stabilizing economy, 0.0091 0.0034 0.0483 -0.0043
modest population growth (0.1808) (0.0434) (0.0061) (0.0834)
1851-1913 Strong economy, 0.0116 0.0016 0.0361 0.0038
increasing population (0.1219) (0.0396) (0.0051) (0.0339)
1914-1945 Turmoil economy, 0.0082 0.0196 0.039 0.0212
stable population (0.3118) (0.0300) (0.0066) (0.0767)
1946-1973 Economy very strong, 0.0573 0.0571 0.0463 0.0439
increasing population (0.2597) (0.0382) (0.0152) (0.0272)
1974-2005 Strong economy, 0.0594 0.0484 0.0689 0.0344
increasing population (0.0913) (0.0241) (0.0177) (0.0253)
Notes: This table providesmeans and standard deviations (in brackets) of changes in thenatural logarithmsof nominal house prices andhouse rents, aswell as
the nominal interest rate and the consumer price index (CPI). Separation between periods is based on the economic development of Amsterdam, population
growth, and city expansion. Interest rates are available for the period 1796-2005. See Table 1.2 for index sources. For period demarcations seeDeVries (1984),
Van Zanden (1994), Spies et al (1993), De Vries and Van derWoude (1995).
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we also observe that standard deviations do not change
much. For example, Table 1.1 reports that the standard devia-
tion of rent changes for 1851-1913 is 0.0396, while it is 0.0300
for 1914-1945. Themeannominal rent change ismuchhigher
for the period between 1914 and 2005. This is mostly caused
by inﬂation. This suggests that the statistical behavior of
our rent indices changes because of underlying changes in
the economic situation rather than as an artifact of diﬀerent
measurementmethods.
1.4 House prices and fundamentals
In the ﬁrst step of our analysis we investigate the price-rent
ratio in order to calculate potential price deviations from
market fundamentals. Figure 1.5 shows theAmsterdamrent-
price ratio for our complete sampleperiod, aswell as its aver-
age over that period. Obviously, when house prices are high
relative to housing rents, the rent-price ratio is low. Thus,
many market observers conclude that a rent-price ratio far
below its historical average indicates that asset prices have
increased beyond fundamental values (i.e. housing rents) –
suggesting a possible bubble in the housingmarket.
While the rent-price ratio is ameasure of house prices rel-
ative to fundamentals, it does not give a complete picture of
the housing market. For example, the period 1781 through
1815 saw a dramatic rise in the rent-price ratio from 4.6 per-
cent to 11.4 percent, suggesting that prices decreased relative
Figure 1.5: Rent-price ratio, 1650-2005
0% 
2% 
4% 
6% 
8% 
10% 
12% 
14% 
1825 1850 1875 1900 1925 1950 1975 2000 
observed rent/price ratio average rent/price ratio 
Notes: Information on both rents and prices are available for only very few
houses and years at the same time in our sample, so we do not observe the
rent-price ratio directly. We therefore rescale the aggregated rent-price ra-
tio based on the rent and house price indices to 4.5 percent in 2001, which is
theannual rental yielddirect returnonDutchresidential real estate as stated
in the ROZ/IPD index for this year (ROZ, 2007).
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Table 1.2: Description of data sources and selected time series properties for (sub-)indices
Index Years Scope Source Mean Std. 5th P. 95th P.
House prices 1 ln(price index)
1650-1965 Herengracht A’dam Eichholtz (1997) 0.0060 0.2067 -0.3400 0.3450
1965-2005 National NVM (2008) 0.0555 0.0843 -0.0981 0.2187
Rents 1 ln(rent index)
1650-1850 Amsterdam Eichholtz & Theebe (2007) 0.0004 0.0419 -0.0678 0.0564
1850-1913 Amsterdam Van Riel (2006) 0.0016 0.0394 -0.0629 0.0842
1914-2005 National CBS (1993; 1948; 1999; 2008) 0.0411 0.0345 -0.0062 0.0982
Bond yields ln(bond yields)
1783-1795 Province of Holland Own calc. based on van Zanden
(2000)
0.0300 0.0040 0.0251 0.0402
1796-1813 Amsterdam Amsterdam Stock Exchange Oﬃ-
cial Price List
0.0546 0.0171 0.0409 0.1014
1814-1955 National Eichholtz & Koedijk (1996) 0.0398 0.0080 0.0295 0.0556
1956-2005 National CBS (2010b) 0.0636 0.0177 0.0400 0.0899
Consumer price index (CPI) 1 ln(CPI)
1650-1850 Amsterdam Nusteling (1985) 0.0009 0.0810 -0.1261 0.1301
1850-1899 Amsterdam Van Riel (2006) 0.0001 0.0356 -0.0455 0.0543
1900-2005 National CBS (2010a) 0.0304 0.0479 -0.0387 0.1080
Notes: All numbers in nominal terms.
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to rents. However, during this period, rents and prices both
declined at relatively similar rates: -3.9 percent and -1.9 per-
cent, respectively. Thus, even with this small diﬀerence in
relative declines, the rent-price ratio changed substantially.
In addition, another important observation to be made
from Figure 1.5 is that the rent-price ratio has deviated from
its long-run average for substantial periods of time. For ex-
ample, the ratio is below the long-run average formost of the
eighteenth century, and above it for the ﬁrst 60 years of the
nineteenth century. Clearly, the graph suggests that a de-
viation of the rent-price ratio from its own average is not a
guarantee for a quick reversion to the average. In the last 75
years, the ratio has been rather volatile, especially so during
the middle decades of the twentieth century. We note that
in the last 20 years, the Amsterdam rent-price ratio has de-
clined, but still remains within historical range.5
Our analysis builds on the methods employed by Camp-
bell and Shiller (1988 and 2001), Brunnermeier and Julliard
(2008), and Campbell et al (2009). This approach is based
on the present value model: the former two papers have
dividends and interest rates as the fundamentals underly-
ing stock prices, whereas the latter two papers use rents and
interest rates as fundamentals for house prices. Of course
underlying dividends, rents and interest rates are them-
5We formally test for the presence of unit roots in the rent and price indices.
TheDickey-Fuller test statistics are reported in the appendix. They indicate
that both series contain unit roots and are thus non-stationary. The ﬁrst
diﬀerences, however, are stationary.
selves resting on deeper foundations, like economic devel-
opment, demographics, technological change, and wars and
other disasters. However, the method used by these authors
assumes that interest rates and rents (or dividends) capture
those fundamentals. As in Campbell et al (2009), we de-
ﬁne the gross return on housing (Rh) over the period from
t to t + 1 as a function of the price of housing (P ) and the
rental payment (L):
Rh;t+1 =
Pt+1 + Lt+1
Pt
(1.2)
Taking logs and assuming the rent-price ratio is stationary,
we can express (2) as
lt   pt = k + Et
" 1X
j=0
jrh;t+1+j  
1X
j=0
jlt+1+j
#
(1.3)
where rh;t is the log return to housing, pt is the log house
price, lt is the log rent,lt+1 is lt+1 lt, isdeﬁnedas 11+e(l p)
with

l   p

the long-run average rent-price ratio, and k is a
constant of linearization that equals
 
1    1ln + 1  


ln
 
1
 1

. Campbell et al (2009) show that by deﬁning the
return to housing as a function of an interest rate and a risk
premium (rh = i + h), the rent-price ratio can be decom-
posed into three components consisting of the discounted
expected future real interest rates, the discounted expected
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future rent growth, and the discounted housing risk pre-
mium. Thus, the rent-price ratio is expressed as:
lt   pt = k +
1X
=1
 1E^t[it+ ] +
1X
=1
 1E^t[h;t+ ]
 
1X
=1
 1E^t[lt+ ]
(1.4)
where E^t is the conditional expectation computed from a -
period VAR forecast.
For each year between 1785 and 2005, we compute lt   pt
using the Amsterdam house price and rent indices scaled
to the 2002 ratio of 4.5 percent.6 At each period t, we cal-
culate the average rent-price ratio over the prior 40-years
(t   1 to t   40) as an approximation of

l   p

. We then
calculate  and k for each year based on our

l   p

approxi-
mation. Weapproximate thediscountedexpected future rent
growth, discounted expected future housing risk premium,
and discounted expected real interest rate in (4) for each year
t based on 40-year forecasts for each variable obtained from
the maximum likelihood estimation of a VAR(1) model over
6We cannot observe the rent-price ratio directly, as information on both
rents andprices are available foronlyvery fewhouses andyears at the same
time in our sample. We therefore rescale the aggregated rent-price ratio
based on indices to 4.5 percent in 2001, which is the rental yield for that
year onDutch residential real estate as stated in theROZ/IPD index for this
year (ROZ, 2007). We ﬁnd our results to be robust for diﬀerent scales.
the period t   1 to t   40. We chose a lag of 1 based on the
Schwarz’Bayesian InformationCriterion (SBIC) for theover-
all data series. Besides, we checked the robustness of our re-
sults under severalVARspeciﬁcations, changing thenumber
of lags and the time period on which the VAR is based. This
did not markedly change the results.
Table 1.3 gives an overview of our VAR estimation results.
For 181 years (Panel A: 1825-2005), we estimate VARmodels
based on information from a 40 year rolling window. The
forecasting models cover the real interest rate (i), the hous-
ing risk premium (), and the change in real rents (l). The
ﬁrst section summarizes the coeﬃcients for the real interest
rate forecast model:
it = 0 + iit 1 + t 1 + llt 1 + t; (1.5)
while the second section describes the housing premia
forecast model:
t = 0 + iit 1 + t 1 + llt 1 + t: (1.6)
The results from the real rent change forecast model:
lt = 0 + iit 1 + t 1 + llt 1 + t (1.7)
are displayed in the bottom section. Columns 1, 2, and 3 dis-
play the inter-quartile values for the estimated coeﬃcients
for it 1,t 1,lt 1, respectively. Column 4 displays the re-
sults of theWald test that none of the included regressors ex-
plains the dependent variable and the last column shows the
distribution of theR2 measure of model ﬁt.
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The performance of our VAR models is surprisingly good
when compared to studies based onmodern data. For exam-
ple, the R2 statistics reported in Table 1.3 are about half of
the values reported by Campbell et al (2009), whoworkwith
data on housingmarkets in U.S. metropolitan areas covering
the years 1975-2007 and employ additionalmacro-economic
variables that are not available with older data. In addition,
we see that over half of the yearly estimated VAR models
haveWald statistics that denote statistical signiﬁcance at the
5 percent level, indicating thatwe can reject the null hypoth-
esis that none of the model factors explain the dependent
variable in over half of the years.
Weﬁnd that the coeﬃcients for the ﬁrst lag of the variable
have (on average) the highest statistical signiﬁcance. Bond
yields in year t, for instance, are mainly driven by bond
yields in period t   1. For example, we ﬁnd that 50 percent
of the yearly estimated coeﬃcients for i are signiﬁcant at
the 5 percent level. In contrast, rents and prices do not have
a strong impact with 0.6 percent and 7 percent of the yearly
coeﬃcients for l and  signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level,
respectively. In the second section of Panel A we also note
that interest rates are an important factor impactinghousing
premia (), which again is in linewithpreviouswork. For ex-
ample, we see that 32 percent of thei yearly estimated coef-
ﬁcients are signiﬁcant at the5percent level. Wealsoﬁnd that
the lagged housing premium has a signiﬁcant impact on the
current housing premium with 78 percent of the yearly es-
timated coeﬃcients for  signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
LikeCaseandShiller (1989, 1990)weﬁnd thepredictabilityof
housing returns in the opposite direction. In our data, hous-
ing excess returns are reverting to their mean, as indicated
bynegative coeﬃcients for its laggedvalues. Throughout the
centuries, the coeﬃcients on the lagged housing premium
arebecoming lessnegative. In the last 10yearsof our sample,
the coeﬃcients turn positive, reconciling our ﬁndings with
studies onmodern data.
Table 1.3 also reports results for two sub-periods (from
1825 through 1915 and from1916until 2005) to investigate the
possible role of rent control in our results; theﬁrst period re-
ﬂects completely free rental markets, while the other covers
the regulatedperiod. The introductionof rent control altered
the predictability of changes in rents. In our “free” century
(1825-1915), changes in rents were hardly predictable. For
example, the coeﬃcients for lagged values of rent changes
(l) are negative and only signiﬁcant at the 5 percent con-
ﬁdence level in 7 out of 91 years. In addition, the median
R2 for this model is 11 percent. In contrast, during the sub-
set 1916-2005, the presence of rent control links the nom-
inal rents to changes in CPI and thereby transmits the au-
toregressive properties of the inﬂation time series to rents.
As a result, in the third section of Panel C we note that the
coeﬃcients for lagged changes in rents (l) become posi-
tive and statistically more signiﬁcant with 29 percent of the
yearly coeﬃcients being statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 per-
cent level. Furthermore, the median R2 for this model in-
creases to 33 percent.
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Table 1.3: Summary of VAR estimation results
Dependent variable Coeﬃcient estimates p-value R2 
it 1 t 1 lt 1 (Wald)
Panel A: 1825-2005
it 25th percentile 0.344 -0.049 -0.137 0 0.127
Median 0.459 -0.015 0.016 0.007 0.235
75th percentile 0.577 0.002 0.095 0.121 0.332
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.503 0.072 0.006 0.564 NA
t 25th percentile -1.531 -0.529 -0.021 0 0.118
Median -1.120 -0.399 0.318 0.008 0.229
75th percentile -0.577 -0.304 0.867 0.148 0.340
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.320 0.779 0.155 0.613 NA
lt 25th percentile 0.062 -0.053 -0.214 0 0.103
Median 0.194 -0.018 0.03 0.035 0.177
75th percentile 0.379 0.016 0.438 0.204 0.331
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.127 0.133 0.182 0.519 NA
Panel B: 1825-1915
it 25th percentile 0.295 -0.112 -0.241 0.066 0.107
Median 0.366 -0.048 -0.115 0.119 0.128
75th percentile 0.469 -0.023 0.041 0.187 0.153
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.484 0.088 0.011 0.154 NA
t 25th percentile -1.281 -0.577 0.128 0 0.232
Median -0.858 -0.522 0.343 0.001 0.286
75th percentile -0.366 -0.396 0.839 0.007 0.394
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.429 0.967 0.264 0.912 NA
lt 25th percentile -0.005 -0.116 -0.26 0.070 0.095
Median 0.171 -0.048 -0.18 0.169 0.112
75th percentile 0.440 0.052 -0.049 0.239 0.15
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.165 0.253 0.077 0.187 NA
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Dependent variable Coeﬃcient estimates p-value R2 
it 1 t 1 lt 1 (Wald)
Panel C: 1916-2005
it 25th percentile 0.441 -0.013 -0.021 0 0.267
Median 0.537 -0.003 0.047 0 0.327
75th percentile 0.641 0.018 0.118 0.002 0.431
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.522 0.056 0 0.978 NA
t 25th percentile -2.268 -0.401 -0.122 0.018 0.096
Median -1.391 -0.309 0.185 0.138 0.121
75th percentile -0.810 -0.236 1.078 0.233 0.202
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.211 0.589 0.044 0.311 NA
lt 25th percentile 0.086 -0.03 0.105 0 0.252
Median 0.197 -0.005 0.438 0 0.331
75th percentile 0.320 0.009 0.529 0.004 0.407
Frac. of years sig. at 5% 0.089 0.011 0.289 0.856 NA
Notes: For 181 years (1825-2005), we estimate aVARmodel based on information froma40 year rollingwindow. The forecastingmodels cover the real interest
rate i, the housing risk premium, and the change in real rentsl. The ﬁrst panel summarizes the coeﬃcients on the real interest rate forecast model it =
0+iit 1+t 1+llt 1+t,while the secondpaneldescribes thehousingpremia forecastmodelt 1 = 0+iit 1+t 1+llt 1+t.
The results from the real rent change forecastmodellt 1 = 0+iit 1+t 1+llt 1+ t are displayed in the bottompanel. Column4 displays
the results of theWald test that none of the included regressors explains the dependent variable. The last column shows the distribution of theR2 measure
of model ﬁt.
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Based on our estimates of the fundamental values driving
the rent-price ratio, we calculate the pricing error as
t = (lt   pt) 

~kt +~it + ~t   ~lt

(1.8)
where ~kt, ~it, ~t, ~lt denote our calculated approximations
of the constant of linearization, the future real rate, future
housing risk premium, and future rental growth, respec-
tively. This pricing error represents the price deviations
from fundamentals and is the focus of our subsequent anal-
ysis.
Figure 1.6 shows that the theoretical rent-price ratio based
on fundamentals follows the actual rent-price ratio through
time. The correlation between annual changes of observed
and fundamental rent-price ratios is 0.19. However, the es-
timated correlations increase for shorter intervals. For ex-
ample, over the period prior to 1916 the correlation between
theobservedand fundamental rent-price ratios is0.56. How-
ever, in the second period (1916-2005), the correlation drops
to -0.11. As a result, we see that the fundamentals-based ra-
tio is less volatile during the crisis years of the inter-bellum,
both in year to year changes and in long-term swings.
Figure 1.7 depicts thediﬀerencebetween the rent-price ra-
tio and its theoretical counterpart. This graph shows that
prices (or rents) can deviate from fundamentals for extended
periods of time. For example, throughout the second half of
the 19th century, thepricing errorwas continuouslynegative,
indicating that actual rents were lower or the actual prices
Figure 1.6: Rent-price ratio and theoretical counterpart based on fun-
damentals
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 
1X
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 1E^t
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i
where rh;t is the log return to housing, pt is the log house price, lt is the log
rent,lt+ is lt+   lt,  is deﬁned aswith the long-run average rent-price
ratio, and k is a constant of linearization that equals
 
1  1ln + 1 


ln
 
1
 1

. E^t is the conditional expectation computed from a -period
VAR forecast
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higher than predicted by our model. Starting with World
War I, a period of ﬁnancial turbulences left its mark both
on the actual rent-price ratio and on its fundamental coun-
terpart. During World War I, The Netherlands ﬁrst experi-
enced a period of strong inﬂation, followed by deﬂation in
the early 1920s and during the early 1930s, again followed by
inﬂation in the late 1930s and 1940s. For both series, volatil-
ity shoots up, caused by huge swings in house prices and in-
ﬂation.7 In these uncertain times, house prices seem to be
more depressed than fundamentals suggest, indicating that
investors attached a substantial discount to long term invest-
ments like housing.
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century the
magnitude of themispricing declines as the distortions from
the turbulent (inter)war periods fade out. Alternating peri-
ods of relative over-/underpricing of homes with regard to
fundamentals can be observed. For example, in the 1970s,
home prices appreciate much more than suggested, as low
after-tax mortgage costs diminished in real terms through
high inﬂation. This bubble lasts for a few years only. Resi-
dential real estate investors’ exuberance tips over when real
interest rates increase sharply in the 1980s as the target-
ing of inﬂation becomes a prime concern of the monetary
policy. The rent-price ratio not only returns to its funda-
mental value, but overshoots in the following years, indicat-
7In the actual rent-price ratio series, the direct impact of changes in the CPI
cancelsout. Expectationson futurechanges, however, are still incorporated
into prices and to a lesser extent into rents.
Figure 1.7: Rent-price ratio error  in logs, 1825-2005
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Notes: The rent-price ratio error represents the price deviations from funda-
mentals and is calculated as
t =
 
lt   pt
   ~kt + ~it + ~t   ~lt;
Where ~kt, ~it, ~t, ~lt denote our calculated approximations of the constant
of linearization, the future real rate, future housing risk premium, and fu-
ture rental growth, respectively.
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ing depressed market sentiments. From 1993 onwards, the
rent-price ratio remains constantly below its fundamental
counterpart, which suggests that the steep increase in house
prices in the last decademay not be sustainable in the longer
run.
1.5 Adjustment mechanisms
Since continuously negative or positive pricing errors have
occurred over the varying time frames, the question emerges
as to whether prices or rents will correct to eliminate the
mispricing. Step three of our analysis deals with this ques-
tion and investigates the rent-price ratio adjustment mech-
anism.
Following Gallin (2008), we estimate the following vector
error correctionmodel:
yt = A0yt 1 + A1yt 1 + Axt 1 + t (1.9)
where yt is deﬁned as

ln(R) ln(P )
0
, and xt 1 includes ex-
ogenous variables inﬂuencingyt. MatrixA0 represents the
product of the cointegration vector and the matrix contain-
ing the error correction coeﬃcients (Gallin 2008). We for-
mally test for the existence of a cointegration vector for the
price and rent series and whether it is diﬀerent from (1 -1).
We ﬁnd no evidence for the cointegration vector to diﬀer
from (1 -1), which is in linewith theory and allows for amore
eﬃcient estimation of the model. Since a positive (negative)
error correction coeﬃcient for prices implies that priceswill
decrease (increase) when the current rent-price ratio is low
relative to the long run average, and vice versa for rents: a
positive coeﬃcient suggests falling (increasing) rents when
the rent-price ratio is relatively low (high).
Table 1.4 reports the estimated error correction coeﬃ-
cients for the full time-period as well as the rent-controlled
(1916-2005) and non-regulated (1650-1915) periods. In gen-
eral, we see that the error correction coeﬃcients for prices
are statistically and economically more signiﬁcant than the
coeﬃcients for rents. For example, the estimated error cor-
rection coeﬃcients for the 1650-2005 period is positive and
signiﬁcant (at the 1 percent level) for prices but is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant for rents. However, we do see that for the
sub-period 1916-2005, both estimated coeﬃcients are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level with prices being
positive and rents being negative. Thus, the results indi-
cate that when prices diverge from fundamentals both rents
and prices can be the mechanism for restoring equilibrium.
However, the absolute magnitude of the price coeﬃcients is
6 to 7 times higher than the size of the rent coeﬃcients. As a
result, we conclude that rents and prices do adjust to imbal-
ances, and, consistent with Gallin (2008), our results show
that prices appear to adjust more than rents. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd that the prominent role of prices in the error correc-
tion process becomes even stronger in the years 1916-2005,
when rent regulation hinders rental adjustments.
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Table 1.4: Error correction coeﬃcients for real rents and real prices
Time period Error correction coeﬃcients
 ln(P )  ln(R)
1650-2005 0:154  0:023
(0:042) (0:017)
1650-1915 0:134  0:054
(0:068) (0:032)
1916-2005 0:182  0:038
(0:073) (0:015)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance of coef-
ﬁcient at the 10%, 5%, 1% conﬁdence level.
The signs of all error correction coeﬃcients are in line with expectations.
For prices, the error correction coeﬃcients are statistically and economi-
cally more signiﬁcant than the coeﬃcients for rents. This means that devi-
ations in the rent-price ratio aremostly corrected for by price adjustments,
not changes in rents. The role of prices in the error correction becomes even
stronger in the years 1916-2005, when rent regulation hinders rent adjust-
ments.
Overall, the results indicate that our key ﬁnding holds in
both periods. That is, when the rent-price ratio indicates a
disequilibrium situation, this disequilibriummaypersist for
a long timebeforeprices and rents correct. Furthermore, our
analysis suggests thatwhen they do converge, priceswill ad-
just faster than rents.
1.6 Conclusions
One of the primary problems associatedwith identifying the
presence of pricing bubbles in asset markets is the lack of
suﬃciently long time-horizon data. Thus, the purpose of
this paper is to utilize a 355-year time series of real house
prices and rents to investigate whether substantial devia-
tions ofmarket prices away frommarket fundamental values
can persist.
Our analysis consisted of two parts. First, we esti-
mated a measure of housing market mispricing based on
the relationship between market fundamentals (expected
rent growth and expected house price appreciation) and the
price-rent ratio. Second, we investigated the link between
the rent-price ratio and changes in rents and house prices
over various time horizons.
Several lessons can be learned from our analysis. First,
house prices and rents are cointegrated, indicating that the
same underlying fundamentals likely inﬂuence both. Sec-
ond, our analysis of the rent-price ratio reveals sustained
periods of “bubble” and “crisis” conditions that can con-
tinue without a corresponding correction (or crash). Third,
our analysis shows that changes in house prices and rents
are both mechanisms for “correcting” imbalances between
prices and fundamentals. Between these, prices appear to
have greater importance in correcting disequilibria.
Based on these ﬁndings, our investigation into the long-
rundevelopments of house prices and rents has implications
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for the ongoing debate concerning the recent price increases
and subsequent corrections inmany of the worldwide hous-
ing markets. While it appears that many markets have had
bubble characteristics, our study shows that bubble crashes
arenot always inevitable in the short run. Whilepricesdo re-
vert back to fundamentals, this reversion may take decades.
So the move towards equilibrium may be more a fading out
than a crash. Recently,markets likeAmsterdam, Cape Town,
and Paris that have been characterized by strong price gains
in the last decade and were widely thought of as overvalued,
have nevertheless kept their value, while other markets ex-
perienced a free fall.
One of the implications of this analysis is that it is decid-
edly diﬃcult to knowwhen, or even if, an asset price bubble
will collapse. The results suggest that it is unwise to use per-
fect hindsight to criticize lenders who originated mortgages
at the peak of the market and subsequently suﬀered signif-
icant losses due to borrower defaults since historical trends
showthat it ispossible forpricebubbles to slowlydeﬂateover
long periods such that the losses may not have occurred. Fi-
nally, our results imply that lengthy periods of little or no
house price appreciation are also possible. Thus, those look-
ing for a speedy recovery in the housingmarket after the cri-
sis may be disappointed.
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Appendix
VAR Results in graphs
Thegraphs inFigure 1.8provideplots of theyearly individual
coeﬃcients (and 95 percent conﬁdence interval) for the VAR
models (5), (6), and (7).
Testing for Stationarity
Weusemarket rents and interest rates as proxies for housing
fundamentals. Theﬁrst step is todetermine if the two indices
are stationary using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. A
series is considered non-stationary if it contains a unit root.
We follow David Dickey andWayne A. Fuller (1981) to deter-
mine the existence of a unit root and therefore whether the
series is stationary. The Dickey-Fuller test requires estimat-
ing the following autoregressive (AR(p)) process for the rent
(L) and price (P ) series:
yt = + 
yt 1 + 1yt 1 + 

2yt 2
+ : : :+ p 1yt p+1 + ut
(1.10)
where yt denotes the rent and price series, respectively, and
 = (1 + 2 + : : : + p)   1. The rent and price series
contain a unit root (and arenon-stationary) ifwe fail to reject
the null hypothesis that  = 1 by comparing the estimated
DF t-statistic to the critical values obtained from theDickey-
Fuller distribution.
Table 1.5 reports the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test
statistics for the rent and price series. Based on the ADF
statistics, we conﬁrm that both series contain unit roots and
thus are non-stationary. We repeat the test using ﬁrst diﬀer-
ences of each series (Table 1.6), and ﬁnd that we are able to
reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity.
The choice of lag-length when estimating the augmented
Dickey-Fuller equation is not exact. Thus, we also test for
unit roots using the Phillips-Perron non-parametric proce-
dure (Peter Phillips and Pierre Perron, 1998), which corrects
for autocorrelation. Tables 1.5 and 1.6 also report thePhillips-
Perron test statistics, which conﬁrm the presence of unit
roots.
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Figure 1.8: Yearly VAR coeﬃcient estimates and 95% conﬁdence intervals
it, it 1 it, t 1 it, lt 1
-.5
-.5
0
0
.5
.5
1
1
.5
1.
5
coefficient
co
ef
fic
ien
t
800
1800
5
1850
9
1900 1950
20
2000
year
year
-.4
-.4
2
-.2
0
0
.2
.2
coefficient
co
ef
fic
ien
t
1800
1800
5
1850
9
1900 1950
20
2000
year
year
-1
-1
.5
-.5
0
0
.5
.5
1
1
coefficient
co
ef
fic
ien
t
800
1800
5
1850
9
1900 1950
20
2000
year
year
t, it 1 t, t 1 t, lt 1
-6
-6
4
-4
2
-2
0
0
2
2
4
4
coefficient
co
ef
fic
ien
t
1800
1800
5
1850
9
1900 1950
0
2000
year
year
-1
-1
.5
-.5
0
0
.5
.5
1
1
coefficient
co
ef
fic
ien
t
800
1800
5
1850
9
1900 1950
20
2000
year
year
-2
-2
0
0
2
2
4
4
6
6
coefficient
co
ef
fic
ien
t
1800
1800
5
1850
9
1900 1950
0
2000
year
year
lt, it 1 lt, t 1 lt, lt 1
-1
-1
.5
-.5
0
0
.5
.5
1
1
.5
1.
5
coefficient
co
ef
fic
ien
t
800
1800
5
1850
9
1900 1950
20
2000
year
year
-.4
-.4
2
-.2
0
0
.2
.2
4
.4
coefficient
co
ef
fic
ien
t
1800
1800
5
1850
9
1900 1950
20
2000
year
year
-1
-1
.5
-.5
0
0
.5
.5
1
1
.5
1.
5
coefficient
co
ef
fic
ien
t
800
1800
5
1850
9
1900 1950
20
2000
year
year
44
CHAPTER 1. HOUSE PRICES AND FUNDAMENTALS
Table 1.5: Unit root tests for levels of real rent and house price indices
Lag ln(Rents) ln(Prices) ln(Price/Rent)
ADF PP ADF PP ADF PP
1 6,44 7,32 0,79 0,24 -4,36 -5,58
(0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.0005) (0.0001)
2 5,81 7,18 1,28 0,57 -3,59 -5,46
(0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.0067) (0.0001)
3 5,58 7,17 1,76 0,86 -3,06 -5,44
(0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.0315) (0.0001)
4 4,6 7,04 1,92 0,99 -2,91 -5,56
(0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.0461) (0.0001)
5 3,7 6,83 2,04 1,09 -2,75 -5,68
(0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.0667) (0.0001)
6 3,55 6,68 1,59 1,01 -3,01 -5,89
(0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.9999) (0.0358) (0.0001)
Notes: For each series we present the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and
Phillips-Perron (PP) test statistics for 1-6 lags. Numbers in parentheses are
asymptotic p-values.
Table 1.6: Unit root tests for ﬁrst diﬀerences of real rent and house
price indices
Lag ln(Rents) ln(Prices)
ADF PP ADF PP
1 -10,08 -15,35 -17,42 -26,7
(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
2 -8,14 -15,47 -14,35 -27,39
(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
3 -6,17 -15,58 -11,57 -28,08
(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
4 -4,89 -15,77 -9,97 -28,48
(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
5 -4,38 -16,03 -7,76 -28,62
(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
6 -3,62 -16,27 -7,54 -28,48
(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
Notes:For each series we present the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and
Phillips-Perron (PP) test statistics for 1-6 lags. Numbers in parentheses are
asymptotic p-values.
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Chapter 2
Real Option Value and the Long TermDynamics of House Prices
This chapter is joint work with
JohnM. Clapp (University of Connecticut) and
Piet Eichholtz (Maastricht University).
2.1 Introduction
To understand the eﬀects of real option value on the dynam-
ics of houseprices, oneneeds to focus attentionon the option
embedded in existing dwellings. The literature regarding the
valueof the redevelopmentoptionanalyzesvacant land,1 but
for existing dwellings, option value derives from the possi-
bility to add space, or to demolish and rebuild.
1See, for example, Titman (1985), Quigg (1993), Capozza and Li (1994) and
Capozza and Sick (1994).
The literature has developed a standard hedonic speciﬁca-
tion valuing houses and other real assets (Rosen, 1974). This
model considers thevalueof the existingvectorof asset char-
acteristics, omitting explicit consideration of any value from
the option to redevelop the property to a level consistent
with current expectations for house prices.2 It is our con-
tention that housingmarket changes from boom to bust will
alter the value of the option to tear down and rebuild or sub-
stantially renovate the existing structure.3
2Rosen speciﬁcally excluded the value of durable assets from his theory
(1974, p. 37).
3Note the asymmetry in option value during rising and falling markets.
During declining markets, owners have little choice except to allow their
properties to deteriorate, slowly reducing their investment: See Glaeser
and Gyourko (2005) for extensive discussion of the asymmetry. Wemodel
the call option (i.e. , the redevelopment option) rather than the put option
(i.e. , the abandonment option).
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In order to investigate how option value drives the prices
of existing homes, we combine insights from the hedonic
pricing literature with real option value. We use a model in
which the value of the redevelopment option is an additive
term in a standard hedonic speciﬁcation.4 In eﬀect, the re-
development option is an option to change the vector of he-
donic characteristics of a dwelling.
We propose that option value is a positive function of the
unrealizeddevelopmentpotential of the lot,measuredby the
maximum structure allowed by zoning relative to the exist-
ing structure. If the existing conﬁguration of the dwelling
and the land it stands on is close to the optimum, then the
strike price of the option is high because the use value of the
existing vector is exchanged for the value of the new conﬁg-
uration. In this case, the value of the redevelopment option
is low. Similarly, a small old house in a neighborhood with
larger newer housesmay have substantial option value.
We use a new database to document changes in real op-
tion values, analyzing their role in the pricing of the West
Berlin housing market. Existing empirical tests of real op-
tion theory focus on cross sectional data. For an understand-
ing of the inﬂuence of real option value on the dynamics of
houseprices, a longer termperspective is required. OurWest
Berlin data cover theperiod from1978 through2007. Besides
that, there are twoother reasonswhy these data are uniquely
ﬁt to study the eﬀect of real option value on the price behav-
4Speciﬁcally, we provide a closed form solution to the model developed in
Clapp and Salavei (2009) and we add drift in house prices.
ior of existing homes.
First, our dataset of Berlin’s residential real estate sales not
only provides transaction prices, location and a – limited –
set of hedonic characteristics, but it also covers the degree of
existing development for each dwelling, and the maximum
development permitted by zoning, which allows for the as-
sessment of the option value to redevelop existing dwellings.
By employing this database, this paper is theﬁrst to use zon-
ing limits for an empirical estimate of the real option value
embedded in existing dwellings.
Second, during the 30 years covered by the database the
city of Berlin experienced signiﬁcant political and economic
volatility, with important consequences for the West Berlin
housingmarket. During the threedecades from1978 through
2007 theWest Berlin housing market has experienced three
very diﬀerent phases of relative tranquility, boom and bust,
which are likely to have aﬀected option values in an econom-
ically signiﬁcant way.
Berlinwas a focal point of theColdWarwhen thatwas still
in its early stages, but after 1961, when the Wall was con-
structed, West Berlin experienced a period of relative tran-
quility and prosperity. Sealed oﬀ from its direct surround-
ings by the iron curtain, protected byNATO against external
threats, and ﬁnanced by generous transfer payments from
West Germany, the lucky western part of the divided city
lived a quiet but comfortable life. This situation continued
until 1989. Ourdata show that houseprices between 1978 and
1989grewsteadilybyanaverageof 1.9percentperyear in real
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terms.
The quiet period ended abruptly and unexpectedly with
the collapse of the communist rule in Eastern and Central
Europe. Germany experienced three major political shocks
during a three year period, popularly called the Big Bang
period: the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the reuniﬁcation
of East and West Germany in 1990, and the decision to re-
turn the federal government to Berlin in 1991. In Berlin,
these events set inmotiona real estateboom, both inhousing
and in commercial real estate. The real estate boom, which
peaked in 1994, is clearly visible in our data, which show that
home prices markedly accelerated in the years just after the
fall of the Wall in 1989, with real prices rising by an average
of 4.6 percent per year for ﬁve years.
This boom ended just as the federal government started to
move to Berlin in 1994. This move coincided with the pin-
nacle of the housing market boom, and the housing market
went into a long-lasting decline after that. During the 13
years after 1994 the cumulative decline in real house prices
was 45 percent, or 2.9 percent annually.
Themain contribution of this paper is to give an insight in
the extent to which real option value has exacerbated these
swings in house prices: this study is the ﬁrst to document
the substantial role played by option value in long-runhous-
ingmarket volatility. For the boom period between 1989 and
1994, our results for houseswithhighoptionvalue show that
increases in the redevelopment option value added about
40 percent to the growth in the real value. In the subse-
quent bust, about 50 percent of the decline in the real value
of these high option value houseswas associatedwith reduc-
tions in their option value. But also for houses with low op-
tion value, the economic contribution of changes in option
value appears to be important, and especially so in the bust
phase of the cycle: 12 percent of the decline in real value can
be attributed to changing real option value. This suggests
that option value ampliﬁes the long-term price swing of ex-
isting dwellings.
This paper proceeds with a section introducing the theo-
retical model we use for the analysis. It subsequently tells
the story of the Berlin housingmarket in its urban economic
setting, and provides details of the datawe use. The next sec-
tion provides the framework for the empirical analysis, and
the section after that presents the empirical results, starting
with the presentation of a constant-quality house price in-
dex forBerlin, subsequentlypresenting coeﬃcient estimates
for the hedonics and the redevelopment option, and ending
with a calculation of the economic signiﬁcance of the rede-
velopment option in the diﬀerent phases of the Berlin hous-
ing market cycle. The paper ends with a summary and con-
cluding section.
2.2 Methodology
The model we propose is a standard hedonic model with an
additive redevelopment option value term: i.e. , house value
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consists of use value plus option value. Intuitively, when ex-
isting houses trade, a lump sum for the redevelopment op-
tion value is embedded in the price. The option value term is
motivated by the possibility of tearing down and rebuilding,
or substantially remodeling and adding to the house, modi-
fying the vector of hedonic characteristics.
2.2.1 Embedded Option Value
This section develops a simple hedonic model where market
participants pay for the use value of the existing vector of
characteristics and additionally for the option to redevelop
to a diﬀerent vector. The model provides a framework for
specifying a regression capable of separately identifying the
amount paid for the option and the amount paid for use of
the existing vector.5 As shown here, the main empirical im-
plication of the option value framework is that an additive
nonlinear term is needed for option value.
Our theory is based on a certainty model: i.e. , there is no
underlying stochastic process. Grenadier (1999 and 2002)
motivates our use of the certainty model as a starting point:
the NPV rule may be more empirically relevant than the
5Earlier real options theorydevelopedbyRosenthal andHelsley (1994) deals
with the case where the structure is valueless; only land value (i.e. , option
value) remains. Quigg (1993) uses construction costs and assumed param-
eters with an option value formula to back out the option component from
the value of vacant land. She uses the hedonic model only to estimate the
value of an optimal structure.
value arising from the variance of the underlying stochastic
process.
In the certainty model, option value is generated by irre-
versibility,whichoccurs because it is costly to change thehe-
donic vector. Consider a vector of property characteristics
q0i that changes only by depreciation until the owner decides
to redevelop – i.e. exercise a one-time call option at cost k,
the construction costs associated with the redevelopment.6
This is an exchange option: at time T , the depreciated vec-
tor q0i e T is exchanged for a new structure characterized by
the vector qni . The discount rate is  and spot implicit rental
rates are denoted by the vector r, which grows exponentially
at rate   0.7 To keep the model simple, the new vector
is predetermined, not optimally chosen. Then the hedonic
model with a redevelopment option becomes:
Pi = r
0q0i
t=1Z
t
e(  )t+
max

r0qni
t=1Z
t=T
e(  )tdt  r0q0i e T
t=1Z
t=T
e( )tdt  ke T ; 0

+i
(2.1)
6Depreciation is a scalarmultiplied by each element of the rent vector. Like-
wise, change in implicit market rents will be modeled with a scalar multi-
plied by each element of the rent vector.
7I.e. , each element of the vector of implicit rents grows at the same expo-
nential rate. Finite expected returns, and option value  0, require that
1 >  >  > 0.
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The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of equation (2.1) is the
value of the existing vector (i.e. , the use value of the prop-
erty); this is the only term included in the standard hedonic
model. The term subject to maximization is the value of the
option to redevelop.8 This exchange option – i.e. , exchange
of the depreciated vector of characteristics for a new one – is
exercised at some time T .9 The last term is the present value
of the cost of the exchange.
Notation canbe simpliﬁedwith the scalar values in today’s
money of the old vector of characteristics, v0i and the new
vector, vni :
v0i =
r0q0i
+     ; v
n
i =
r0qni
+     (2.2)
As shown in the appendix, equation (2.1) can be rewritten as:
Pi = v
0
i+
max

e( )T vni   e(  )T v0i
+    
  
  ke T ; 0+ i
(2.3)
A cross-sectional hedonic model with option value is an
estimate of equation (2.3) at time t = 0, when everything
8Further explanation of a certainty model similar to this one can be found
on page 138 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994); page 146 adds uncertainty in the
context of Tobin’s q. Rosenthal and Helsley (1994), use a stochastic model
that allowsmultiple redevelopment options to derive a similar equation.
9Anecessarybutnot suﬃcient condition for positive optionvalue is r0

qni  
q0i e
 T  > 0.
is known except T , which is optimally chosen. Assuming
T  > 0, the ﬁrst order condition is:
vni e
( )T = v0i e
(  )T

+    
  
2
+k


(  )

e T

(2.4)
At the time of redevelopment (T  = 0) the two terms on
the right hand side diﬀer from the NPV rule by themultipli-
ers

+ 
 

> 1 and


 

> 1. These multipliers give the
amount bywhich the value of the renovated property diﬀers
from the strike (= v0i + k).10
The appendix demonstrates that a simple closed form so-
lution for equation (2.3) is available for the case where  = 0
and T  > 0:11
Pi = v
0
i +


  

k

k
vni   v0i


  
  
+ i (2.5)
This solution provides the main empirical implication of
theory: option value is a nonlinear term added to the stan-
dard hedonic value, v0i , and option value declines in v0i .
Figure 2.1 illustrates equation (2.5). The graph shows how
the redevelopment option value and the total house value
10As pointed out by Dixit and Pyndick (1994) the value of the new asset is
appreciating at ratewhereas the cost k is constant,motivatingT  > 0.
Here, depreciation furthermotivates waiting to invest.
11In private correspondence, Professors Jyh-Bang Jou (Massey University)
andTanLee (AucklandUniversity) havedemonstrated that a similar closed
form solution is available in the case where  > 0.
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change with diﬀerent levels of an existing home’s use value.
Total house value (use value plus option value) is the up-
per line. In this example, we set parameters  and  at, re-
spectively, 0.015 and 0.05, both in line withWest Berlin his-
tory. We choose normalized parameter values for construc-
tion cost (k = 1), the value of a new house (vni = 2), and the
rent vector, which is a vector of ones. Diﬀerent values for
k and v will “stretch” the graphs but leave the implications
of (2.5) unchanged. Please note that the total home value is
not monotonically increasing in use value (as assumed by
traditional hedonic models). Total value starts to increase
again, once use value falls below a certain threshold. Casu-
ally speaking, it becomeseasier to redeveloponce the current
structureshavedeterioratedenough. Theoption is rationally
exercised at the tangency between the option payoﬀ and the
option value. In this example, this point corresponds to a use
value of 0.571.
The appendix outlines the generalization of equation (2.5)
to a valuation equation where implicit market prices follow
a standard Wiener process. This generalization reveals that
option value increases with the variance of the underlying
stochastic process. It does not change the fact that option
value is an additive power function as in equation (2.5).
Figure 2.1: Use value, option value and total house value
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Notes: The dotted line is the second term of equation (2.5). The solid line is
the sum of the two terms: use value (ﬁrst term) plus option value (second
term). Usevalueof the existinghouse, v0i is on thex-axis; thepart of this that
varies in cross-sectional is the quantity of existing characteristics, q0i . The
option is rationally exercised at the tangency between the option payoﬀ and
the option value: where use value is 0.571 in this example. Parameters used
here:  = :015,  = :05, both based on West Berlin history. Normalized
numbers: Construction cost, k = 1. Value of new house, vni = 2; the rent
vector is a vector of ones, constant in cross section.
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2.2.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation with Embedded
Option Value
The purpose of this section is to derive empirically testable
propositions from equation (2.5). In the housing literature,
hedonic regressions are typically estimated in logs (lnP is the
dependentvariable). Therefore,wemeasure theoptionvalue
variable with the natural logarithm of v
n
i
v0i
= r0 q
n
i
q0i
, where the
vector of market rents is ﬁxed in the cross-section: call this
ratio “development potential”,Di. We measure the ratio be-
tween the old and new quantities by the maximum size of a
house (in square meters) allowed on each lot by zoning di-
vided by the size of the existing house. As suggested by the-
ory, if the ratio is close to 1 (log close to zero), the property
is close to optimal intensity and option value is likely to be
low.12 A large development potential ratio suggests that the
last term in equation (2.5) has the potential to be large if the
parameters and current price level support an option that is
at- or in-the-money.
Themodel suggests the following testable hypotheses:
H1: The coeﬃcient for lnDi will have a positive
signduringperiodsof signiﬁcantoptionvalue, zero
during other periods. This can be tested against the
12Of course, option value is also a function of the parameters of the model
and the current level of house prices. This motivates our approach, which
is to shift the regression parameter on the option value term over time so
that it can respond to changes in the economic and political environment.
alternative that the coeﬃcients for lnDi have neg-
ative signs.
H2: The eﬀect of Di should be nonlinear:13 near
zero over much of its range and signiﬁcantly pos-
itive at high levels of D.
An additional testable hypothesis follows from the dramatic
events in Berlin between 1989 and 1992: option value should
behigher because expecteddrift andvariance are expected to
increase around these events.14
H3: The coeﬃcients for lnDi should be higher dur-
ing the Big Bang period and lower before and after
that time.
2.3 Events and Data
2.3.1 Events Associated with the Creation and
Destruction of Option Value
After the end ofWorldWar II, the artiﬁcial border surround-
ingWestBerlinbecamemoreandmore impermeable, culmi-
nating in the erectionof aheavily fortiﬁedphysical barrier in
13Note that thewaywe deﬁneD=development potential, the value ofwhich
increases as onemoves from right to left in Figure 2.1.
14When aWiener process for rents is introduced as in the appendix, option
value is a positive function of variance, andwe expect variance to increase
due to the uncertainty surrounding the fall of the BerlinWall.
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1961. The Berlin Wall locked in the Eastern German popula-
tion, making any free movement of people from the East to
theWest virtually impossible. Ironically, theWall stabilized
the political situation, and gradually, a period of business as
usual took theplace of the serial crises that had characterized
the city between 1945 and 1961: it all got quiet on the Eastern
front.
This period of tranquility ended abruptly and unexpect-
edly in 1989. Even those who were witnessing political de-
velopments fromwithin did not foresee the events thatwere
to followshortly. In Juneof 1989, just a fewmonthsbefore the
fall of the Wall, Gerhard Schröder, who would later become
Germany’s Chancellor, said: “After 40 years of Federal Re-
public of Germany, one should not lie to a new generation in
Germany about a chance of re-uniﬁcation. This chance does
not exist.”15
After Hungarian border oﬃcials gave up stopping East
Germans driving into Austria, the East German regime had
no choice but to open the border to the West as well. On
the evening of November 9th, a member of the East German
Politbureau announced the end of the border controls and in
the very same night thousands of East Germans crossed the
border into West Berlin (Schmemann, 1989). This political
and economic “Big Bang” event evolved at a speed that was
unheard of during the preceding 40 years of careful diplo-
macy. On October 3rd, 1990, East and West Germany were
15Gerhard Schröder on 12.6.1989 in Bild-Zeitung. Source: http://dipbt.
bundestag.de/dip21/btp/13/13247.asc (retrieved on Dec. 15, 2010)
re-united, including a full integration of the monetary sys-
tem, the administration, and the judicial system.
In a very close vote in June 1991, the uniﬁed German par-
liament decided to make Berlin the political capital of Ger-
many again. Moving the government, parliament, and about
half of the federal administration, including approximately
9,000 civil servants, started in 1994 and was ﬁnalized by
1999.
These events set in a period of great expectations, not least
for the real estate sector. Plans were hatched to redevelop
the center of Berlin, many areas of which had been largely
untouched since their destruction in 1945, and house prices
started rising much more quickly than they had done in the
years before. The boom from 1989 to 1994 fueled construc-
tion activity in Berlin, suggesting the exercise of develop-
ment options: about 140,000 housing units were added to
the housing stock from 1992 to 2002, which is a net growth
of 8 percent of the total stock.
But, soon after the shocks of the early nineties, Berlin’s
population started falling and its economy started stalling.
While it was still a walled city, West Berlin received dispro-
portionate transfers from the West German federal govern-
ment, ultimately aimed at sustaining the city’s population
levels. After 1995, these subsidieswere gradually phased out.
From 1992 through 2002 the number of Berliners holding
any kind of job declined by 6 percent (Destatis, 2009). The
number of total hours worked decreased at a faster rate, in-
dicating that full-time jobs vanished evenmore rapidly. De-
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spite the inﬂux of government employees, Berlin’s popula-
tionnumbers started to decline slightly in 1994, and thende-
clinedmore rapidly each year until 2001.16
2.3.2 The Dataset
Micro-data for housing transactions are diﬃcult to obtain in
Germany, as house sales are treated as private information.
Every transaction of land or buildings, however, needs to be
certiﬁed by a notary, who sends the title deed to the local
land register. A copy of each contract is forwarded to local
‘committees for land price valuation’ (Gutachterausschuss
für Grundstückswerte). These independent expert panels
maintain transaction databases and disseminate aggregated
information on price trends for land and buildings. In addi-
tion, they oﬀer plot-speciﬁc appraisals for the government,
themortgage industry and private parties.
Third parties are not granted access to these databases due
to strict privacy laws. Moreover, the databases exist on local
level only. The committees for land price valuation are ruled
by state law, which varies slightly in the degree of privacy
protection across Germany. For the state of Berlin, universi-
ties are allowed to analyze the data as long as no information
can be traced back to single transactions.17
16ArecentpaperbyGlaeser andGyourko (2005) showshowthe combination
of population decline and a durable housing supply is likely to cause sub-
stantial decline in house prices and new construction. Here, we associate
the Big Bang events with the creation and destruction of option value.
17Schulz et al. (2003) and Schulz andWerwatz (2004) are the only paperswe
We got access to a database including all transactions of
single-family homes forWest Berlin from 1978 through 1989
and for the united Berlin from 1990 through 2007. All
records include the sales price and date, the address, and key
hedonics.
Our single-family dwellings data set comprises of 37,276
transactions between 1978 and2007.18 Thedatabase contains
measures of the building’s interior ﬂoor space and the size
and dimensions of the lot. We exclude 39 observations with
plots larger than 4,000m2 from the sample, as they are very
special cases clustering around a single street in the outskirts
ofBerlin. Weexcludeanadditional403observationswith in-
terior sizes below 20m2 or above 500m2.19
The database contains two additional hedonic variables:
1) replacement value and 2) maximum ﬂoor space allowed
by zoning. The former provides us with a proxy for build-
ing age and condition. The structure’s replacement value is
estimated by a professional appraiser during an external in-
spection conducted at the time the sale is entered into the
know of that use (subsets of) these data.
18For a city of the size of Berlin, this number of transactions seems very low,
especially for a 30-year period. It can be explained by the fact that only
12percentofhomes inBerlin areowner-occupied,which is the lowest level
amongGerman states. Furthermore, the greatmajority of homes inBerlin
is multifamily rather than single family.
19We could link several exceptionally large buildings to new embassies, or-
ganizational buildings, or other non-residential uses being established in
residential areas. Other extremely small or large outliers are probably
recording errors.
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database. The replacement value (adjusted with the con-
sumer price index to the year 2000) is not only missing for
incomplete records but for all sales of naked land that is
zoned for residential use, butnotdevelopedyet. These trans-
actionsalso include landwith temporarilydeviatinguses like
ad-hoc parking lots. We exclude 3,369 observations that lack
replacement value.
The data item thatmakes theBerlin housing data unique is
the information regarding the upper ceiling of developable
ﬂoor space allowed under the zoning at the time of transac-
tion. This is the crucial data itemneeded to assess themagni-
tude of the redevelopment option. Under the German zon-
ing regime, the upper ceiling is expressed as a ratio of the
total interior space allowed, divided by the lot size. This
means that the development potential is a direct function of
the space realized, the size of the land, and the zoning ra-
tio. Even for neighborhoods where the zoning ratio is uni-
form, we have a substantial amount of variation, since lot
sizes in Berlin are not standardized. Thatmeanswe estimate
themagnitudeof the redevelopmentoptionwith somenoise.
Based on the ratio of maximum interior area allowed by
zoning divided by the current interior ﬂoor space, we cal-
culate the unrealized space potential at the dwelling level.
A quarter of our sample has a development potential ratio
of one, which means that they are fully developed. We ob-
serve substantial variation of development potential within
and across neighborhoods. In the Dahlem area, for instance,
homes have been developed to on average of 81 percent of the
theoretical upper boundary, while those in Reinickendorf
have only 43 percent of the theoreticalmaximumdeveloped.
Before 1985, only a third of all records report the infor-
mation on redevelopment potential, while it is included for
most, but not all transactions after 1985. In all, this informa-
tion ismissing for 6,543 transactions.20 Finally, excluding all
observations in the Eastern part of the city reduces our sam-
ple to 19,825 transactions.
2.4 Empirical Approach
2.4.1 Controlling for Location
The quality of a location and our measure of space potential
are interlinked. Better-located properties are likely to be re-
developedﬁrst, implying that optionvalue is correlatedwith
location value. At the other end of the spectrum, very high
levels of development potential lose their economic mean-
ing as zoning limits the development potential from a legal
point of view only. In areas with lenient zoning and low at-
tractiveness theoption to add space to thebuildingwill be far
out of the money while similar redevelopment possibilities
in a prospering neighborhoodwill carry value. Thus, it is not
suﬃcient to simply use our zoning variable to measure the
amount of development potential, the vni   v0i term in equa-
20t-tests show that the reporting of this variable is not conditional on the
value of any of the other hedonic variables.
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tion (2.5).
Our empirical strategy to control for location is ﬁrst to
match sales of fully developedpropertieswith sales of neigh-
boringproperties thatmayormaynotbe fullydeveloped. We
focus on areas where our measure of development potential
has economic meaning by identifying homes that are built
on relatively large lots that have been fully developed. For
these dwellings we believe that zoning is the limiting fac-
tor to redevelopment, rather than economic considerations
like location quality or the state of the local housingmarket.
Therefore, the redevelopment option may be in-the-money
for transactions near sales of fully developed properties and
within the same time period.
Technically, we select all fully developedproperties on lots
with sizes above the median lot size and pair them with all
transactions within a circle with a half mile (804m) radius21
that occurred in the same 3-year band (1978-1980, 1981-1983,
… , 2005-2007) as the reference point. Requiring this tem-
poral proximity besides spatial proximity makes our analy-
sis robust to possible changes in Berlin’s spatial equilibrium
caused by the re-uniﬁcation in 1990. We exclude midpoints
that have fewer than 9 comparables in the reference circle
and timeperiod. In total, 487 fully developedhomes on large
lots remain in our sample, augmented with 6,256 compara-
ble transactions. For each of the 487 areas, we deﬁne spa-
tial dummy variables. The comparables are not exclusive, as
21This setup tomatch properties by location has also been used in Eichholtz,
Kok and Quigley (2010).
observations can be located in the intersections of the half-
mile-circles. Our strategy of isolating the sales with at least
some development potential and matching them geograph-
ically to those with no development potential is required in
order to adequately control for omitted location characteris-
tics.
Figure 2.2 visualizes the distribution of the sample within
West Berlin and its neighborhoods (shaded in light grey).
Each location of a single-family home transaction is marked
by a small black dot. The vast majority of these homes is
located in Berlin’s periphery, while the multi-unit-rental
buildings dominate the city center. The 487 circles are
marked by white dots surrounded by dark grey circles with
a radius of half a mile. Overall, the circles cover 35 of the
49 western neighborhoods and adequately represent the ge-
ographic distribution of the full sample.
Finally, we reﬁne themodeling of locationwithin each cir-
cle by adding spatial variables such as distances to rivers or
openspace, primaryschoolorkindergarten, public transport
hubs or railway tracks. To calculate these distances, we ﬁrst
translate the street address into longitude and latitude coor-
dinates through theGoogleMapsweb service.22 Locations of
railway tracks, parks, lakes, rivers, andother open spaces are
derived from free GISmaps supplied by the OpenStreetmap
project,23 while the complete list of subway-, railway-, and
22Detailed information on how to use the Google Maps toolbox for geocod-
ing can be obtained from the authors on request.
23www.openstreetmap.org
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Figure 2.2: Geographic distribution of single-family home transactions in West Berlin.
Notes: TheMap shows the boundaries of Berlin andWest Berlin’s oﬃcial neighborhood classiﬁcations (shaded in light grey). Each location of a single-family
hometransaction ismarkedbyasmallblackdot. Thevastmajorityof thesehomesare located inBerlin’speriphery,while rental apartmentbuildingsdominate
in the city center. We match fully developed buildings, which have large lots (represented by white dots) with buildings that are within a half-mile circle
(surrounding dark-grey circles) to control for the location of the buildings.
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light rail-stations was obtained from the Berlin transporta-
tion authorities. We calculate the fastest route to the center,
which is a combination of the walking time to these public
transport hubs and the subsequent commuting time to the
center. We look up the commuting time on aMondaymorn-
ing to Berlin central station for each of the public transport
stations in the 2009 transportation schedules.24 The school
administration’s oﬃcial address list reveals the location of
all of primary schools and kindergartens. In addition, we de-
ﬁne dummy variables for the distances to the (formerly) for-
tiﬁed East-West border (Berlin Wall and Brandenburg bor-
der).
2.4.2 Comparing Fully Developed to High Op-
tion Value Sales, Same Neighborhood
Fully developed sales account for 26.3 percent of our sample.
For these sales the option to add space has no value because
zoning prohibits additional space. We deﬁned high develop-
ment potential as the upper 26:3rd percentile of the distribu-
tion of development potential. It is these properties where
we expect value to be increased most by the presence of the
option after controlling for hedonic characteristics: lot area,
24The new central station is located in what can be considered the center
of the united Berlin, close to government quarters and parliament. It is
Berlin’s central transportation hub. During the ColdWar, Berlin Zoo sta-
tion served as interimmain station. It is about 4 train-minuteswest of the
new center.
interior ﬂoor space and replacement value.
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics of the ﬁnal sam-
ple, the subsample of matched dwellings in the half-mile
circles, and the subsamples of high, low, and no option
value dwellings. Average transaction values for single-
family homes, at 2007 prices, were roughly between EUR
350,000 and EUR 375,000. When comparing the matched
sample with the full sample, one can see that dwellings in
the matched subsample have higher selling prices, larger lot
sizes and a somewhat higher replacement value.
Next, we compare the descriptive statistics for high op-
tion value properties to those for fully developed properties.
The average sales prices (in 2007 Euros) for the high option
value sample are almost identical. By construction, the high
option value sales are on larger lots and have less interior
area. Not surprisingly, they have lower replacement value;
the magnitude of the diﬀerence suggests that building age
and depreciation are captured by replacement value.25
The location variables suggest that the half-mile radius
circles successfully control for neighborhood. For exam-
ple, both types of property are, on average, about 25 min-
utes from the city center by train (excluding the commut-
ing time from the home to the nearest train station). More-
over, the standard deviation of this time is very similar.
Likewise, comparisons of distance to water and distance to
green space do not show a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence.
25Maintenance will be optimally reduced for properties approaching the
trigger point for redevelopment.
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About 12 percent of dwellings in both subsamples are located
within 200 meters of a railroad track and each has 6-7 per-
cent of dwellings located within 200 meters of the former
border (e.g. , the Wall) between East and West Berlin. This
suggests that we have adequately matched the locations of
the two types of property.
2.4.3 Regressionmodel
In order to empirically investigate the eﬀect of option value
on the value of existing dwellings we propose an empirically
testable form of equation (2.5):
ln(Pi) = + BhXi + BsSi + ByYi
+fFulldev + hHighOV + D ln(Di)HighOV + i
(2.6)
where i indexes properties sold at time t; the time subscript
is suppressed to emphasize the essential cross-sectional na-
ture of the regression.26 The vector of quality hedonics is
givenbyXi; location (distances andneighborhooddummies)
are represented by the vector Si and time dummies by the
vectorYi. We allow for the nonlinearity illustrated by Figure
2.1 with two dummyvariables: Fulldev is one if lnDi is zero,
otherwise zero; HighOV is one for the sales with relatively
high values for lnDi (e.g. , upper 25th percentile), otherwise
26The empirical estimates shift coeﬃcients over time to allow option value
to vary.
zero.27 The coeﬃcients on lnDi can now be interpreted as
the elasticity of house price with respect to development po-
tential. The coeﬃcient before the interaction of lnDi and
HighOV can be interpreted as ameasure of curvature, as the
price elasticity for option value is allowed to change for high
option value observations. i is a noise term. Concerns over
potential correlations between i and omitted location vari-
ables are addressed by pairing high option value properties
with neighboring fully developed properties, as explained in
the previous section.
Equation (2.6) is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS). We further control for location in all regressions by
calculating Huber-White robust standard errors with clus-
tering for each of the 487 neighborhoods.28
2.5 Results
In order to test H1 and H3, we need to split our full 30-year
sample into sub-periods based on housing market circum-
stances. We base these sub-periods on house price changes,
so to demarcate the sub-periods we need to a house price
27The log linear transformation given by equation (2.6) is highly robust
whereas amaximum likelihood estimation of the nonlinear form of equa-
tion (2.5) might not converge. Convergence is especially problematical
during periodswith very lowoption value,when the last termof the equa-
tionmight plausibly be omitted.
28Cameron,Gelbach andMiller (2008) suggest that 487neighborhoods pro-
vide enough variation to obviate the need for bootstrapmethods.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics comparing matched sample with complete sample
Full sample Matched sample No OV LowOV High OV
Price (inﬂated to 2007 EUR) 345 (211) 377 (247) 365 (195) 392 (241) 364 (299)
Lot size (m2) 515 (269) 572 (280) 383 (184) 569 (232) 767 (304)
Interior ﬂoor space (m2) 146 (53) 155 (59) 167 (68) 162 (56) 128 (47)
Replacement value (2007 EUR) 153 (121) 164 (136) 218 (124) 171 (125) 96 (139)
Dist. to water (m) 2963 (1757) 2860 (1637) 2856 (1789) 2926 (1614) 2747 (1510)
Dist. to green space (m) 1734 (1477) 1504 (1298) 1500 (1284) 1514 (1320) 1490 (1269)
Dist. to kindergarten (m) 583 (396) 593 (378) 594 (396) 595 (375) 590 (364)
Dist. to primary school (m) 650 (330) 652 (336) 683 (363) 637 (329) 650 (316)
Dist. to transportation hub (m) 1392 (1239) 1730 (1630) 1866 (1681) 1723 (1652) 1607 (1526)
Minutes to center from hub 26 (8) 26 (8) 26 (8) 26 (8) 27 (9)
Rail tracks < 200m 0.10 (0.31) 0.12 (0.33) 0.12 (0.32) 0.12 (0.32) 0.13 (0.34)
Border < 200m 0.07 (0.25) 0.07 (0.25) 0.07 (0.26) 0.06 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24)
D fully developed 0.23 (0.42) 0.26 (0.44) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
D high OV 0.28 (0.45) 0.26 (0.44) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0)
ln(Development potential) 0.38 (0.38) 0.36 (0.37) 0 (0) 0.27 (0.16) 0.87 (0.25)
N 19825 6723 1767 3189 1767
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in brackets). D high OV is deﬁned 1 for all observations with development potential> 0:58 and 0 otherwise.
index of Berlin. Before presenting the regression results of
equation (2.6), we ﬁrst provide this index.
2.5.1 Berlin House Price Index
Based on our data set of single-family homes we estimate
a standard hedonic price index spanning the years 1978
through 2007.29 We estimate time dummy coeﬃcients for a
standard hedonic functional formwith no option value vari-
29Ours is theﬁrstWestBerlin constantquality indexbasedonastandardhe-
donic regression. Indeed, it is the ﬁrst city-level transaction based hedo-
nic index inGermany. The index is available at http://www.lindenthal.eu.
SeeHoﬀmannandLorenz (2006), TheCommittee forLandPriceValuation
(Gutachterausschuss, 2008), and Schulz et al. (2003) for discussion of ear-
lier estimates.
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ables and with constant coeﬃcients on all property charac-
teristics. We took the exponent of these coeﬃcients and nor-
malized to 100 in 1978. The resulting price index is plotted in
Figure 2.3.
The graph suggests that the Berlin housingmarket has ex-
perienced roughly three phases for the 30 years covered by
the index. The ﬁrst period, between 1978 and 1989, can be
characterized by steady growth. The average nominal house
price increaseover this timeperiodwas5percentperannum.
In real terms, the annual growth rate was 1.9 percent.
The great expectations in the aftermath of the fall of the
Wall fueled price increases, peaking in 1994 with nominal
prices being 47 percent above 1989 values. The average an-
nual price increase for this periodwas 8.1 percent in nominal
terms, and 4.6percent in real terms.
In 1995, housepricesdecreasedslightly followedbyamuch
larger drop in 1996. In 2007, house prices were back at 1989
levels – in nominal terms. In real terms, however, prices had
plummeted to 55 percent of their 1994 values, and 84 per-
cent of their 1978 values. The average price fall between 1994
and 2007 was 2.3 percent per annum in nominal terms and
2.9percent in real terms. The sluggishperformanceof the lo-
cal economy, adverse demographic trends and the fading out
of the Berlin subsidies, combined with low growth for Ger-
manhouseprices ingeneral (Lindenthal andEichholtz, 2010)
are likely reasons for the disappointingprice performance in
the Berlin housingmarket after 1994.
Figure 2.3: West Berlin house price index
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Notes: Hedonic indices for single-family homes were estimated based on a
standard hedonic model with annual time dummies. The CPI index is pro-
vided by the German central bank (available online at Hedonic indices for
single-family homes were estimated based on a standard hedonic model
with annual time dummies. The CPI index is provided by the German cen-
tral bank (available online at http://bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik_
zeitreihen.en.php?lang=en&tr=UJFB99).
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Testing the Static Option ValueModel
We ﬁrst analyze redevelopment option value for the full
sample period, using the regressionmodel givenby equation
(2.6). Regressions 1a, 2aand3aexcludedistancevariables, re-
lying on our matching of fully developed sales (lnDi = 0)
with less developed (lnDi > 0) sales within half a mile to
control for omitted location variables; moreover, we include
487 location dummies in all regressions. We also estimate
every regression including further variables controlling for
location based on geographic information systems (regres-
sions 1b, 2b, and 3b).
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 2.2 provide the regression
results for the standard hedonic model – i.e. , omitting op-
tion value variables. This model captures the cross sectional
variation inBerlin house prices ratherwell, as theR-squared
is around 0.9. The results are robust to adding the distance
variables as additional controls for location (regression 1b).
Most of these variables are not statistically signiﬁcant, sug-
gesting that the 487 neighborhoods do a good job of control-
ling location. Within these neighborhoods, value is signif-
icantly reduced by increased distance to the nearest public
transit station. Value increases with longer commuting time
to the center of Berlin reﬂecting Berlin’s industrial origins
with factories and working class quarters in the center and
higher quality buildings for the better oﬀ in the green belt
around it.
Next, we introduce option value into the model by the log
of the variable D measuring development potential. Again,
we use a speciﬁcation with hedonics alone and one that
also includes location eﬀects. As before, time and spatial
dummies are included in both setups. We have adequately
captured option value only if estimates are non-negative
(hypothesis H1). The results presented in columns 2a and
2b show that we cannot reject H1: the estimated elastic-
ity of house value with respect to development potential is
16.0 percent for the model with hedonics only, and 15.3 per-
cent for the full hedonic model, both signiﬁcant at the 1 per-
cent level.
Moreover, the introduction of the redevelopment option
into themodel leads to an economically and statistically sig-
niﬁcant change in the coeﬃcients for lot size and interior
space.30 The coeﬃcient for lot size decreases by just over
25 percent, while that for interior space increases by about
50 percent. The eﬀects of the other variables do not change
markedly. The directions of these changes are predicted by
standard omitted variables analysis: option value increases
with lot size and decreases with interior space, and option
value is necessarily non-negative. This implies the omission
of option value from the standard hedonic will cause the co-
30Rosen’s (1974) theory implies that hedonic coeﬃcients represent implicit
market prices. Our model separates option value from the present value
of rent from existing characteristics. This implies that the coeﬃcients for
hedonic characteristics inourmodelmeasure the implicit valueof theﬂow
of rents, whereas those in the standard hedonic model (results in column
1a, Table 2.2) represent some combination of rental value and the value of
the option.
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Table 2.2: Regression coeﬃcients for static regressions
ln(price) Model
1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
ln(lot size) 0:474(0:011) 0:477(0:012) 0:361(0:017) 0:368(0:018) 0:399(0:019) 0:406(0:020)
ln(interior space) 0:243(0:016) 0:238(0:017) 0:368(0:021) 0:360(0:022) 0:344(0:023) 0:335(0:024)
ln(replacement value) 0:229(0:007) 0:229(0:007) 0:234(0:007) 0:233(0:007) 0:233(0:007) 0:233(0:007)
Logarithm of distance to…
Green space  0:009 (0:005)  0:009 (0:005)  0:009 (0:005)
Water  0:012 (0:010)  0:011 (0:010)  0:009 (0:010)
Kindergarten  0:004 (0:006)  0:001 (0:006)  0:002 (0:006)
Primary school  0:001 (0:006) 0:001 (0:006) 0:001 (0:006)
Publ. transport hub  0:026(0:008)  0:018 (0:008)  0:020 (0:008)
Minutes hub to center 0:092(0:024) 0:091(0:024) 0:087(0:024)
Border < 200 m  0:011 (0:014)  0:012 (0:014)  0:012 (0:013)
Rail tracks < 200 m  0:01 (0:010)  0:005 (0:010)  0:006 (0:010)
ln(dev. potential) 0:160(0:021) 0:153(0:021) 0:045 (0:026) 0:038 (0:027)
ln(dev. pot.)D high dev. pot. 0:190(0:045) 0:188(0:045)
D fully developed 0:028(0:008) 0:028(0:008)
D high dev. pot.  0:093(0:034)  0:091(0:034)
Neighborhoods Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant  1:398(0:084)  1:328(0:156)  1:422(0:084)  1:435(0:152)  1:534(0:083)  1:537(0:151)
R-squared 0:903 0:904 0:905 0:906 0:907 0:908
Notes:  p < 0:01,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:1. Robust standard errors (clustered for each of 487 neighborhoods) in parentheses, N=6688. Years covered:
1978-2007. The natural logarithmof sales prices (inﬂated to 2007 Euros) is regressed against a set of hedonics (lot size, interior ﬂoor space, replacement value
of building) and variables describing the real option to extend the building. Development potential is deﬁned as the ratio of maximum home size allowed
under current zoning divided by current size. Time and neighborhood eﬀects are controlled for by spatial (i.e. , neighborhood) and temporal dummies. Fully
developed sales with lot size greater than themedian (523 squaremeters) are matched with sales within half a mile to construct the 487 neighborhoods.
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eﬃcient of lot size (interior area) to be biased upward (down-
ward).
We subsequently investigate the eﬀect of option value by
introducing dummies for dwellings with high development
potential (HighOV ) and with zero development potential
(Fulldev), and by including an interaction term of the devel-
opment potentialwith the dummy for high development po-
tential. The coeﬃcients for these variables allow for curva-
ture of the option value with respect to the development po-
tential illustrated by Figure 2.1. The results are provided in
columns 3a and 3b of Table 2.2. The curvaturewith respect to
the development potential axis is as predicted by Figure 2.1
and H2. The results show that the elasticity of house value
with respect to development potential is about 23.5 percent
(= .045 + .190) for the 1,767 sales with the highest develop-
ment potential. These are the smaller structures on large
lots in neighborhoodswhere the option is likely to be in-the-
money. The statistically signiﬁcant 2.8 percent premium for
fully developedproperties controls for a residual location ef-
fect: better located properties are likely to be developed ﬁrst.
The signiﬁcant 9.4 percent discount on the high option
value dummy does not mean that high option value homes
carry a discount. This negative intercept is more than oﬀset
by the larger coeﬃcient for ln(development potential). Multi-
ply this coeﬃcient estimate (0.19+0.045) with theminimum
value for ln(development potential) for high option value sales
(0.58) to get 0.11 and add -0.093. In otherwords, the high op-
tion value properties start at a value of 4.4 percent in addi-
tion topropertyvalueand increase toamean (75th percentile)
of 10.0 (14.7) percent. The sale with the largest option value
has 80.4 percent of property value in the redevelopment op-
tion.
2.5.2 Option Value During the Boom and Bust
Years
The two pronounced phases of boom and bust evident in
the graph of Berlin house prices depicted in Figure 2.2 pro-
vide for a natural experiment. We expect substantial option
value tobe createdduring theboomyears,whilemuchof this
should dissipate during the subsequent bust.
To testwhetheroptionvaluedoes indeedgoup in theboom
and down in the bust, we estimate a hedonic model in which
we approximate the boom period with a dummy variable
for the six years from 1990 through 1995, and the bust with
a dummy for the years from 1996 through 2007. The left
out time period is the “quiet” period preceding the Big Bang
events: the period from 1978 through 1989.
The basic setup of this model includes hedonic variables,
dummies for the boom and bust years and spatial dummies.
The results are presented in Table 2.3, model 1. House value
increases 10.4 percent during the boom, in real terms. Dur-
ing thebust housevalues average about 17.4percent less than
during the boomand 6 percent less than during the quiet pe-
riod between 1978 and 1989. The (average) decline fromboom
to bust of about 16 percent is statistically signiﬁcant.
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Table 2.3: Regression coeﬃcients for time-varying option value models
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
ln(lot size) 0:480 (0:01) 0:364 (0:02) 0:399 (0:02) 0:401 (0:02) 0:399 (0:02)
ln(int. space) 0:250 (0:02) 0:378 (0:02) 0:355 (0:02) 0:354 (0:02) 0:356 (0:02)
ln(replacement value) 0:228 (0:01) 0:233 (0:01) 0:232 (0:01) 0:232 (0:01) 0:232 (0:01)
period = boom (1990-1995) 0:099 (0:02) 0:100 (0:02) 0:101 (0:02) 0:101 (0:02) 0:101 (0:02)
period = bust (1996-2007)  0:062 (0:01)  0:057 (0:01)  0:059 (0:01)  0:056 (0:01)  0:055 (0:01)
ln(dev. potential) 0:060 (0:03)
|  quiet 0:220 (0:03) 0:130 (0:05) 0:127 (0:04)
|  boom 0:272 (0:03) 0:154 (0:04) 0:144 (0:05)
|  bust 0:118 (0:03) 0 (0:03) 0:008 (0:03)
ln(dev. potential ratio)  D high dev. potential
|  quiet 0:231 (0:05) 0:178 (0:05) 0:259 (0:07)
|  boom 0:274 (0:04) 0:200 (0:05) 0:334 (0:07)
|  bust 0:146 (0:05) 0:196 (0:05) 0:143 (0:06)
D high dev. potential  0:094 (0:03)  0:097 (0:03)
|  quiet  0:168 (0:05)
|  boom  0:217 (0:05)
|  bust  0:051 (0:04)
D fully developed 0:029 (0:01) 0:029 (0:01)
|  quiet 0:032 (0:02)
|  boom 0:032 (0:01)
|  bust 0:027 (0:01)
Constant  1:052 (0:08)  1:077 (0:08)  1:187 (0:08)  1:196 (0:08)  1:194 (0:09)
R-squared 0:899 0:903 0:905 0:905 0:905
Notes:  p < 0:01,  p < 0:05, y p < 0:1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. N=6688. The natural logarithm of sales prices (inﬂated to 2007 Euros) is
regressed against a set of hedonics and variables describing the real option to extend the building. Development potential is deﬁned as the ratio ofmaximum
home size allowed under current zoning divided by current size. Under model speciﬁcations 5-8, the option value coeﬃcient is allowed to change across
three time periods: build-up (1978-1989), boom (1990-1995) and bust (1996-2007). Neighborhood eﬀects are controlled for by spatial dummies.
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To investigate the eﬀect of option value on long-term
house price movements – and to test H3 – model 2 includes
development potential in the regression, and it is interacted
with the market phase dummies. The results show that
we cannot reject H3: redevelopment potential has a signiﬁ-
cantly positive eﬀect on value in the relatively quiet ﬁrst pe-
riod, and this eﬀect goes up during the boom – but the dif-
ference is not signiﬁcant. During the boom, the elasticity of
house value with respect to development potential is 0.272,
even exceeding the elasticity on the high option value prop-
erties in the static regressions (Table 2.2, models 3a and 3b).
As predicted by the theoretical model, the redevelopment
option elasticity shows a statistically signiﬁcant decline of
more than 0.15 in the subsequent bust.31 During the bust
the elasticity was roughly half what it was during the quiet
period, indicating a very substantial decline in option value
over themarket cycle.
To check for robustness of the results, we try a number
of alternative speciﬁcations of the model with the time-
dependent redevelopment option. First, we investigate the
eﬀect of the redevelopment option by only letting the re-
development option for dwellings with high redevelopment
potential be time-dependent, keeping the other measures of
option value constant. The results, model 3 of Table 2.3, do
not materially diﬀer frommodel 2.
Models 4 and 5 test hypothesesH2 andH3 simultaneously
31Note that the introduction of the redevelopment option has an eﬀect on
the coeﬃcients for lot size and interior space similar to the static model.
by shifting the elasticity with the dummy for high develop-
ment potential and allowing all elasticity coeﬃcients to shift
over the three sub-periods. Again, H2 and H3 cannot be re-
jected: the coeﬃcients on the interaction term in all three
periods are signiﬁcantly positive. In both speciﬁcations, the
coeﬃcient for option value in the boom is statistically and
economically signiﬁcant, but the diﬀerence with the coeﬃ-
cient for the quiet period is not statistically signiﬁcant. For
the bust, we do ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant negative dif-
ference with the preceding periods. For high option value
properties, the elasticity is over .47 (.14 plus .33) during the
boom; it declines by two thirds, to .15 during the bust; in-
terestingly, high option value properties retain a signiﬁcant
positive elasticity even during the bust. For low option value
properties the elasticity of .14 goes to zero during the bust
phase.32
Table 2.4 converts the elasticity estimates in Table 2.3 into
the amount of option value over time for low and for high
option value sales.33 Table 2.3 suggests that the share of
32Adding the high development potential dummy conﬁrms H1 since the
minimum (25th percentile) of ln(D) for these properties is .58 (.68). This
implies that option value as a percentage of property value is a minimum
of 6 percent during quiet and boom periods and 3.7 percent during the
bust. For the 25th percentile property these numbers are about 10 percent
and 5 percent. Note that fully developed properties have a 3 percent pre-
mium during all phases of the cycle.
33This isdonebymultiplying thepoint estimatesof elasticitiesby theappro-
priate mean values of the development potential variable (Table 2.1): 0.27
for the 3189 mid range sales and 0.87 for the 1767 high option value sales.
Then the coeﬃcient on the appropriate dummy for high development po-
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option value in transaction prices increased by between 15
and 20 percent during the boom for both low and high op-
tion value properties. During the bust, option value dropped
to less than half of its pre-boom percentage for high op-
tion value properties, and the 4 percent option premium for
properties with low development potential disappears. The
relativemagnitude of the changewas uniform across the low
andhighoptionvalue segments, and it is robust acrossmodel
speciﬁcations 3 through 5.
Translating these relative numbers into Euro amounts vi-
sualizes the economic magnitude of the real option compo-
nent in home values. Model speciﬁcations 3 through 5 imply
that the option to add more space to the building is worth
up to EUR 98,000 for high option value sales during the
boom. Due to the high elasticity of property value with re-
spect to development potential, and the increase in this elas-
ticity during the boom, roughly 40 percent of the change in
house value from the quiet period was due to change in op-
tionvalue. During thebust, about 50percent of thedecline in
valuewas due to changes in option value. Turning to proper-
ties with low option value (nearly half of the sales we exam-
ined) option value also seems to contribute to the volatility
of house prices. This is especially true during the bust, when
about 12 percent of the decline in value is due to change in
option value.
tential is added: the exponent of the result is option value as a percentage
of property value.
2.5.3 Generality of Results
We control for location factors by pairing fully developed
sales with nearby sales of those with some development po-
tential. Speciﬁcally, we selected a sample of 6,723 sales from
the full sample of 19,825. This is the 35 percent of sales on
lots abovemedian for the full sample andwith at least 9 sales
within a half-mile ring of the fully developed sales. The re-
sulting sample has sales in 35 of West Berlin’s 47 neighbor-
hoods as deﬁned by the government.34 We calculate that
68 percent of all single-family homes in the full sample have
at least 10percentdevelopmentpotential. Forhomeswith lot
sizes bigger than the median, the share increases to 90 per-
cent. With more than two thirds of all buildings sold being
subject to changes in embedded real option value, our re-
sults can be generalized to Berlin’s market for single family
homes.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the eﬀects of the redevelopment op-
tion on the value of existing dwellings, based on a theoretical
model showing that option value is additive to the use value
of the existing characteristic vector. In our hedonic model,
implicit market prices measure the value of rents from ex-
isting property characteristics, while additionally, a market
34The 47 government neighborhoods cover all of West Berlin; they are not
overlapping. See Figure 2.2 for amap.
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Table 2.4: Share of option value in total home value in boom and bust period
Model Model
2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5
Share of development option value in total value of home Change in value of dev. option in absolute terms (2007 EUR)
LowOV LowOV
quiet 6.1% 1.6% 3.6% 3.5% quiet to boom 11,129 1,293 5,649 4,756
Boom 7.6% 1.6% 4.2% 4.0% boom to bust -22,787 -2,237 -17,777 -15,991
Bust 3.2% 1.6% 0.0% 0.2%
High OV High OV
Quiet 21.1% 17.3% 18.6% 18.3% quiet to boom 40,171 32,379 35,050 30,084
Boom 26.7% 21.7% 23.5% 22.0% boom to bust -81,331 -65,896 -77,120 -68,544
Bust 10.8% 8.9% 7.5% 8.4%
Value of dev. option (in Euros inﬂated to 2007 values) Change in value of dev. option/change in total home value
LowOV LowOV
quiet 20,777 5,545 12,128 11,843 quiet to boom 14.1% 1.6% 7.1% 6.0%
Boom 31,907 6,838 17,777 40,345 boom to bust 16.6% 1.6% 13.0% 11.7%
Bust 9,119 4,601 0 609
High OV High OV
Quiet 71,615 58,576 63,297 62,035 quiet to boom 50.7% 40.9% 44.3% 38.0%
Boom 111,787 90,955 98,347 92,119 boom to bust 102.7% 48.1% 56.3% 50.0%
Bust 30,456 25,059 21,227 23,575
Notes: : All calculations are based on coeﬃcients from Table 2.3. As an example of percentages consider high OV during the quiet period, 18.3 % =
exp((.127+.259)*0.87 -0.168), where 0.87 is the mean value for ln(D) from Table 2.1. To convert the percentages into Euros, we used the median transaction
prices for each phase in our sample: For the build-up period, themedian pricewas EUR 339,500, for the boomphase EUR418,700 and for the bust phase EUR
281,700.
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premium is paid for the option to tear down and replace, or
substantially redevelop, the existing property. Theory im-
plies that any redevelopment option value is a function of
unrealized development potential for the dwelling. We pro-
pose to identify high option value properties by dividing the
maximumstructure allowed by zoning by the existing struc-
ture size. We identify neighborhoodswith high option value
by ﬁnding fully developed properties on lots above median
size. The presence of neighboring properties with unreal-
ized development potential establishes the possibility of in-
the-money option value after controlling for location. The
eﬀect of option value on property value is expected to be
highly nonlinear, to increase during periods of high volatil-
ityand/or risinghouseprices, and todecrease inperiodswith
falling house prices.
AnewdatabaseconsistingofWestBerlinhousesales span-
ning the years 1978 through 2007 allows us to analyze the
eﬀects of the redevelopment option over diﬀerent phases in
the housing market cycle. The main prediction of theory is
conﬁrmed: the elasticity of house value with respect to de-
velopment potential is 15 percent on average over our full
sample period; for high development potential homes, the
elasticity increases to 23 percent.
The time period covered in the dataset includes Berlin’s
Big Bang, which coincided with a boom in house prices,
followed by a prolonged bust. The constant quality house
price index presented in this paper shows that average house
prices fell every year in the 10 years after 1994, losing 45 per-
cent in real terms from their peak. For high option value
homes, about 40 percent of the price increase during the
boom years can be explained by the change in the value of
the redevelopment option, while about 50 percent of the of
the subsequent fall in prices can be attributed to reduction in
option value. For low option value homes, the eﬀects on the
real estate cycle are less pronounced but still economically
signiﬁcant. These results generalize to about 75 percent of
West Berlin neighborhoods by geography and to 68 percent
of all sales.
Our results support our re-interpretation of coeﬃcients
from standard hedonic models. When an appropriate op-
tion value variable is included in the regression, the coeﬃ-
cients on hedonic variables should be interpreted as the im-
plicit market value of rental income. When the option value
variable is excluded, these coeﬃcients include the eﬀects of
additive option value. The diﬀerence is very large in our em-
pirical ﬁndings: the coeﬃcient on the log of lot size (log of
interior area) is about 25 percent lower (50 percent higher)
when the development potential variable is included in the
regression.
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Appendix A: Derivation of
Hedonic Model with Option Value
Themodel setup and deﬁnitions of terms are given by equa-
tion (2.1). Simplify by noting that the integrals from T to in-
ﬁnity can be restated as the integrals from 0 to inﬁnity dis-
counted back to the present:
Pi =
r0q0i
(+    )+
max
 
e( )T
r0qni
(+       e
(  )T r
0q0i
(  )   ke
 T ; 0
!
+i
(2.7)
The scalars for values at time 0, v0i and vni further simplify
notation. Moreover, assuming zero depreciation,  = 0 gives
the simplest possible closed form solution, as can be seen by
examining equation (2.7). This case is particularly relevant in
West Berlin, where our data do not contain property age or
any other way to separately identify depreciation. The max-
imization problem then simpliﬁes to:
Pi = v
0
i +max
 
e( )T (vni   v0i )  ke T ; 0

+ i: (2.8)
This is a special case of equation (2.3) in the text.
Theﬁrst order condition (FOC) for choosingT tomaximize
equation (2.8) is:35
e( )T

(vni   v0i ) =

  ke
 T (2.9)
At the time of redevelopment T  = 0, equation (2.9) im-
plies that the net increase in value is a multiple of cost be-
cause the option to delay has value.
The second order condition evaluated at T  = 0 is  (  
)(vni   v0i ) < 2k. Thismust hold given ﬁnite value,   >
0.
DeﬁneXi =


 

k
(vni  v0i

. The solution to the maxi-
mization problem in equation (2.8) is now seen to depend on:
eT

= elnXi = Xi ; e
 T = e 

 lnXi = X
  
i (2.10)
Substitute into equation (2.8) given T = T  to derive the
solution given in the text as equation (2.5):
Pi = v
0
i +
 
  

k
 k
vni   v0i
 
  
  
+ i (2.11)
Generalization to aWiener process for rents
The additive functional form given by equation (2.11) sur-
vives the introduction of a stochastic process for rents. Sim-
plify by reducing the vector of hedonic characteristics to a
35In the following, we maximize under the assumption that T  > 0 : i.e
at time t = 0 parameters are such that the value gap (vni   v0i ) is rising
towards a trigger point where equation (2.9) holds.
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scalar, s0i , which implies that rent, p is also a scalar. Consider
an Ito process for the rent:
dp
p
= dt+ dW (2.12)
where the rate of drift per unit time, t is  and  scales the
variance of a standardWiener process, dW .
Given these simplifying assumptions and the stochastic
process in equation (2.12), Clapp, Jou and Lee (2009) derive
the following solution where the new aggregate level of the
hedonic vector sni , is chosen optimally:
Pi = vs
0
i+B0(s
0
i )
B1+i where B1 < 0; B0  0; v  0 :
(2.13)
TheBi parameters are functions of the current level of price,
the constant rate of interest , the rate of depreciation ,
the parameters of equation (2.12) and parameters of the cost
function.
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Chapter 3
Demographics, Human Capital, and the Demand for Housing
This chapter is joint work with
Piet Eichholtz (Maastricht University).
The study received the AAREAL Best Research Paper
Award, 2010, and theEuropeanRealEstateSociety (ERES)
Doctoral Prize, 2007.
3.1 Introduction
18 years after Mankiw andWeil started a short-lived but in-
tense debate on how demographics drive the demand for
housing, empirical evidence is still not conclusive, especially
in an international context. Demographic change, however,
is one of the key challenges many industrialized countries
will face in the future. Togive abrief example, theUnitedNa-
tions Population Division (2007) estimates that Russia will
lose 24 percent of its current population by the year 2050.
For Bulgaria, the expected decline in total population is 35
percent in the same period, while neighboring Turkey will
experience an impressive population growth of 29 percent.
On a regional level, population changes are even more pro-
nounced. The German federal state of Thuringia, for exam-
ple, is already losing 1 percent of its population annually
(Thüringer Landesamt für Statistik, 2008). Beside the rapid
changes in total populations numbers, societies will age dra-
matically. In South Korea, for instance, themedian age is in-
creasing three years every ﬁve years and the share of inhab-
itants older than 60 years will increase from 14 percent now
to 42 percent in 2050. International demographic dynamics
dwarf the so-called baby bust in the United States.
Giventhe fundamentaldemographicchangecurrentlyun-
derway, it is surprising how few studies have researched the
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eﬀect of demographics on housing markets in Europe and
Asia. For Japan, Ohtake and Shintani (1996) ﬁnd that de-
mographic change has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on housing prices
through the short-run adjustment process in the hous-
ing market. Ermisch (1996) establishes a link between age
(among other demographic variables) and the level of hous-
ing services demanded in six British agglomerations. Lindh
and Malmberg (1999) show that the population’s age struc-
ture is related to residential construction in Sweden and
other OECD countries. Lee et al. (2001) ﬁnd evidence that
demographics do explain the amount of housing services de-
manded in Austria. Neuteboom and Brounen (2007) predict
Dutch housing demand to increase with household age.
In their controversial work,Mankiw andWeil (1989)mod-
eled the per-capita quantity of housing demanded as a func-
tionofage. Analyzing 1970censusdata for theUS, they found
demand for housing to be very low for residents younger
than 20 years, to shoot up for 20-35 years-olds, and to de-
cline constantly thereafter. Furthermore, they createda time
series of housing demand by combining the cross-sectional
results on the age-speciﬁc quantity of housing demandwith
time series data on the age composition of the population.
Regressing this demand time series against the aggregated
housing quantity (represented by the net stock of residen-
tial capital) revealed no signiﬁcant dependency. Real house
prices, however,were found todependondemandasdeﬁned
by their model. Mankiw andWeil concluded that the ageing
baby-boom generation’s move out of the high-demand age-
classes would drive total demand down and result in a sharp
drop in house prices.
Criticism of this paper came from many directions: Peek
andWilcox (1991) investigated themovements of house price
indices and found that real after-tax interest rates and con-
struction costs were the main determinants of price swings.
Demographic variables like income and age were still sig-
niﬁcant but not as pronounced as suggested byMankiw and
Weil. Hendershott’s (1991) main point of criticism was the
lack of predictive power of the Mankiw andWeil models for
the 1970s and 1980s, making predictions for the 1990s im-
possible. In addition, he criticized the negative time trend in
their basic equationwhichaccounts formost of thepredicted
declineMankiw andWeil had explained by demographics.
Engelhardt and Poterba (1991) applied the Mankiw and
Weil approach to new data. For Canada, they observed an
age-housingdemand relationship similar to theoneMankiw
andWeil found for the US. Canadian house prices, however,
were not determined by the derived demand variable.
GreenandHendershott’s (1996)paperwas thenext corner-
stone of the debate. They followedMankiw andWeil in link-
ing per capita housing expenditures and demographic infor-
mation based on cross-sectional data from the 1980 census.
The methodology, however, advanced in two aspects: ﬁrst,
they estimated the real contribution each hedonic charac-
teristic of a dwelling makes to the household’s housing ex-
penditures. This made it possible to control for the quantity
and quality of housing services consumed. Second, they re-
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gressed the marginal prices of each of these hedonic charac-
teristics against the demographic variables of the household.
These innovations allowed the quantity of housing services
consumed (by deﬁning a constant quality house) and all de-
mographic characteristics but age to be kept constant. They
found that demand for housing does not decline with age,
but rather that educationand incomedetermine thequantity
servicesofhousingconsumed. This implies thatMankiwand
Weil underestimated the housing services the baby-boom
generationwoulddemand in the futurebynot controlling for
the fact that younger generations enjoyed a better education
than their predecessors.
This paper extends the work of Green and Hendershott
(1996) in three directions: ﬁrst, we reﬁne the existing
methodology and model the demographic dynamics more
carefully. We separate life cycle variables, that change their val-
ues according to the household’s state in the life cycle, from
cohort variables, which do not change with age. Instead of al-
lowing every demographic variable to vary (likeMankiw and
Weil, 1989), or keeping all demographics constant (likeGreen
and Hendershott, 1996) we explicitly consider the change in
the life cycle variables like income or household size over
time. This leads to a more robust projection of housing de-
mand.
Second, a very detailed micro-dataset provides informa-
tion on the hedonic attributes of a representative share of
English residential real estate in combination with exten-
sive demographic information on the respective households.
The majority of earlier studies was based on publicly avail-
able census cross-sections. These are easy to analyze, allow
for very large samples, and are very representative. On the
downside, however, census data oﬀers only very basic in-
formation on the physical attributes of the dwellings1. For-
tunately, our data set oﬀers rich information on the physi-
cal characteristics of individual homes, their interior and ex-
terior condition, energy eﬃciency, the local environment,
and the attitudes of the inhabiting households towards their
residence as well as similarly detailed information on the
household’s demographic proﬁle. Overall, more than 900
variables are coded in the data set, of which approximately
two thirds are relating to the dwelling, and one third to the
household.
Third, using English data gives us the opportunity to
analyze an environment diﬀerent from the Unites States.
This international perspective is crucial since demographic
changes in the US are, although important, dwarfed by the
developments inEurope andAsia. TheUnited States are pro-
jected to experience further population growth (albeit at a
lower rate than before) combined with a younger age distri-
bution thanmost European countries.
Britain is not expected to have a demographic contrac-
tion like continental European countries, especially in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, but the situation is very distinct
from the US and Canada. The British population growth is
1Green andHendershott (1996), for instance, had to restrict their analysis to
18 hedonic variables of housing quality, including 8 regional dummies.
75
CHAPTER 3. DEMOGRAPHICS ANDHOUSING DEMAND
leveling oﬀ more rapidly and the population’s age structure
is already older than the American. Until 2050, the pro-
jected growth rate in British population numbers is less than
half the American equivalent2. This makes the UK housing
market a very interesting environment to investigate demo-
graphic implications.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. In the
ﬁrst sections, we present the method and data we use. Sec-
tion 4 discusses the results and establishes a link between
demographics and housing demand. Continuing in Section
5, we combine our results with demographic projections, al-
lowing for demand forecasts for the next 20 years. A sum-
mary and discussion of themain results ﬁnishes the paper.
3.2 Method
We follow the method ﬁrst proposed by Rosen (1974) and
subsequently reﬁned by Green and Hendershott (1996). The
ﬁrst step is to estimate the relationship between the ﬂow
of housing services and the hedonic characteristics of the
dwelling:
q = f(Z); (1)
where q is the ﬂow of housing services from the dwelling
(rent paid or user costs of housing – for a discussion see the
next section), andZ is a vector of the hedonic characteristics
2The United Nations project the population growth from 2010 to 2050 to be
11 %, while the United States will enjoy a total population increase of 27 %.
of the house. Then, we take the derivative of f and obtain the
real marginal contribution qi of each hedonic characteristic
to housing demand:
qi =
@f
@zi
(Z): (2)
In the last step, themarginal contributions obtained from (2)
are regressed against the demographic characteristics of the
household:
qi = gi(Z;A;X; Y ); (3)
where X is a vector of the demographic characteristics of
the household. The household’s age A and income Y are
excluded from X and controlled for separately (Green and
Hendershott, 1996).
Again followingGreen andHendershott (1996) in selecting
functional forms for (1) and (3), we use the translog function
by Christensen et al. (1975) to estimate equation 1:
ln(q) = 0+
nX
i=1
iln(zi)+0:5
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
ij ln(zi)ln(zj)+; (10)
0 being the intercept, i the coeﬃcient of characteristic i,
and ij is the coeﬃcient of the characteristics i and j inter-
acting.  is independently and normally distributed (10) and
is estimated subject to the following restrictions:
nX
i=1
i = 1; (4)
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nX
i=1
ij = 0; (5)
ij = ji: (6)
We restrict (1) to be homogeneous of degree one, therefore
the aggregated housing service of a house can be computed
(based on Euler’s theorem) as:
q =
nX
i=1
qizi; (7)
where zi is the amount of characteristic i included in the
house. Taking partial derivatives of (10) with respect to zi
gives us the hedonic prices qi:
qi =
@q
@zi
=
0@i + nX
j=1
ij ln(zi)
1A q
zi
: (20)
Considering the case when markets are perfect and housing
suppliers have identical cost functions, all variation in qi is
caused by nonlinearities in the hedonicmodel (1). Residents,
however, haveheterogeneous utility functions depending on
tastes anddemographics. In the last step,we regress qi on the
demographic variables and on the level of zi:
qi = 0+zzi+
14X
a=1
aAa+ X+yY +
14X
a=1
yaY Aa+; (30)
where the ’s are individual coeﬃcients, Aa are dummies
for 14 ﬁve-year age cohorts (starting at age 15), and  is in-
dependently and normally distributed. Y is the household’s
income net of housing expenditures, while the vector con-
tains the coeﬃcients for the other demographic variables in
X .
The service ﬂowprovided by the ith hedonic characteristic
varies with age-class j:
qij = 0+zzi+
14X
a=1
aAja+ Xj+yY +
14X
a=1
yaYjAja; (300)
where Xj and Yj contain the demographic proﬁle of the
household and its income.
Life-cycle variables like the household’s size, employment
status, physical ﬁtness, and, most importantly, household
income are unlikely to stay constant when households age.
Cohort variables like educational level, gender, and ethnic-
ity will not change in age. Instead of allowing every demo-
graphic variable to vary (like Mankiw and Weil, 1989), or
keeping all demographics constant (like Green and Hender-
shott, 1996) we explicitly model the change in the life cycle
variables like income3 over time, while keeping the cohort
variables constant.
Like Campbell et al. (2001), we use income dynamics esti-
mates derived fromahousehold panel to calibrate themodel.
3Hwang andQuigley (2006), in establishing a causality between income and
housing services consumed, ﬁnd that exogenous increases in aggregated
income drive house prices up.
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For the 1991-2001 waves from the British Household Panel
Survey, we estimate a ﬁxed eﬀect model:
ln(income)i;t = i +
75X
a=21
aDAa;i;t
+
75X
a=21
3X
edu=1
a;eduDA_Educa;edu;i;t + i;t
(8)
where i is capturing household ﬁxed eﬀects, DAa is a
dummy variable equal to 1 for households with a head aged a
(and 0 otherwise), DA_Educ are age-education interaction
dummies,  and  are coeﬃcients, and  is independently
and normally distributed.
Furthermore, we assume household size, employment,
and physical ﬁtness to change as people reach age 60 and
above. Ermisch (1996) argues that household types change in
thehousehold life cycle, andwe let this variable adjust to rep-
resentative values for each age-class.
Finally, total demand for housing q can be obtained by
summing over the age classes and then the housing charac-
teristics:
q =
14X
a=1
nX
i=1
waqia; (9)
wherewa is the share of households in age-class a.
3.3 Data
This paper builds on data collected for the English Hous-
ing Condition Survey (EHCS). The EHCS is a study under-
taken by the Oﬃce of the Deputy Prime Minister to assess
the condition of the English4 housing stock and to evalu-
ate the eﬀect of housing market policies. A representative
cross-section of households is interviewed about their views
on their home and neighbourhood, their income, and hous-
ing costs, and about demographic details of the household’s
members. Additional information on the interior and exte-
rior condition of the dwelling, its energy eﬃciency, and the
local environment is obtained by a subsequent professional
inspection. Each dwelling’smarket value is estimated by two
professional appraisors independently (Oﬃce of the Deputy
Prime Minister, 2003). From 1971 until 2001, the EHCS was
conducted every ﬁve years. Since April 2002 the EHCS has
been running on a continuous basis5.
For 17,500 dwellings a full interview, physical survey, and
4Similar studies have beenundertaken forWales and Scotland, but unfortu-
nately these surveys arenot entirely equivalent to theEHCS.Wewill there-
fore use English data only.
5The English Housing Condition Survey gradually evolved over time which
makes it diﬃcult to combine the data from diﬀerent years in quasi-panels.
Multiple demographic key variables like the education of the household’s
members or their attitudes towards the dwelling they live in were only in-
troduced in 2001. Our later analysis shows that especially the educational
achievement is crucial in explaining the willingness to pay for housing,
thus we do not consider the pre-2001 cross-sections, which lack this in-
formation.
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market valuation is obtained. Excluding vacant dwellings
leaves us with a sample of 16,749 households covering all
tenuresandregions. TheEHCS isbasedonastratiﬁedsample
with over-sampling of the rented tenures, which otherwise
would be too small a sample to allow for reliable results. As
a consequence of this sampling technique, each observation
must later be weighted with a grossing factor when calcu-
lating aggregated national ﬁgures from this sample (ODPM,
2002).
The rental market for housing is subject to two strong
sources of governmental intervention: ﬁrst, Local Author-
ities (LA) and Registered Social Landlords (RSL) oﬀer rel-
atively inexpensive housing to low- and middle-income
households. Aﬀordability is important, since the median of
the income6 of tenants fromRSL or LA dwellings is only two
We have access to the continuous survey data for 2002, 2003, and 2004.
Again, the number of variables is lower than in 2001. Pooling these years
doesnot create additional information, since interestingdetailswill be lost.
Inaddition, thenumberofobservationsperyear is roughlyhalf thenumber
of 2001, making an analysis based on single years with a large number of
explanatory variables impossible.
Overall, demographic changes between 2001 and 2004 are not very pro-
nounced since the period is relatively short. Possible changes in demand
patterns over time will be mainly caused by other factors like the expected
changes in house prices, risk premia, or the cost of housing ﬁnancing. In
sum, we prefer the richness of the 2001 data set over the intersection of
more years.
6Income is the annual net incomeof thehousehold referencepersonandany
partner from wages, pensions, savings and social beneﬁts. It does not in-
clude housing related beneﬁts such as council tax beneﬁt, housing beneﬁt,
thirds of the median of income renters in the unregulated
market. Second, a substantial share of low-income house-
holds are eligible for direct housing subsidies, especially the
very young and the old households. Where housing beneﬁts
are paid, they amount to 85% of all rent paid on average.
For this study, both forms of state intervention cause se-
vere distortions, since we assume that subsidies will shift
demand upwards, and the choice of dwelling characteris-
tics will no longer be solely determined by the household’s
housing preferences and budget. We therefore exclude all
dwellings rented from Local Authorities and Registered So-
cialLandlords,which further reducesour sample to9,453ob-
servations. After grossing the remaining observations still
represent 80%of the English housing stock, according to the
Oﬃce of the Deputy PrimeMinister (ODPM, 2002).
Single cross-sections can obviously provide information
for one moment in time only. Disentangling age eﬀects
common to all households from cohort eﬀects is impossible.
When one generation has a relatively strong willingness to
pay for housing services (after controlling for income etc.),
studies based on one cross-section necessarily have to as-
sume that the following generationswill have the same pref-
erencewhen reaching this age. Forecasts canbe inaccurate in
case there are inter-generational diﬀerences in tastes (My-
ers, 1999). The data this paper is based on allow us to analyze
one cross-section only, thus our ﬁndings are subject to this
Income Support Mortgage Interest or any payments made under a Mort-
gage Payment Protection Insurance policy (ODPM, 2002).
79
CHAPTER 3. DEMOGRAPHICS ANDHOUSING DEMAND
limitation.
The EHCS classiﬁes dwellings into the following cate-
gories: small terraced houses, large terraced houses, (semi-
)detached houses, bungalows, and ﬂats7. Dwelling types are
relatively similarly distributed in 8 out of 10 regions. (Semi-
)detached houses and bungalows make up the largest share
(54%), followed by terraced houses (29%) and ﬂats (18%). In-
ner and Outer London, however, have a diﬀerent structure,
with less houses (67%/35%) and ahigher share of apartments
(34%/65%)8.
With respect to the year of construction, all dwellings are
clustered into 9 cohorts9. Large regional diﬀerences with re-
spect to the construction time distribution can be observed.
In general, the least attractive construction cohorts ranging
from1850until 1964 aremore often observed in thenorthern
regions and London. The South-West has the highest share
of pre-1850 buildings. Our data suggest a natural selection
7A small terraced house is a house forming part of a block where at least one
house is attached to two or more other houses. It has a ﬂoor space up to
70m2, in contrast to the medium/large terraced house, which is bigger than
70m2. Semi-detached houses are houses that are attached to one other house,
whereas a for a detached house none of the habitable structure is joined to
another residential building. Bungalows are houseswith all of the habitable
accommodation on one ﬂoor. We do not further classify flats into possi-
ble sub-categories like ﬂats in high-rise vs. low-rise buildings or converted
ﬂats vs. purpose-built ﬂats.
8Table 3.1 provides additional summary statistics.
9The EHCS construction-classiﬁcations are: pre 1850, 1850-1899, 1900-1918,
the (inter-)war period 1919-1944, 1945-1964, 1965-1974, 1975-1980, 1981-
1990, and 1991-2001.
process in favor of quality: Buildings erected before 1850 are
on average twice as valuable today as the average value of a
house built after 1850 (Table 3.2). High quality dwellings or
houses at unique locations are more likely to survive, which
will be reﬂected in relatively higher values for the very old
cohorts.
A similar north-south diﬀerence can be observed in our
sample with regard to age. Prices of dwellings in the north-
ern regions are less thanhalf the prices of those in the south-
ern regions (not correcting for quality). London has a spe-
cial role again,withprivate residential propertyvaluesbeing
twice as high as the national average (Table 3.2).
The northern regions display a lower share of owner-
occupied dwellings and a higher share of residential prop-
erty provided by Local Authorities when compared to the
south of the country (London being an exception again).
3.8% of all households in our sample live in dwellings that
fail tomeetminimal quality standards and are regarded ‘un-
ﬁt’ for housing according to the law10. Again, Inner London
has a special position with twice the national percentage of
unﬁt dwellings, which might be caused by the relatively old
housing stock and low home-ownership rates.
When analyzing the demographic characteristics of
10For a dwelling to be ﬁt under Section 604 of the 1989 Local Govern-
ment and Housing Act it must satisfy criteria related to: disrepair; struc-
tural stability; dampness; lighting, heating and ventilation; water supply;
drainage; facilities for food preparation; and the presence, location and
functioning of essential utilities (WC, bath/shower, and sink).
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Table 3.1: Regional distributions of housing type and age of dwelling
dwelling type (in %) dwelling age cohort (in %)
region sm
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18
50
18
50
-1
89
9
19
00
-1
91
8
19
19
-1
94
4
19
45
-1
96
4
19
65
-1
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4
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75
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98
0
19
81
-1
99
0
19
90
-2
00
1
North East 12 17 47 10 13 1 4 10 18 26 17 6 11 7
Yorkshire & Humber 14 16 45 12 12 3 11 9 18 22 14 6 11 5
N. West & Mersey 16 18 45 8 13 2 11 12 20 20 13 5 11 6
E. Midlands 10 12 55 14 8 4 7 7 14 22 16 8 13 8
W. Midlands 15 16 49 7 14 2 7 8 19 25 16 6 11 6
South West 12 15 45 14 13 7 8 7 12 20 15 8 15 7
Eastern 12 12 46 15 15 4 5 5 12 22 19 9 14 9
South East 10 14 48 10 18 3 8 7 13 23 17 8 14 7
Outer London 13 20 32 2 34 0 8 10 39 15 11 4 7 5
Inner London 7 22 5 1 65 1 21 14 15 17 12 5 9 6
England total 13 16 44 10 18 3 9 9 17 22 15 7 12 7
Note: Dwelling types are relatively similarly distributed in 8 out of 10 regions. (Semi-)detached houses and bungalowsmake up the largest share, followed by
terraced houses and ﬂats. Inner and Outer London, however, have a diﬀerent structure, with less houses and a higher share of apartments.
Large regional diﬀerenceswith respect to the age structure of houses can be observed. In general, the least attractive age cohorts ranging from 1850 until 1964
aremore often observed in the northern regions and London. The South-West has the highest share of pre-1850 buildings.
Source: own calculations based on EHCS data.
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Table 3.2: Total number of dwellings, tenure, average dwelling price
Tenure (in %) avg. price (in £)
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North East 1.04 67 7 21 5 42,774 75,285 79,332 40,079
Yorkshire & H. 2.11 68 10 18 4 48,417 85,245 76,334 58,836
N. West & Mersey 2.79 70 9 14 8 43,952 94,270 84,649 53,722
E. Midlands 1.78 74 9 14 4 52,883 102,856 93,336 38,154
W. Midlands 2.08 71 6 14 8 54,454 105,750 111,789 56,894
South West 2.07 76 10 7 7 84,107 145,635 125,584 72,046
Eastern 2.28 74 9 12 5 96,356 153,136 117,680 76,201
South East 3.33 76 11 7 7 111,728 215,237 159,019 83,024
Outer London 1.83 70 12 11 7 152,590 242,808 211,440 112,374
Inner London 1.15 43 17 28 13 295,674 491,748 217,515 173,685
England (total) 20.46 71 10 13 6 90,996 161,360 125,771 73,640
Notes: Thenorthern regions display a lower share of owner-occupied dwellings and a higher share of residential property provided by Local Authoritieswhen
compared to the south of the country (London being an exception).
With regard to value, a similar north-south diﬀerence can be observed. Prices of dwellings in the northern regions are less than half the prices of those in
the southern regions (not correcting for quality). London has a special role again, with private residential property values being twice as high as the national
average.
Source: EHCS
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households in our sample, we follow the EHCS deﬁnition for
Household Reference Persons (HRP), representing the house-
hold’s social and economic position. The HRP is the person
in whose name the dwelling is owned or rented or who is
otherwise responsible for the accommodation. When two
or more people jointly own or rent the dwelling, the person
with the highest income is taken as HRP (ODPM, 2002).
Educational levels diﬀer signiﬁcantly across age groups
in the sample. More than 50% of all residents aged 65 and
above do not reach the GCSE-level (or comparable), as op-
posed to merely 12% for the 25-29-year-olds. Of the 25-29-
year-olds 38% are holding a university degree, as compared
to less than 15% for people older than 65. Since education is
the most prominent determinant of human capital, one ob-
viously needs to control for it.
We regard tenure as a typical example of a life cycle driven
variable. Our data suggests that tenure is determined by the
household’s current position in the life cycle. The largest
share of students and young professionals heading a house-
hold ﬁrst lives in privately let dwellings. The share of pri-
vately rented houses decreases by half between age 20 and
30, as people leave school or university and start working,
start families, and buy their own homes. From age 30 un-
til 40, the share drops again by half and stays low thereafter.
The very low home-ownership rate among residents aged 70
and older, however, could be caused by a negative cohort ef-
fect for this generation.
3.4 Results
The user cost of housing q for renters is the sum of rent, en-
ergy, and service costs (if not included in the rent already),
and the local council tax11, if applicable. For owner-occupied
housing, the cost of housing qowner can be understood as the
opportunity cost of not investing in an asset class similar to
residential real estate:
qowner = V  (rf +   g) +K; (10)
where V is the value of the dwelling, rf the risk-free inter-
est rate in 2001,  a risk premium for residential real estate,
g the expected capital gain, and K is the sum of all direct
costs for maintenance, energy, and council tax. We set rf
to 4.78% which is the yield for 20-year British government
bonds in 2001. g is set to 2.5%, which is the average real an-
nual growth rate of the Halifax housing index for 1983-2001.
For the risk premium we take onehalf of theUKequity pre-
mium of 4.2%, as estimated by Dimson et al. (2003). Figures
for the direct costs are provided in the EHCS data set. We
subsequently try a number of speciﬁcations for the interest
rate, the equity premium and the expected price apprecia-
tion, which scales the vector of marginal prices. The relative
magnitude of the marginal prices compared to each other is
11Inour sample, 20%ofdwellings are subject to council tax,which is theonly
residential property tax in the UK. Council tax is paid by the resident and
not necessarily by the owner. We account for council tax support granted
to economically weak households.
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Table 3.3: Education and income by birth cohort
Age Education (%) Median income (£)
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20-24 5 25 37 24 9 10,658 6,165 13,693 10,687 11,443 13,985
25-29 14 30 18 26 12 19,102 13,966 18,104 20,692 23,299 23,145
30-34 14 34 20 19 13 22,733 15,365 21,014 21,736 29,203 30,391
35-39 15 34 20 19 12 24,136 17,780 21,545 25,117 29,789 30,831
40-44 22 28 17 20 13 24,229 18,726 20,648 24,664 30,819 34,761
45-49 30 25 16 19 10 22,892 18,400 22,379 24,340 28,303 35,739
50-54 36 20 14 18 12 22,635 18,038 20,694 26,330 29,263 36,002
55-59 43 20 13 14 10 18,748 15,424 17,220 21,067 25,197 31,205
60-64 48 18 9 16 9 14,488 12,690 15,194 16,315 20,086 20,429
65-69 58 18 7 13 4 11,649 9,528 12,353 12,733 17,687 18,955
70-74 63 13 8 11 5 9,860 7,941 11,482 13,129 14,089 17,666
75-79 68 11 10 8 3 8,648 7,223 9,587 13,160 13,008 17,296
80+ 71 9 9 7 4 7,581 6,688 8,890 9,413 11,885 16,754
Notes: Income is the median annual net income at the household level, including income from savings, pensions and
housing beneﬁts.
Source: EHCS, 2001 cross-section.
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stable, however.
We estimate (10) by ordinary least squares, subject to con-
straints (4)-(6). Table 3.4 presents the coeﬃcients and the
partial derivatives qi for each of the 47 hedonics, which can
be understood as the premium (or discount) households are
willing to pay for one more unit of this characteristic. The
signs of the partial derivatives are all as expected: positive
for normal goods and negative for inferior goods. As an ex-
ample, residents arewilling topayanadditional£1,793ayear
for living in a detached house, when compared to an apart-
ment, which is the reference house type. Not surprisingly, a
residence in London comes at a hefty premium when com-
pared to the North East.
Houses constructed in the 19th century are preferred over
more recently erected structures. Houses built before 1850
are most attractive, while the least attractive construction
periods are 1945-1974 and 1991-2001. Older houses appar-
ently have features like architecture or neighborhood attrac-
tiveness that are not captured in our control variables but ac-
counted for in the time dummy.
Other normal goods like parking space or a garage, a sec-
ond living room or bathroom, central heating, more ﬂoor
space, or a larger plot size all have positive derivatives.
Living in a city center (as opposed to a rural environment)
is attractive when compared to a suburban residential or an
urban area. Neighbors are not valued much: isolated loca-
tions or places with only a few dwellings aremore expensive
than places with many houses surrounding. As expected,
areas experiencing high demand are more expensive; areas
withmany vacancies, on the other hand, come at a discount.
The EHCS provides two measures of the level of crime in an
area. In the interviews, respondents are asked about their
perceptions with regard to crime. We ﬁnd a positive coef-
ﬁcient for the dummy indicating that no crime is perceived.
Second, we interpret the presences of secured windows and
doors as an indicator for a threat of burglary, and we ﬁnd
negative coeﬃcients for it. Links to public transport close to
the housemake a placemore attractive12.
Having established hedonic prices, we link the prices to
the demographic characteristics of the inhabitants by equa-
tion (30). We use 52 variables13 to estimate how the port-
folio of housing services demanded varies with age, house-
12The explanatory power of the regression improves quite substantially
when estimating (10) including dwellings rented out by social landlords
and local authorities into the sample aswell,with theR2 nearing0.76. Ap-
parently, rents are easier to explain by the underlyinghedonics, since they
are heavily regulated. In many cases regulation prescribes a clear relation
between hedonics like ﬂoor space or number of rooms and the rent asked.
In addition, buildings in the social housing sector are more standardized
than owner-occupied houses, which makes them easier to model in a lin-
ear way.
13Weregress themarginal prices qi against the following demographic vari-
ables: age-group dummies (15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-
49, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, 80+), education dummies (up to
GCSE/O level/CSE Equivalent; up to A level or equivalent; up to degree,
or degree equivalent; higher degree/postgraduate qualiﬁcation), employ-
ment status dummies (full time work, part-time work, retired, unem-
ployed, full time education), gender, dummy for persons with long-term
illness in household, ethnicity dummies (black, Asian, other non-white),
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Table 3.4: Marginal prices qi for hedonic characteristics
Variables describing dwelling Variables describing location
Variable Mean SD N Variable Mean SD N
Dwelling type (vs. apartment) Region (vs. North East)
Terraced small 296 714 1213 Yorkshire and Humber 109 640 970
Terraced large 433 1026 1798 North West and Mersey 619 1156 1057
Detached 1793 1577 4617 E Midlands 729 994 1044
Bungalow 1956 1650 882 W Midlands 888 998 905
tenure (vs. renting) S West 2326 1734 1138
Owner Occupied 1421 2890 8225 Eastern 2269 1559 994
Year of construction (vs. 1991-2001) S East 3237 2057 1010
pre 1850 1724 2214 387 O/London 7929 3579 779
1850-1899 1240 2437 1046 I/London 10422 6040 549
1900-1918 1039 1583 1127 Neighborhood type (vs. rural)
1919-1944 807 1272 1982 City centre 197 3586 248
1945-1964 288 952 1811 Urban -924 2383 2026
1965-1974 285 880 1329 Suburban residential -399 1910 5152
1975-1980 429 1184 545 Rural residential -263 1890 1301
1981-1990 444 1111 781 Village centre -348 1881 392
Misc. # houses in community (vs. 500+)
Parking lot 722 740 6412 isolated 1599 2478 190
2nd living room 427 787 4439 Under 100 781 1256 1329
2nd bathroom 818 1432 1001 100-299 364 670 2413
2nd WC 536 899 3592 300-499 224 647 1491
ln(bedrooms) 1223 1315 9014 Demand
ln(plot) 11 20 7585 High demand area 1918 1585 2349
ln(ﬂoorspace) 536 411 9453 No vacancies around 771 1171 8175
Misc.
No crime perceived 287 688 936
Good public transport 173 644 1061
No secure windows 72 383 4404
Notes: Mean and standard deviation
in £/year. The average values of qi
can be interpreted as the average
annual premium (or discount)
residents pay for an additional unit of
i. For example, living in a detached
house (in contrast to a apartment) is
worth on average £1,793, after
controlling for size etc. A second
bathroom’s price is £818.
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hold composition, household type, economic situation of the
household, income, employment status, educational level,
ethnicity, and attitudes of the inhabitants regarding the
dwelling they live in.
Equation (20) states that imputed prices for each hedonic
characteristic are in fact marginal prices: the level of the he-
donic characteristic zi inﬂuences the marginal price qi. For
example, the willingness to pay for one additional bedroom
depends on the number of bedrooms already present in the
house. A household’s unobservable taste will impact both
the price and the quantity – someone with a strong prefer-
ence for a gardenwill not only be willing to paymore for the
garden but is more likely to have a large garden as well. In
order to avoid the error term  being correlated to the left-
hand side qi, we use two-stage least squares (2SLS), as sug-
gestedbyBartik (1987). In contrast toGreenandHendershott
(1996), however, we employ 2SLS for the logarithmic vari-
ables only (ﬂoor space, plot size, # bedrooms). Income net
of housing, regional dummies, dummies on the tenure, and
dwelling type are used as instruments. Prices for character-
istics measured by dummy variables are estimated by OLS
omitting zi, since the values of the respective dummies are
diﬃcult to be replaced by instruments not already included
dummy for disabled person living in the household, dummy for house-
holds with children, dummies for personal motives of the residents (al-
ways lived in the dwelling, have familiy and friends close by, live close
to work, regard the dwelling as the “right kind of property”, aﬀordability,
wishing tomove), the usage (weekend and evenings only), the household’s
income, the interactions of incomewith age, and the household’s size.
in our direct regressors.
The demand formost housing components increases with
household size. Especially detached houses and bungalows
are more in demand. As expected, the demand for more
(bath) rooms is positively related to the number of people
living in the dwelling. Singles do not have demand patterns
very diﬀerent from multi-person households after control-
ling for household size.
Higher levels of income shift the reservation prices for al-
most all housing components upwards (or downwards for
inferior housing services). As an example, we estimate the
premiumahousehold iswilling topay for living inadetached
house (vs. living in a small terraced house) to increase by
3.3%when income doubles.
Beside this direct income eﬀect, we believe that a house-
hold’s human capital is driving its current housing con-
sumption decision. The optimal level of housing consump-
tion does not depend on current income solely, but to a
large extent on the present value of future streams of in-
come. The more income a household can expect, the more
housing services it can (and wishes to) consume over its life-
time. Borrowing on mortgage allows young households to
smooth their consumption inter-temporally, ashigher levels
of housing consumption are possible in earlier years already.
Assuming a concave housing utility curve, the smoothing of
housing consumption increases a household’s lifetime util-
ity. In addition, transaction costs are reduced, as the level of
housing services does not necessarily need to be readjusted
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each time current income changes. The household will only
move to a larger (smaller) home in case the expected value of
human capital changes signiﬁcantly.
Unfortunately, humancapital isnot easilymeasurable. We
therefore have to rely upon education as a proxy for human
capital, assuming higher levels of education to be related to
higher future income. As an illustration, a well-educated
young professional can expect that her income will increase
more in subsequent years than the income of a less educated
householdwith the same level of current income. Our results
show that, after controlling for income, households headed
by university graduates are willing to pay more (less) for all
normal (inferior) goods when compared to households with
lower educational achievements. This holds true for less ad-
vanced educational levels as well: having passed GCSE lets
the household demandmore housing than householdswith-
out any conventional education (our reference group)14.
Similarly, health plays an important role in housing de-
mand. In our sample, households with members suﬀering
from long-term illnesses or including people with disabili-
ties consume less housing services. This does not imply that
housing has a lower priority for the ill or disabled. Health
problems, however, impair humanwealth as future incomes
are expected to be lower, which in turn depresses overall
housing consumption.
14Relaxed borrowing constraints could be an alternative explanation, since
banks could bemore willing to provide mortgages to better educated cus-
tomers.
We do not ﬁnd a direct impact of age on housing de-
mand. Most coeﬃcients for the cohort dummies are in-
signiﬁcant. Still, older households are more willing to pay
for housing than younger households. The higher income-
age interaction coeﬃcients for older age groups do not in-
dicate that older people spend more on housing in absolute
terms. Given the lower income for retirees, it is rather the
relative share of the income devoted to housing that drives
up the coeﬃcients. People simply stay in their houses af-
ter retiring, consuming the same amount of housing as be-
fore. This inter-temporal smoothing of housing consump-
tion makes sense from an investor’s life cycle perspective as
well: owner-occupiers build up housing wealth during their
working years and consume more than otherwise possible
when retiring. For aging owner-occupiers, housing services
are often as big as income. People apparently do not ac-
count for the opportunity costs of not renting out or sell-
ing the paid-oﬀ house they are living in. However, this line
of reasoning cannot explain why elderly renters pay rela-
tively more as well, since they have to make rent payments
in cash. We believe that moving is costly for older peo-
ple, both ﬁnancially, since they have to rely on professional
help more than younger households, and emotionally and
socially, since they are leaving a place they lived in for years.
In the same line of reasoning, it is not surprising that most
of the coeﬃcients for the variable indicating retirement are
positive and signiﬁcant, indicating a constant willingness to
pay for housing even when income decreases.
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Only few black and Asian households are included in the
sample, and they are not evenly distributed geographically.
After controlling for age, income, education, household type
and size, we ﬁnd Asian and black households to attach a dis-
count on being owner, having a parking lot, or a suburban
residential location. Dwellings constructed between 1850
and 1914or located inhighlydemandedneighborhoods carry
a premium. These results do not necessarily imply diﬀerent
tasteswith regard to these characteristics directly, butwe in-
terpret them as a preference for traditional migrant neigh-
borhoods in the historic city centers.
Households that are at home onweekends and in evenings
only are less inclined to spend on housing services than
households that use the space during workdays as well. The
premium for owning the property, for instance, is decreased
by £250 a year.
Those households that indicated that the place they live in
is “the right kind of property” for them are willing to pay
more for many housing services. Households that are in-
tending tomove soon, on theotherhand, consume lesshous-
ing thanexpected, given their level of income, education, and
other demographic factors. We read this as another indica-
tor for transaction costs letting householdswait until the de-
sired and the current level of housing strongly deviate before
upgrading to a better home.
Having established the link between demographics and
the determinants of a house, we can now asses how demand
for a constant-quality house will change in age. National av-
erages are taken to deﬁne a representative constant quality
dwelling. We calculate the demand for this dwelling in three
alternative ways:
First, we calculate a total age derivative, in which all de-
mographic characteristics of an age-group are changing in
age (life cycle variables). Age groups are assumed to have
thesamedemographic characteristics theirpredecessorshad
earlier. This is, roughly, the Mankiw and Weil (1989) ap-
proach.
Second, we calculate a partial age derivative based on co-
horts, keeping all demographics beside age constant, which
is in line with the approach used by Green and Hendershott
(1996). For variables like the highest educational achieve-
ment or attitudes of the residents, this assumption is reason-
able. But for variables like income, it certainly is not.
Third, the results from the demographic regression (Ta-
ble 3.5) suggest that changes in household size, income, em-
ployment status, and health signiﬁcantly inﬂuence hous-
ing demand. We therefore deﬁne life cycle variables15, which
change with age, and estimate demand taking account of
likely changes in these life cycle variables.
Changes in income are estimated using (8). In general, a
household’s income ﬁrst increases with age, peaks around
age 52, declines until age 65 and stabilizes subsequently. The
better a household is educated, the more pronounced dy-
namics can be observed. For instance, income ﬁrst quadru-
15Life-cycle variables are income, household size, household type, health of
householdmembers, or employment status.
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Figure 3.1: Income dynamics for British households
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All values in £/year. A household’s income ﬁrst increases with age, peaks
around age 52, declines until age 65 and stabilizes subsequently. The better
a household is educated, the more pronounced dynamics can be observed.
For instance, income quadruples for households headed by university grad-
uates fromage25-52, anddecreases againbyone thirdas themembersof the
household retire, before it stabilizes. For lower educational levels, both the
increase and the decline are less steep. Households who’s head has enjoyed
no formal education start at very low income levels, experience robust in-
come growth until age 55, but do not suﬀer from income losses as they reach
retirement.
Data: British Household Panel Survey, 1991-2001.
ples for households headed by university graduates from
age 25-52, and decreases again by one third as the members
of the household retire, before it stabilizes. For lower ed-
ucational levels, both the increase and the decline are less
steep. Households who’s head has enjoyed no formal ed-
ucation start at very low income levels, experience robust
income growth until age 55, but do not suﬀer from income
losses as they reach retirement. This surprising result could
be linked to state transfers to the elderly and, more likely, to
cohort eﬀects in disguise: 62% of all household heads born
between 1925 and 1930 received basic schooling only, while
for the cohort born between 1975 and 1980, the share drops
to as low as 11% (please see Table 3.3).
After age65,weassumeall households to retire, thehouse-
hold size to go down to an average of 1.5, the share of house-
holds with at least one disabled member to rise to 15%, and
the share of households with long-term ill persons to rise to
35%16, and calculate an adjusted partial derivative. We ac-
knowledge that this is still a rough way of modelling which
could be reﬁned in the future. The age group of 50-54 is our
reference group for both partial derivatives.
Figure 3.2 shows that demand for housing increases from
age 20-24 until age 50-54 for all three derivatives by ca
50%. The total age derivative increases faster than the par-
16These assumptions are based on the averages for older age groups in our
sample (controlled for incomeandeducation). Werunrobustness tests, us-
ing diﬀerent parameters for income dynamics, health and household size.
We do not observe qualitative changes in the results.
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Figure 3.2: Demand for an average dwelling as a function of age
Figure 2: Demand for an average dwelling as a function of age
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We define a constant quality house based on national averages and calculate the
age-cohort specific demand for this house in three alternative ways:
1) Total age derivative, where all demographic characteristics vary with age
2) Partial age derivative, where the demographic profile is kept constant over all
age-groups
3) Partial age derivatives with adjustments, which allows for changes in the selected
demographic characteristics of a cohort – relative income or household size are
expected to change as a household moves through the housing life cycle.
28
Notes: We deﬁne a constant quality house based on national averages and
calculate the age-cohort speciﬁc demand for this house in three alternative
ways:
1) Total age derivative, where all demographi characteristi ry with age
2) Partial age derivative, wher the demographic proﬁle is kept consta t
over all age-groups
3) Partial age derivatives with adjustments, which allows for changes in the
selected demographic characteristics of a cohort – relative income or house-
hold size are expected to change as a householdmoves through the housing
life cycle.
tial derivatives, which can be explained by younger cohorts
having enjoyed a better education, earning more and hav-
ing overall a higher expected worth of human capital. Af-
ter 50-5417, the total age derivative declines again, indicat-
ing that older households were consuming less housing ser-
vices than younger ones. The partial derivatives, however,
do not decrease, indicating that today’s 50-year-oldswill not
reduce housing consumption – on the contrary, housingwill
be amore important part of their overall consumption. After
age 55, the adjusted demand stabilizes, although the house-
hold’s disposable income decreases. The unadjusted partial
age derivative keeps increasing in age, even for the very old.
The total agederivative canbe regardedas the lowerbound
of future housing demand for aging households, whereas the
unadjusted partial age derivative is the higher bound. Or put
diﬀerently: Mankiw and Weil were too pessimistic, while
Hendershott and Green probably overestimated future de-
mand. The adjusted partial age derivative’s demand projec-
tions will be located in between the two extreme positions.
The pattern of the graph is very robust. Using diﬀerent
reference groups, alternative regression models, or diﬀer-
ent assumptions for the user-cost of housing q does not al-
ter the overall shape qualitatively. Choosing younger ref-
erence groups makes the diﬀerence between the total age
17Please note that the age indicated in the graph is the age of the household
reference person. By deﬁnition, this is not the average age of the house-
hold members, which is usually lower. Thus, the demand graphs for indi-
viduals instead of households is shifted to the left.
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derivative and the partial age derivatives more pronounced
as younger age cohorts are better educated anddemandmore
housing. Using a semi-logarithmic functional form for (10)
does not change the results signiﬁcantly. The level of the to-
tal demand, however, is quite sensitive to higher (lower) user
cost ofhousingassumed,whichwill shift all threegraphsup-
wards (downwards) in comparable ways.
The relative change of demand for housing services in age
is similar for all dwelling types, as Figure 3.3 shows. Only
the levels diﬀer: the willingness to pay is highest for de-
tached houses followed by terraced houses, bungalows and
apartments. Demand for bungalows and detached houses
rises faster in age than demand for apartments and terraced
houses.
3.5 Future Demand for Housing
Our results allow for a discussion of the future development
of housing demand in England with regard to changing de-
mographics. Wewill focus on the two determinants of hous-
ingdemand: thenumberofhouseholds and the level ofhous-
ing services demanded per household.
The number of households in England is expected to
grow further. TheGovernmentActuary’s Department (GAD)
projects England’s population to increase by 10 percent to 56
million in the period between 2007 and 2027 (GAD, 2007).
In addition, household size is expected to decrease, lead-
Figure 3.3: Demand disaggregated for dwelling types
Figure 3: Demand disaggregated for dwelling types
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The relative change of demand for housing services in age is similar for all dwelling
types. Only the levels differ: the willingness to pay is highest for detached houses
followed by terraced houses, bungalows and apartments. Demand for bungalows
and detached houses rises faster in age than demand for apartments and terraced
houses.
29
Notes: Therelative changeofdemand forhousingservices inage is similar for
all dwelling types. Only the levels diﬀer: thewillingness topay is highest for
detached houses followed by terraced houses, bungalows and apartments.
Demand for bungalows anddetachedhouses rises faster in age thandemand
for apartments and terraced houses.
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ing to even more growth in household numbers suggesting
higher future demand for housing. This robust future out-
look isverydiﬀerent fromtheprojections formanyotherEu-
ropean countries. Especially in many Central and Southern
European countries, population growth has already turned
into shrinkage and the population structure is older already
(United Nations Population Division, 2007).
Combining projections for the population numbers and
the age structure with the earlier established willingness to
pay for a constant-quality house, gives a forecast for aggre-
gate housing demand. Assuming the average household size
to stay constant, we derive the number of households per age
group and calculate aggregated demand based on Equation
(9) for each year until 2027.
Our calculations suggest that housing demand will con-
tinue to grow, with an average growth of 0.9 percent in the
next 20 years. Demand growth will peak in the period from
2012 until 2017 and slow down afterwards.
Based on alternative assumptions regarding fertility rates
and migration dynamics, the GAD oﬀers so-called ‘variant
scenarios’ in addition to the most likely scenario. Assuming
higher fertility rates and higher net-migration into the UK
leads to a scenario with a younger population, while lower
fertility rates and low inﬂux of (mostly) young immigrants
results in projections of a relatively old population.
The graphs in Figure 3.4 show that the overall housing de-
mand development is very similar across the three scenar-
ios. Again, annual demand growth is positive for all years in
all scenarios with a peak in 2012-2017. For the younger pop-
ulation scenario, changes are mainly driven by shifts in the
total number of households. In the case of an older popu-
lation, however, almost the entire growth can be attributed
to higher per-household demand. Due to the robust outlook
under all scenarios covered, we expect English housing de-
mand to increase in the next years18.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper aims to investigate how demographics determine
the amount and the quality of housing services demanded. It
contributes to the current debate in three ways: First, based
on a very detailed 2001 cross-section of English households,
we ﬁnd that human capital is a key driver for housing de-
mand. Variables that are positively related to human capital
increase the demand for housing. For instance, each addi-
tional level of education a household has achieved, drives up
its reservation prices for the housing services consumed. On
the other hand, factors like chronic illnesses that impair hu-
18To convert our demand forecasts into house price predictions, we need
information on supply elasticities in England. Malpezzi and Maclennan
(2001) investigate the supply elasticity for residential property in the US
and the UK. First, they ﬁnd that the supply elasticity is lower in the UK
than in the US. Second, for the post-war UK they estimate supply elastic-
ities between 0 and 1, depending on the parameter values chosen in the
models. This suggests that increased demand will further drive up house
prices.
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Figure 3.4: Aggregate housing demand growth projections, England
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Notes: The Government Actuary’s Department oﬀers two alternative popu-
lation scenarios in addition to the base case: Assuming higher fertility rates
and higher net-migration into the UK leads to a scenario with a younger
population, while lower fertility rates and low migration results in projec-
tions of a relatively old population.
Combining projections for the population numbers and the age structure
with the earlier established willingness to pay for housing services, gives a
forecast for aggregated housing demand.
mancapitalhaveanegative impact onhousing consumption.
Since eachgeneration isbetter educated than thegenerations
before, an aging societywill demandmore housing on an ag-
gregated level, even if the total number of households stops
growing. A scenario analysis with diﬀerent population pro-
jections shows that the upward slopingpartial age derivative
is supporting demand in an aging society.
Second, we reﬁne the existing methodology by distin-
guishing between life cycle variables that are expected to
change with age for each household, and cohort variables,
that are determined by the household’s birth-cohort and not
by age. Earlier studies either let all demographics change
with age, or kept all variables constant during the entire
household life cycle.
Third, we believe that our ﬁndings are very relevant
for other European countries beside England. Despite the
cultural and economic heterogeneity within Europe, the
upward-sloping age-demand-relationship observed in Eng-
land should be a reasonable proxy for other European na-
tions, even in case of diﬀerent demographic proﬁles. Today,
Europe is facing anunprecedenteddemographic change: The
entire area reaching from Germany in the west, to Russia in
the east, and to the Balkans in the south is losing population
already today– and this development is expected to gainmo-
mentum in the next decades (United Nations Population Di-
vision, 2007).
A regional housing market with unattractive economic
perspectives and living conditions faces a double challenge:
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not only does the total number of households decline, but
householdshaving enjoyedabetter educationaremore likely
than the less educated to move away to more prosperous
regions. Without the younger generation being better ed-
ucated and more wealthy than the generations before, the
pressure on housing demand caused by population shrink-
age cannot be oﬀ-set.
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Table 3.5: Demographic regression – selected results
price of Household Income Education Health Ethnicity Perceptions Usage
size income 20-24 60-64 GCSE A-lev. Univ. higher lt ill disab. retired black Asian right kind want move WE & ev. zi R
2
Terraced small 87 0.028 167 262 229 0.14
Terraced large 0.013 -0.039 215 392 278 167 0.09
Detached 147 0.033 148 376 661 894 -235 235 279 -241 -122 0.21
Bungalow 223 0.045 306 492 -371 476 -1427 0.16
Yorkshire & H. -0.018 -101 -196 -250 0.11
N West & Mersey 135 0.032 254 501 905 -570 0.17
E Midlands 80 0.021 298 333 307 0.15
W Midlands 122 0.027 343 828 -178 0.20
S West 210 0.053 -0.107 -0.046 378 555 626 604 0.15
Eastern 174 0.049 386 385 416 667 -311 0.24
S East 409 0.048 -0.079 332 985 1060 -973 -503 -260 0.23
O/London 777 1184 1118 2183 -1586 -1644 -934 -757 0.27
I/London 734 1597 2654 3362 -3369 4119 -1643 3770 -1040 0.24
Owner occupied 130 0.053 0.043 278 544 1016 1240 -230 -360 -1055 -887 368 -575 -254 0.16
pre 1850 0.047 858 648 0.16
1850-1899 0.081 -0.087 519 806 906 -403 1358 1229 862 491 -329 0.17
1900-1918 114 524 568 877 597 388 624 0.19
1919-1944 0.023 316 534 1112 402 -112 0.13
1945-1964 -0.066 320 457 0.10
1965-1974 75 0.012 -0.021 200 238 -252 -158 0.09
1975-1980 294 -284 837 0.22
1981-1990 129 386 -262 226 0.09
City centre 0.21
Urban -328 -0.053 0.125 -359 -434 -775 -941 -1404 0.17
Suburban res. -251 -0.018 0.022 -431 -415 -531 -226 0.07
Rural residential -0.050 -358 -329 -486 0.09
Village centre -964 0.10
Under 100 0.028 -0.033 206 216 408 774 0.13
100-299 0.017 133 164 233 300 0.05
300-499 50 0.019 287 -108 0.09
isolated 0.26
Prking lot 0.013 53 117 104 -88 178 -292 -245 81 -99 -66 0.09
2nd liv. 0.015 -0.034 97 125 242 379 204 141 -69 -83 0.18
2nd bath 302 0.247 236 668 -821 271 164 0.31
2nd WC 39 0.026 -0.034 145 189 312 378 -138 205 280 -96 -78 0.20
No crime 140 161 219 0.06
Good pub. trans. 108 0.041 0.019 -86 0.33
No sec. windows -23 0.007 -0.007 -41 179 100 86 0.03
High demand area 75 0.025 -0.071 0.026 369 686 380 466 338 410 0.17
No vacancies -0.025 152 306 -73 244 -69 0.02
ln(bedrooms) 0.014 0.020 0.036 157 234 440 -76 -141 -255 640 216 344 0.10
ln(plot size) 0.000 0.000 2 4 2 2 3 -3 -1 -7 0.03
ln(area) -17 0.008 0.005 33 69 62 83 59 -29 -16 562 0.32
Notes: Only signiﬁcant coeﬃcients (p-value< 0.1) are displayed. All others are omitted for the sake of readability. Due to space constraints, results for only
selected regressors are presented above. Prices for plot size, ﬂoor space, number of bedrooms, and repaircosts (all in logs) are estimated in a 2SLS, following
Bartik (1987). We use income net of housing, regional dummies, tenure dummies and house type dummies as instruments. R2 for 2SLS have no statistical
meaning and are therefore not stated. All other equations are estimated by ordinary least squares.
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The topography of growth and decline: Local price dynamics within
cities
4.1 Introduction
Cities are highly dynamic organisms. They emerge, prosper,
decline, and perish in reaction to changing populations, eco-
nomic trends, political, social, and technological advances.
Urban economists likeKrugman (Krugman, 1991, 1993; Fujita
et al. , 2000) explain why people crowd together and found
cities in the ﬁrst place. Others investigate the relative com-
petitiveness of cities (e.g. Ellison and Glaeser, 1999; Porter,
1996), carving out the causes for cross-sectional variation
and time-trends. Yet another discourse focuses on cities’
ability to adapt to changing environments, or, as Glaeser
(2005) called it, to “re-invent” themselves.
This paper researches within-city dynamics. It builds on
a broad strand of literature addressing the urban layout of
cities, which extends the mono-centric Alonso-Mills-Muth
model (Alonso, 1964; Mills, 1972; Muth, 1969) to a variety of
poly-centric speciﬁcations. By nowwe understand how eco-
nomic factors inﬂuence the formation of subcenters (Fujita
and Ogawa, 1982; McMillen and Smith, 2003). Price diﬀer-
entials across residential neighborhoods are exogenous, as
they are reﬂecting diﬀerences in employment opportunities
or amenities in general.
Guerrieri et al. (2010) carry the debate to the next level
by explicitlymodeling endogeneities in neighborhood home
price levels. They assume that wealthy households obtain a
higher utility from being close to other wealthy neighbors
than less wealthy households do. Ultimately, this leads to a
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sorting of householdswithin a city based on home values. In
a self-enforcingprocess, the rich and the lesswealthyhuddle
in separate parts of town.
Previous studies analyzed subcenters of huge metropoli-
tan areas that remained relatively large entities, compara-
ble to mid-size cities. Redfearn (2007), for instance, iden-
tiﬁes only 41 subcenters for the Los Angeles metropolitan
area based on a non-parametric identiﬁcation methodol-
ogy. Guerrieri et al. (2010) manage to zoom in a bit fur-
ther when analyzing 77 community districts for the city of
Chicago, each consisting out of several census tracts. Noth-
ing is known about endogenous price dynamics in smaller
towns or at more ﬁne-grained levels of observations.
Endogeneous eﬀects, however, are likely to be the
strongest at very local levels. When choosing a location
to live, the relative magnitude of the endogenous forces
increases in the proximity of evaluated alternatives. Simply
speaking, when deciding to move to one block or to an
adjacent block, the usual determinants like proximity to
work or distance to city-wide amenities are less important
since they are very similar. Instead, local factors gain in
relative importance. Pushing it to the extreme: The only
spatial diﬀerence across two neighboring houses are the
non-mutual neighbors.
House prices were at the forefront of the latest ﬁnancial
cycle. Seemingly constant real growth rates in home values
ﬁrst fueled theﬁnancial systemand the real economyduring
the too-nice-to-be-true upswing in themid2000’s. The sub-
sequent downswingwas again caused by (and left a deep im-
pact on) thehousing sector. Homevalues in theUnitedStates
as estimated by the Case-Shiller Composite 20 house price
index lost 31.6 percent in the 3 years following their peak in
April 2006 (Case and Shiller, 2010). In the same period fore-
closures sky-rocketed, pushing the highly leveraged ﬁnan-
cial system over the edge.
This paper analyzes how changes in price trends trans-
late into changes in the spatial distribution of prices within
cities. Were certain quarters, for instance, more sensitive to
the the price bubble? Do prices converge across neighbor-
hoods when home values are decreasing in a metropolitan
region, leveling out the diﬀerences between the prosperous
areasand theunpopularones? Ordoesadecline inhomeval-
ues increase thepolarization in rich andpoor quarters? Does
an extended period of falling prices create pockets of relative
poverty within the tissue of a city?
Another set of questions is motivated by changing demo-
graphics. Over the last ﬁfty years, at least 370 cities world-
wide with populations over 100,000 have shrunk by more
than 10 percent (Oswalt and Rieniets, 2006). Classic exam-
ples of cities facing demographic challenges are Pittsburgh,
Detroit, or New Orleans. In Europe, more than one-third
of European cities lost population in the period from 1996
to 2001 (European Commission, 2007). The unprecedented
rates at which Central and Eastern European countries are
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currently losing population give a new urgency to the ques-
tions of how demographic contraction aﬀects not only the
total wealth of regions, but also the relative distribution of
housing wealth within these regions. For instance, all but
two Eastern German cities1 have suﬀered from falling pop-
ulation numbers and depressed home values in the last two
decades. I am not aware of any study that researches the
impact of demographic decline on the wealth distribution
within such cities.
The Netherlands are an ideal test environment for study-
ing housing markets due to a national peculiarity: Hous-
ing supply is to a large extend exogenous. Vermeulen and
Rouwendal (2007) estimate the housing supply elasticity for
TheNetherlands tobenegligibly small. Dutchmunicipalities
release land for new residential construction only in home-
opathic doses. In addition, zoning rules are extremely tight
and red tape around construction is dense. The average time
between the decision to start a building project and the be-
ginning of actual construction is estimated to be on average
90 months (Eichholtz and Lindenthal, 2008). Thus, any re-
sponses to demand shocks will be very delayed, if there is a
response at all. The market for existing homes, however is
entirely free and comparable to the United States or other
Western countries.
The paper is structured as follows: First, three ideas on
changing within-city price diﬀerentials are introduced. The
secondsectionsuggests empirical strategies to test these the-
1Dresden and Leipzig
ories while the data used in this paper are described in sec-
tion three. The fourth part presents the empirical results,
followed by an overall discussion.
4.2 Research question
Figure 4.1 simpliﬁes the relative price paths of buildings
with comparable quality characteristics across two neigh-
borhoods within the same metropolitan area. Neighbor-
hoodA is amore attractive quarter enjoying relative housing
wealth, while neighborhood B has lower home values. Line
G0 represents the original price gradient.
The relative price diﬀerences are not ﬁxed but evolve in
time. A negative shock to house prices at metropolitan level,
for instance, leads to lower home values in both neighbor-
hoods. In case the general decline improved the relative at-
tractiveness of neighborhood A versus B, the stronger dif-
ferences in home values across neighborhoods (D1) lead to a
steeper price gradient G1. Alternatively, a shock could level
out the diﬀerences (D2), causing the inter-neighborhood
price gradient to ﬂatten (G2).
Why would a general swing in home values impact rela-
tive price diﬀerentials at local levels? First, Guerrieri et al.
(2010) reason that being in the proximity of rich neighbors
improves the general level of amenities like the quality of
schools or lower crime levels. Under the assumption that
richerhouseholdsderiveahigherutility fromsuchamenities
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Figure 4.1: Decreasing home values and relative prices levels across
neighborhoods
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Note: This ﬁgure depicts the relative price paths of buildings with com-
parable quality characteristics across two neighborhoods within the same
metropolitan area. Neighborhood A is a more attractive quarter enjoying
relative housingwealth, while neighborhoodBhas lower homevalues. Line
G0 represents the original price gradient.
A negative shock to house prices at metropolitan level leads to lower home
values in both neighborhoods. In case the general decline enforced the rel-
ative attractiveness of neighborhood A versus B, the stronger diﬀerences in
home values across neighborhoods (D1) lead to a steeper price gradientG1.
Alternatively, a shock could level out the diﬀerences (D2), causing the inter-
neighborhood price gradient to ﬂatten (G2).
than poorer families can, an endogenous price dynamic sets
in: the rich concentrate in (and further improve) amenity
richareaswhile thepoor favor cheaphousing in low-amenity
parts of town. When testing whether the predictions de-
rived from this model can be conﬁrmed empirically, Guer-
rieri et al. (2010) ﬁnd aﬀordable neighborhoods bordering
already expensive quarters to be the most sensitive to this
circle of endogenous gentriﬁcation. In boom years they will
gain more in value than other neighborhoods and, symmet-
rically, they will lose more in city-wide down swings. The
ﬁrst twohypothesesof thispaper testwhether theseﬁndings
can be conﬁrmedwithmore detailed data.
Houses located in areas close to relatively high-value
neighborhoods will …
H1: …experience higher price growth than homes in areas
bordering comparable or low-price neighborhoods when
prices rise at city-level.
H2: …lose more value than homes in areas bordering com-
parable or low-price neighborhoods when prices fall at city
level.
The alternative hypotheses state that there is no (or an oﬀ-
setting) price growth eﬀect for proximity to more expensive
areas.
Household mobility is a necessary condition for any en-
dogenous sorting of households in wealthy and poor neigh-
borhoods. Without people moving, the virtuous circle of
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endogenous wealth accumulation in distinct quarters can-
not set in. The most mobile group of people are those that
just move into the city. If a city has a sizable inﬂux of new
residents, not only demand for housing in general is sup-
ported but also the speed of gentriﬁcation will accelerate. I
do not know of any paper investigating such a moderating
role of population growth on endogenous home price dy-
namics. This paper will therefore test the following hypoth-
esis:
H3: Endogenous gentrification effects increase in the city’s
population growth rate.
Second, sticky housing supply in combination with
shrinking household numbers potentially shifts and tilts the
price gradient. Aggregate housing demand is a product of
the number of households and the demand for housing ser-
vices per household. A lower number of households causes
a lower level of aggregate demand (keeping everything else
constant) and pushes prices down as supply cannot adjust
quickly enough due to the durable nature of the structures in
place. If income, availability of ﬁnancing, and consumption
preferences of the remaining households are not aﬀected by
the decline in home values,2 these households can consume
2This sounds like a bold assumption since Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) ﬁnd
cities with falling home values to attract low human capital households.
For The Netherlands in general, however, income per households was not
at least the same amount of non-housing goods while si-
multaneously increase the consumption of housing services
without paying more for it. As a result, they will chose to
increase housing consumption, at least partially. Overall,
households will move from weak areas with less attractive
structures and amenities in place to stronger quarters,
‘ﬁlling up’ vacant higher quality apartments that used to be
out of reach. This population and human capital transfer
aggravates disparities within cities. Alternatively, if house
prices increase while population numbers drop, the relative
diﬀerentials will not change since poor households cannot
move ‘up’. In sum, changes in the within-city house price
gradients are expected to diﬀer depending on the the cities’
population growth rates.
More formally speaking, the relative price diﬀerence be-
tween low price areas and neighboring high-price areas will
…
H4: …stay equal or become smaller for areas with rising
city-wide home prices, regardless of changing population
numbers.
H5: …becomemore pronounced for areas with falling city-
wide home prices when population numbers decline.
H6: …stay equal or become smaller for areas with falling
city-wide home prices when population numbers decline.
depressed by falling home values and the global ﬁnancial crisis. On aver-
age households gross income decreases by just -0.28 percent in real terms
in 2009 (CBS, 2010).
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Finally, one can think of an investment-driven reason for
changes in the inner-city price diﬀerentials. Above average
price growth rates for selected quarters in townduring boom
periods and subsequent higher losses in busts indicate lo-
cal price speculation and overshooting. Investors chase after
good investment opportunities in those areas where prices
have been going up, further fueling the price rally. Once lo-
callyoverheatedmarketsdip intodecline, prices in these ‘fast
rise’ areas will melt down quicker than in surrounding ar-
eas. A vast literature on home price bubbles emerged in the
last decade (for instance Himmelberg et al. , 2005; Brunner-
meier and Julliard, 2008; Case and Shiller, 2003). Only few
papers, however, explicitly address the spatial diﬀusion of
speculative processes. Roehner (1999), as an exception, an-
alyzes the price path of twenty districts in central Paris dur-
ing theprice bubble in the late 1980s. Heﬁndshomeprices in
mundanequarters to rise faster, reach thepeak earlier, and to
declinemore rapidly than house prices in lesswealthy areas.
Roehner’s ﬁndings warrant a last hypothesis:
H7: House prices in areas that have risen more than av-
erage in price upswings will decline more than average in
subsequent price downswings, regardless of the relative po-
sition of the area on the within-city price gradient.
Although H7 falls short of a rigorous test for local price
bubbles, controlling for speculation in even a naïve manner
strengthens the ﬁndings fromH1 throughH6.
4.3 Methodology
Thispaper suggests twoempirical approaches toestimate the
within-city price dynamics. The ﬁrst models neighborhood
eﬀects by including spatial dummies based on the neighbor-
hood classiﬁcation oﬀered by the Dutch Central Bureau of
Statistics (CBS) into a hedonic regression. Subsequently it
analyzes endogenous changes in the neighborhood coeﬃ-
cients for several periods in time, both in booming and de-
cliningmarket regimes.
The second approach estimates continuous surfaces of
home values in metropolitan areas. House price index
surfaces are like topographic maps of a landscape: neigh-
borhoods carrying a location premium translate into ‘hills’
or ‘peaks’ in the surface, while less attractive areas form
‘troughs’ or ‘valleys’. This approach does not rely on any for-
mal neighborhood classiﬁcation and uses the information
more eﬃciently, allowing for amore detailed analysis.
The following sub-sections lay out the empirical estima-
tion techniques inmore detail.
4.3.1 Spatial dummy approach
Using spatial dummies is probably themost straight forward
way of including location into a hedonic regression analy-
sis. The CBS subdivides The Netherlands into 2542 neigh-
borhoods, distributed across 441municipalities (Central Bu-
reau of Statistics, 2010a). We only include neighborhoods
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with suﬃcient numbers of observations across time. For
each neighborhood, we deﬁne a variable as 1 for all sales lo-
cated within this neighborhood and 0 otherwise. The fol-
lowingordinary least squares (OLS) equation is estimated for
several subperiods:
ln(Pi) = + BXi + GNi + i; (4.1)
where the natural logarithm of the sales price P of house i is
regressed against a vector of hedonic variablesXi describing
thephysical characteristics of thehouse3 andavectorNi con-
taining the spatial dummies. t is the regression intercept,B
andG are vectors of regression coeﬃcients and i is the error
term, which is expected to be normally and independently
distributed (IID).
The vector of neighborhood coeﬃcients G represents the
relative attractiveness of each neighborhood, which can be
understood as the value of a featureless home in a certain
location – the house-specific characteristics are already cap-
tured in the hedonic coeﬃcientsB. The second step explains
changes in these location coeﬃcients across the four periods
by estimating the following equation with OLS:
t;t 1Coeﬀn = + 1Dbust;n + 2t 1;t 2Coeﬀn
+2Dbust;nn;max;t 1Coeﬀn + n
(4.2)
3The following hedonic variables are included: interior ﬂoor space, lot size,
construction period, house type, number of rooms, number of ﬂoors, pres-
ence of balcony or terrace, monument status of building.
The change in the coeﬃcient for neighborhood n from pe-
riod t  1 to t is regressed against an intercept and a period
time dummyDbust. The neighborhood coeﬃcients aremean
reverting in case2 on the lagged change in coeﬃcients is es-
timated to be smaller than -1. In case 2 is positive, coeﬃ-
cients are estimated to follow multi-period trends. n;max
measures the diﬀerence in coeﬃcients of neighborhood n
and itsmost expensiveneighbor in theprecedingperiod. The
variable is not deﬁned in case all neighbors have lower co-
eﬃcients. 3 captures potential spillover eﬀects from high-
price neighborhoods to more aﬀordable areas (H1 and H2).
The interaction terms Dbust allows for diﬀerent elasticities
across boom and bust market regimes. n is the IID error
term.
4.3.2 Neighborhood analysis based on Kriging
This approach comprises of three steps. The house-speciﬁc
price component is ﬁrst explained in a standard hedonic
model, which is a reduced version of (4.1):
ln(Pi) = + BXi + i + i; (4.3)
At this stage we do not directly control for any location-
related diﬀerences in home prices – all spatial dependencies
are captured in the error term i. i encompasses the re-
maining estimation error, which is independently and iden-
tically distributed (IID) around 0.
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When estimating (4.3) by ordinary least squares the resid-
uals will contain both  and . Obviously, the spatial correla-
tion in the residualswill render theOLS estimates to be inef-
ﬁcient, the standard errors biased, and the predicted values
to be potentially incorrect (i. a. Dubin 1988). Eﬃciency and
standard error bias, however, are not a major concern in the
following step in which we carve out the spatial correlations
from the residuals of (4.3). Since  is IID, it will drop out sub-
sequently.
In the second step, we estimate an index surface of hous-
ing values by means of ordinary kriging. Kriging is a mini-
mummean squared error technique to interpolate the value
of a variable at unobservedgeographic locationsbasedonob-
served values close by. Originating from geology and min-
ing science, this procedure found several applications in the
domain of real estate research. Basu and Thibodeau (1998),
ﬁnd kriged predictions to be more precise than OLS-based
predictions in case spatial dependencies are contained in the
residuals. For an introduction to kriging in real estate re-
search see Pace et al. (1998b); a more elaborated foundation
is provided by Cressie (1993).
Kriging is still not a standard estimation technique, so a
more elaborated motivation might be warranted that dis-
cusses the advantages of kriging versus controlling for space
through dummies. Simple spatialmodeling bymeans of e. g.
space dummies estimate an index value for predeﬁned spa-
tial entities like provinces, counties, municipalities, neigh-
borhoods, and, in rare cases, residential blocks. This ap-
proach bears several problems. First, one needs (to deﬁne)
an adequate classiﬁcation into spatial units. Often, a classi-
ﬁcation at the desired level of aggregation is not available.
And, in case it is, the segmentation will follow possibly ar-
bitrary administrative boundaries that are only partially rel-
evant for demarcating submarkets. Clapp and Wang (2006)
show that U.S. census tracts are not ideal for analyzing local
housing markets. Instead, they suggest a classiﬁcation and
regression tree technique to determine relevant boundaries
directly from the data. Second, sparse data prohibit very
detailed local index estimations based on ﬁne-grained spa-
tial entities since aminimumnumber of observationswithin
an entity is needed for achieving reliable results – a ‘natural
maximum’ in local detailedness cannot be surpassed. Third,
when relying on any kind of boundary-based segmentation,
the index will be discontinuous at spatial boundaries.
An index surface does not rely on any boundary classiﬁca-
tions. It estimates an index value for any point on a plain and
is therefore continuous. Naturally, the precision of the sur-
face increases in the density of observations. Explicitlymod-
eling the spatial correlation across observations allows for
a more ﬁne-grained estimation as information from neigh-
boring observations support the otherwise too sparse data
in the researched area – one can ‘zoom in’ more. Clapp and
Wang (2006), however, argue that including more neigh-
bors is not automatically better. They present a trade-oﬀ
between more smoothness of the surface over space (when
many neighbors are included) versus lower location-speciﬁc
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bias: with fewer neighbors included, the surface will match
local diﬀerencesmore closely.
We estimate the outreach and functional form of the spa-
tial correlation based on ﬁtted exponential semi-variograms
(Cressie, 1993). The variograms are used to compute the
weightsw for the basic ordinary kriging equation
F (x; y) =
i=NX
i=1
wii; (4.4)
where the interpolated value at a pointwith location (x; y)
is the weighted sum of the measured values at surrounding
points, subject to the unbiasedness constraint
i=NX
i=1
wi = 1: (4.5)
The index surface evolves in time as it is re-estimated for
every of the four periods in the sample.4 In a last step, we
explain diﬀerences in the interpolated values E for a point i
across time:
4Pace et al. (1998a) model the spatial and the temporal dependencies more
directly by estimating an equation containing simultaneously spatial and
temporal lags.
t;t 1Ei = t + 1Dbust;i + 2t 1;t 2EiDbust;i
+3Slopei;t 1Dbust;i + 4maxEi;t 1Dbust;i
+5PopiDbust;i
+6PopimaxEi;t 1Dbust;i
+7t 1;t 2Eexc;iDbust;i + i
(4.6)
In this regression equation, the change in ﬁtted values in
the index surface Et   Et 1 is regressed against a bust pe-
riod dummy variable that is deﬁned 1 for changes after Q2
2008 (and 0 otherwise) and a set of variables characteriz-
ing the location of point i. t is the regression intercept
while the coeﬃcient 1 captures the general price decline in
the bust period. Including the lagged change in ﬁtted values
(t 1;t 2E) controls for potentialmean reversion in the sur-
face estimates.5
The absoluteposition of a given point in a cities price gradi-
ent is cancelled out by analyzing the diﬀerences inE instead
of their levels. Calculating both the spherical distance and
the diﬀerence in estimated values to the closest local price
maximum and minimum controls for the relative position of
a location on the local price gradient. A point on a ﬁtted sur-
face is considered to be a maximum (minimum) if no other
5Mean reversion in the surface estimates could be caused bymarket partic-
ipants correcting deviations from the local mean in subsequent time pe-
riods. Alternatively, it could have a purely estimation technique reason
in case surface estimates are randomly distributed around a true mean to
which theymove back in subsequent periods.
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point in a radius of 750mhas a higher (lower) point estimate.
A positive (negative) coeﬃcient 4 on the diﬀerence in ﬁt-
ted values (‘vertical distance’) to the nearest local maximum
maxEt 1 means that prices for locations far away from a
peak grow at a faster (slower) rate than the peak areas.
The ‘slope’ (Emax   Et 1)/distancemax to the nearest lo-
calmaximumrelates the ‘vertical’ distance to the ‘horizontal’
spherical distance. The bigger the value on the slope variable
is, the bigger is the relative price diﬀerence to close neigh-
bors. A positive coeﬃcient 3 on this proxy variable sup-
ports the endogeneity theory by Guerrieri et al. (2010).
Pop measures the resident population’s growth rate of
the year preceding each of the four periods. Interacting the
population growth rateswith the price diﬀerence to the clos-
estmaximumdisentanglesendogenouspricedynamics from
relative changes in the gradient due to sticky housing sup-
ply. A positive coeﬃcient on this variable indicates that low-
price areas are more sensitive to changes in population than
high price neighborhoods.
Finally, the impact of local speculative dynamics is con-
trolled forbyEexc,which isdeﬁnedas thediﬀerencebetween
the index estimateEi and themean of all index estimates for
points locatedwithin a circlewith a radius of 1000maround
i. If Eexc;t 1 is bigger than Eexc;t 2, the location i has ap-
preciated relative to its close peers. Changes in this relative
price premia or discounts can be read as a naïve proxy for lo-
cal price speculation.
All variables are interacted with the bust-period dummy
to allow for changes in the coeﬃcients across boom and bust
periods.6
In (4.6) both the dependent variable and the independent
variables are (partially) basedonestimates fromthe same in-
dex surface. The slope variable, for instance, contains Et 1
which is a component of the dependent variable aswell. This
violation of the underlying regression assumptions poten-
tially leads to wrong standard error estimates. The magni-
tude of the errors is probably small, since the independent
variables contain ‘non-toxic’ components that are not based
on the kriged index estimates. Nevertheless, an alternative
cross-sectional speciﬁcation (4.7) circumvents the problem
since thedependentvariable and the independent regressors
rely on diﬀerent index surface estimations:
Eexc;i;t = t + 1Dbust;i;t + 2Eexc;i;t 1
+3Slopei;t 1Dbust;i;t + 4max;t 1EiDbust;i;t
+5PopiDbust;i;t + 6PopimaxEi;t 1Dbust;i;t
+7t 1;t 2E + i;t
(4.7)
All variables are deﬁned as in (4.6). The relative over- or un-
derpricing of location i versus the average index surface ﬁg-
ures in the proximity is regressed against a set of location
characteristics.
6Due to space constraints, the non-iteracted ‘base’ variables are not explic-
itly mentioned in (4.6) but enter the estimation as well.
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4.4 Data
This paper relies on a database on all housing transactions
that were facilitated by the association of Dutch realtors
(NVM).7 The data cover about 2.6 million observations from
the years 1985-2009. The sample can be split into 0.8 mil-
lion apartments and 1.8 million single-family homes. About
50 variables describe the hedonics of each building (house
size, housing type, year of construction, number of bed-
rooms, numberof bathrooms/WC,basement, attic, parking),
its location (location within communitiy, distance to ameni-
ties), and details of the transaction itself (e. g. initial asking
price, ﬁnal transaction price, date of ﬁrst oﬀer, transaction
date). The NVM database provides the exact street address
of each transaction, which allows for geocoding each obser-
vation through the Google Maps application programming
interface (Google, 2010).
In the last 25 years, Dutch home prices knew only one di-
rection: up. The Dutch Realtor Association’s price index for
existing residential real estate (NederlandseVereniging voor
Makelaars, 2010) grewby 130percent since 1985 (270percent
in nominal terms). Only for the last 5 quarters of the sample
(2008Q3–2009Q3), one can observe a substantial price de-
cline. This paper focuses on transactions in this unique bust
period and compares them to sales in the preceding peak pe-
7The NVM dataset is already used inmultiple studies; i. a. DeWit, Englund
andFrancke (2009), BrounenandKok (2010), Brounen,Neuteboom, andXu
(2008).
Figure 4.2: Four phases in the latest Dutch house price cycle
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Notes: The solid line depicts the development of prices for Dutch detached
homes adjusted for inﬂation, while the dashed line shows prices in nomi-
nal terms. The four grey bars visualize the periods of investigation in this
study. Phase 1 (1997Q1–1998Q1) provides for a snapshot in the middle of
a period of price increases, with the most rapid price gains still to come –
where markets turn from ‘warm’ to ‘hot’. Phase 2 (2005Q3–2006Q3) covers
the the last quarters of the boomphase, while Phase 3 (2007Q1–2008Q1) in-
cludes the tipping point where prices peak, before entering a phase of price
losses. Phase 4 (2008Q3–2009Q3) is the only period in the sample where
prices fall.
Sources: Price index by NVM (2010), deﬂator from Central Bureau of Statis-
tics (2010).
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riod and two boom intervals. Phase 1 (1997Q1–1998Q1) pro-
vides for a snapshot in the middle of price increases, with
the most rapid price gains still to come – where markets
turn from ‘warm’ to ‘hot’. Phase 2 (2005Q3–2006Q3) cov-
ers the the last quarters of the boom phase, while Phase 3
(2007Q1–2008Q1) includes the tipping point where prices
peak, before entering a period of price losses.
Subsampling the same amount of transactions per neigh-
borhood in each phase keeps the spatial distribution across
CBS neighborhoods constant in time. This ensures that dif-
ferences inestimates arenot causedbydiﬀerent sample sizes
or changes in liquidity across time.8 Summary statistics for
the samples can be found in Table 4.1.
The index surfaces based on (4.4) are estimated for ar-
eas only that are actually used for residential construction
according to the nationwide zoning information for The
Netherlands (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2007). In these ar-
eas, homevalues are interpolated along a 200mregular grid.
Population numbers for eachDutchmunicipality, quarter,
and neighborhood are obtained from the Central Bureau of
Statistics (2010c). Figure 4.3 visualizes the geographic clas-
siﬁcation of Dutch municipalities at the example of the city
of Maastricht. Each municipality is subdivided into quar-
ters represented by bold lines and neighborhoods, depicted
in thin lines. In 2009, The Netherlands were structured
in 441 municipalities, 2,542 quarters and 11,574 neighbor-
hoods. The average headcount per municipality, quarter,
8Only quarters that have at least 10 observation in each phase are included.
and neighborhood is 37383, 6486, and 1425 inhabitants re-
spectively. These areas are not regularly shaped as they fol-
low natural features of the environment, demographic char-
acteristics of the population and the physical characteristics
of the housing stock. Their sizes range from below 500 m in
diameter for neighborhoods in city centers to several kilo-
meters in rural areas.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Hedonic regression
The starting point of both approaches is the estimation of
the hedonic regression equation (4.1) and (4.3), respectively.
Table 4.2 presents the estimated coeﬃcients for both equa-
tions in all 4 sub-periods. Most coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant
at the one percent signiﬁcance level, which is not surprising
given thehighnumberof observations and theparsimonious
model speciﬁcation. The signs andmagnitude of the regres-
sion coeﬃcients are as expected. The regression estimates
suggest positive elasticities on interior ﬂoor space, lot size,
numberof rooms,monument status, presenceof abalconyor
terrace and younger building vintage years. Semi-detached
homes are valued less then detached buildings. Overall, the
coeﬃcients are stable in time - with one exception: the co-
eﬃcients on the number of ﬂoors change signs across time-
periods.
Theoverall explanatorypowerof the spatial dummymodel
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics for subsamples
Phase 1 2 3 4
N 13,853 13,853 13,853 13,853
Price (Euros, in thousands) 1st Q. 118 221 233 220
Median 153 292 310 293
Mean 175 325 342 328
3rd Q. 209 395 423 400
Interior ﬂoor space (m2) 1st Q. 120 120 120 120
Median 137 145 145 140
Mean 149 153 154 151
3rd Q. 166 175 175 171
lotsize (m2) 1st Q. 251 255 257 253
Median 341 349 353 345
Mean 594 611 625 630
3rd Q. 580 580 593 575
Year of construction (in %) 1500-1905 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.5
1906-1930 14.2 12.6 12.6 13.1
1931-1944 10.3 9.2 8.5 9.0
1945-1959 8.0 7.3 8.0 8.5
1960-1970 13.1 11.5 11.1 12.1
1971-1980 17.0 14.1 13.5 13.1
1981-1990 18.2 13.6 13.3 12.8
1991-2000 15.0 20.8 20.2 17.8
2000 n.a. 6.6 8.1 9.1
Number of rooms (in %) 1-2 0.7 2.3 1.3 0.9
2-4 43.3 32.9 29.4 29.2
5-7 53.8 59.5 63.5 63.6
Number of ﬂoors (in %) 1 2.2 3.2 3.6 3.7
2 66.0 69.0 70.2 69.8
3+ 31.8 27.7 26.2 26.6
Other characteristics (in %) detached 43.6 45.2 46.2 42.6
monument status 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.5
balcony/terrace 15.9 19.6 17.8 18.1
Notes: Phase demarcations are
1997Q1–1998Q1, 2005Q3–2006Q3,
2007Q1–2008Q1, 2008Q3–2009Q3.
Identical distribution of observations
across neighborhoods in time is
achieved by stratiﬁed sampling.
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Table 4.2: Hedonic regression coeﬃcients from (4.1) and (4.3)
Variable 1997Q1–1998Q1 2005Q3–2006Q3 2007Q1–2008Q1 2008Q3–2009Q3
Intercept 7:515 7:045 7:963 7:611 7:856 7:616 7:810 7:460
ln(int. space) 0:528 0:791 0:560 0:793 0:585 0:831 0:602 0:849
ln(lot size) 0:202 0:162 0:211 0:153 0:214 0:148 0:207 0:145
Neighborhood dummies Y N Y N Y N Y N
Year of construction 1906-1930 0:026 0:059 0:029 0:049  0:012 0:019 0:022 0:067
(vs. 1500-1905) 1931-1944 0:096 0:088 0:083 0:033 0:039 0:025 0:091 0:097
1945-1959 0:109 0:149 0:063 0:053 0:026 0:043 0:064 0:083
1960-1970 0:143 0:108 0:076 0:025y 0:038 0:012 0:063 0:051
1971-1980 0:196 0:078 0:091  0:036 0:054  0:044 0:092 0:007
1981-1990 0:260 0:173 0:148 0:045 0:107 0:026y 0:150 0:088
1991-2000 0:321 0:218 0:212 0:087 0:169 0:058 0:194 0:100
post 2000     0:224 0:079 0:205 0:090 0:246 0:156
Semidetached (vs. detached)  0:127  0:071  0:101  0:053  0:100  0:049  0:092  0:048
Number of rooms: 3-4 0:116 0:047 0:022y 0:044 0:005 0:003 0:005  0:025
(vs. 1-2) 5-7 0:139 0:076 0:054 0:082 0:034 0:029 0:036y 0:004
8+ 0:148 0:112 0:045 0:047 0:019  0:030 0:030  0:056y
Number of ﬂoors: 2  0:041  0:176 0:119 0:010 0:078  0:045 0:105 0:007
(vs. 1) 3+  0:017y  0:122 0:144 0:044 0:101  0:020 0:126 0:019
monument 0:120 0:203 0:064 0:033 0:075 0:039 0:128 0:226
terrace or balcony 0:036 0:138 0:039 0:133 0:043 0:144 0:035 0:126
adj. R2 0:877 0:569 0:824 0:554 0:833 0:544 0:820 0:533
Notes: y signiﬁcant at p < :10; p < :05; p < :01; p < :001. Most coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the one percent signiﬁcance level, which is not surprising
given the high number of observations and the parsimonious model speciﬁcation. Signs and magnitude of the regression coeﬃcients are as expected. The
regression estimates suggest positive elasticities on int. ﬂoor space, lot size, # of rooms, monument status, presence of a balcony or terrace and younger
building vintage. Semi-detached homes are valued less then detached buildings. All but one coeﬃcient are stable in time.
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Figure 4.3: Spatial segmentation in Dutch municipalities
Notes: UsingMaastricht as an
example themap visualizes the
geographic segmentation
system of Dutch
municipalities. Each
municipality is subdivided into
quarters (wijk) represented by
bold lines and neighborhoods
(buurt), depicted in thin lines.
In 2009, The Netherlands were
structured in 441
municipalities, 2,542 quarters
and 11,574 neighborhoods. The
average headcount per
municipality, quarter, and
neighborhood is 37383, 6486,
and 1425 inhabitants
respectively. These areas are
not regularly shaped as they
follow natural features of the
environment, demographic
characteristics of the
population and the physical
characteristics of the housing
stock. Their sizes range from
below 500m in diameter for
neighborhoods in city centers
to several kilometers in rural
areas.
Data: Central Bureau of
Statistics (2010).
is very high with adjusted R2-values ranging from 0.82 to
0.87.9 Omitting the spatial dummies causes an overall lower
model ﬁt (adj. R2 from0.53 to 0.57). Obviously, the residuals
contain a substantial amount of spatial correlations, which
violates OLS’ assumption of independent error terms. Fur-
thermore, the coeﬃcients are estimated to be bigger for in-
terior ﬂoorspace and to be smaller for lot size when not con-
trolling for location, indicating that expensive homes, on av-
erage, carry bigger homes on relatively small lots.
Table 4.3 presents summary statistics for the spatial dum-
mies instead of individual coeﬃcients due to the high num-
ber of neighborhoods. The coeﬃcients are re-centered
around zero to achieve better comparability across time. The
values for the 25th percentile, median and 75th percentile
are robust in time (only slightly increasing for the later pe-
riods), suggesting a stable general distribution of neighbor-
hood level housing wealth across The Netherlands. More
formally testing, weﬁnd the neighborhood coeﬃcients to be
highly correlated across time, suggesting a goodmodel spec-
iﬁcation and little variation in the relative position of neigh-
borhoods in the city-wide price gradients.
Still, there is variation in the coeﬃcients that can be fur-
ther explained by (4.2). The average change in the coeﬃ-
cients (t;t 1Coeff ) is about 0.130 to 0.152 for the boom pe-
riod and  0:129 to  0:131 in the bust period (adding up the
coeﬃcients 0:152   0:281 for column 1). The direction and
9Brounen et al. (2009) run a GLS on similar NVM data and achieve compa-
rable higher adj. R2 of 0.83.
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics of coeﬃcients for spatial dummies
Phase
1 2 3 4
Min -0.941 -0.694 -0.754 -0.760
1st Q. -0.171 -0.174 -0.188 -0.192
Median -0.003 0.008 -0.003 0.003
Mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3rd Q. 0.161 0.167 0.171 0.170
Max 1.131 0.727 0.805 0.849
Correlations
Phase 1 2 3 4
1 1
2 0.95 1
3 0.94 0.96 1
4 0.94 0.95 0.97 1
Notes: 592neighborhoodsdummycoeﬃcientswere estimated for eachof the
4 phases. The upper panel provides summary statistics for the coeﬃcients,
normalized to a mean of 0. The lower panel shows correlation estimates
for the coeﬃcients across time. The high correlation numbers of 0.94 and
higher suggest inter-temporal stability of the regression coeﬃcients.
magnitude of these price developments are in line with the
NVM index trends. Changes in the coeﬃcients are nega-
tively autocorrelated. If prices in an area increase by 10
percent, for instance, they will decrease by an additional -
3.14 percent to -3.77 percent. This mean reversion eﬀect has
the same magnitude in boom and bust period as the coeﬃ-
cients for the interaction with the bust dummy is not signif-
icantly diﬀerent from zero.
Areas bordering richer neighborhoods (column2 in Ta-
ble 4.4) experience a stronger price growth. For each per-
centage point diﬀerence in home values, the lower area will
rise additional 12 basis points in the next period. This result
supports H1 and is in line with earlier studies. No signiﬁ-
cant change in this eﬀect is found for the bust period, which
speaks against H2. It is interesting to note that the spill-
over eﬀect is one-sided: Being close to low value areas does
not have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on a neighborhood’s
home price growth rate. The coeﬃcient on the price diﬀer-
ence to themost aﬀordable neighbor is not signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero (column 3).
The low number of observations does not allow for tests of
H3 throughH7, which will be addressed in the next section.
4.5.2 Kriging results
The functional form for the spatial correlations in the resid-
uals from (4.3) is obtained by ﬁtting a spherical semi-
variogram (Cressie, 1993). Figure 4.4 shows the variogram
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Table 4.4: Regression coeﬃcients for neighborhood analysis (4.2)
t;t 1Coeﬀ 1 2 3
Intercept 0:152 0:138 0:130
(0:013) (0:018) (0:019)
Dbust  0:281 0:269 0:262
(0:013) (0:019) (0:020)
t 1;t 2Coeﬀ  0:377 0:363 0:314
(0:033) (0:042) (0:048)
| Dbust 0:005 0:014  0:061
(0:049) (0:060) (0:069)
n;max;t 1Coeﬀ 0:119
(0:038)
| Dbust  0:052
(0:056)
 n;min;t 1Coeﬀ  0:060
(0:037)
| Dbust 0:068
(0:054)
N 1180 726 712
adj. R2 0:540 0:561 0:536
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  signiﬁcant at p < :05; p < :01;
p < :001
(black dots) individually estimated for each period and the
ﬁtted models (solid lines). All variograms show strong spa-
tial correlation, especially for distances smaller than 2 km.
Formal testing for time varying spatial correlations opens
up another research direction, but simple eyeballing of the
variograms suggest an increase in the nugget size (the ‘inter-
cept’) in the bust period, indicating an increasedheterogene-
ity in the house-speciﬁc error-term component. The spatial
dependencies become less strong after 2 km, which suggests
a relatively ﬁne-grained neighborhood structure. Neverthe-
less, the variograms keep a slightly positive slope even for
distances exceeding 50 km due to region-wide correlations.
Since the focus of this study is on neighborhood-level diﬀer-
ences, these far reaching dependencies are disregarded and a
range of 10 km is chosen when ﬁtting the variograms.
For each sub-period, I estimate an index surface based on
a universal kriging estimation provided by the gstat library
(Pebesma, 2004) in the R software environment for statis-
tical computing. Figure 4.5 displays the index surface in the
peakperiodasanexample. Relativehousingwealth isvisual-
ized by a continous color scheme ranging fromwhite (lowest
values) to black (highes values).
The average distance from surface 1 to 2, 1 to 3, and 1 to
4 is 0.57, 0.6, and 0.58 (Table 4.5), which is in line with the
national price changes found in the NVM index. For each
period, about 4,700 points are classiﬁed as local maxima or
minima.10 The average distance of a point to a maximum or
10A point is deﬁned to be a local maximum (minimum) if no other point
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Figure 4.4: Variograms for Dutch detached homes through time
1997Q1–1998Q1 2005Q3–2006Q3 2007Q1–2008Q1 2008Q3–2009Q3
Se
m
iv
ar
ia
nc
e
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
1 2 3
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
1 2 3
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
1 2 3
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
1 2 3
distance in km
Note: The variograms (Cressie, 1993) are calculated based on the error terms from (4.3) with gstat library in R (Pebesma, 2004).
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Figure 4.5: Index surface for detached home prices, The Netherlands, 2007Q1–2008Q1
Note: Index surface estimated on residuals from (4.3) by ordinary kriging. Dark areas indicate high location-speciﬁc prices, while lighter areas visualizemore
aﬀordable neighborhoods.
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minimum is about 1.25 km and home values at the maxima
are on average 3.5 percent higher, while the minimum areas
carry a discount of similar magnitude. This documents sub-
stantial price variation within small distances. Within a cir-
cle of about two kilometers, the range in price diﬀerences is
on average 7 percent.
How did prices change within the cities? Figure 4.6
presents price gradients for parts of Amsterdam, Breda,
Groningen and Maastricht. Each panel shows the price es-
timates for the boom, the peak and the bust period along
selected circles of latitude. The examples give a mixed pic-
ture: For Breda, Groningen, and Maastricht, the slope of
the gradient becomes ﬂatter during the bust period, indicat-
ing bigger relative losses in home values in expensive quar-
ters. For central Amsterdam, however, the price gradient be-
comes steeper. The following part investigates these shifts
formally.
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present the regression coeﬃcients and
standard errors for in total six regression equations derived
from (4.6) and (4.7). With four cross-sectional surfaces ini-
tially estimated, only three periods remain after diﬀerenc-
ing the index estimates once. Since (4.6) and (4.7) include
lagged variables, only two periods in time will be compared
ﬁnally: The boom period just before the house prices reach
their peak, and the subsequent bust. As expected, the coef-
within 750 m has a higher (lower) index value. Reducing (increasing) the
range around each point will lead tomore (fewer) local extrema classiﬁca-
tions.
ﬁcient for the bust period dummy variable is signiﬁcant and
negative in all model speciﬁcations.
The coeﬃcient on t 1;t 2E in Table 4.6 is negative and
signiﬁcant, suggesting that growth rates fade out. Still, in-
dex levels (not growth rates) will only revert to their means
when this coeﬃcient is equal to or smaller than -1. During
the bust period, the coeﬃcients fall to values of -0.35, which
suggests that only a third of the growth rate experienced in
boom phases fade away in subsequent periods. This persis-
tence in home value growth is in line with the momentum
found by Case and Shiller (2003) for the American housing
market in the 1970s and 1980s.11
Mean reversion occurs in relative terms, however. The
coeﬃcients estimates for t 1;t 2Eexc in (4.6) are signiﬁ-
cantly negative (-0.13 to -0.145). Locations that have enjoyed
home value growth larger (smaller) than the average value
of locations close bywill therefore experience lower (higher)
growthrates in thenextperiods. Theeﬀectbecomes stronger
in the bust period, with interaction coeﬃcients of -0.072 to -
0.081. If a location ‘sticked out’ in one period, the diﬀerences
to its close surroundings will not vanish entirely, but slowly
fade. In the alternative speciﬁcation (4.7), a price elevation
above local averages will melt down to 0.41 or 0.42 percent
in the next period. In the bust period, the reversion to the
mean is slightly quicker (by -0.027 to -0.036).
Locations close to a local maximum and with a large price
11Amulti-period mean reversion, however, is still possible but is not tested
for in this empirical setup.
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Table 4.5: Summary statistics of index surface estimates for four sub-periods
Phase 1997Q1–1998Q1 2005Q3–2006Q3 2007Q1–2008Q1 2008Q3–2009Q3
Predictions
Min -0.86 -0.45 -0.43 -0.39
1st Qu. -0.56 0.02 0.04 0.01
Median -0.4 0.19 0.24 0.21
Mean -0.4 0.17 0.20 0.18
3rd Qu. -0.25 0.32 0.36 0.34
Max 0.11 0.59 0.60 0.57
Descriptives
# minima 2344 2341 2339 2361
# maxima 2490 2269 2279 2317
distance to min (m) 1262 1276 1319 1302
distance to max (m) 1191 1294 1303 1307
Et   Emin;t 0.040 0.035 0.036 0.036
Emax;t   Et 0.043 0.036 0.037 0.037
Et   Et 1 n/a 0.572 0.040 -0.020
Note: All residential area as deﬁned by Dutch zoning points are added to a regular 200 m-by-200 m grid for which point estimates in the four phases are
calculated by ordinary kriging. Number of points in grid: 56,332.
The relative attractiveness of neighborhoods is described by their distance to local extreme values in the index surface. A point is deﬁned to be a local maxi-
mum (minimum) if no other point within 750m has a higher (lower) index value. Isolated settlements covering only small areas (< 0:1 km2) are excluded.
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Figure 4.6: Estimated price gradients for selected cities
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the bust period, indicating bigger
relative losses in home values in
expensive quarters. For central
Amsterdam, however, the price
gradient becomes steeper.
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Table4.6: Regression results on changes in index surface during boom
and bust (4.6)
Et;t 1 1 2 3
Intercept 0:123(0:002) 0:118(0:002) 0:119(0:002)
Dbust  0:133(0:002)  0:130(0:002)  0:130(0:002)
Et 1;t 2  0:147(0:003)  0:143(0:003)  0:143(0:003)
| Dbust  0:215(0:005)  0:210(0:005)  0:210(0:005)
t 1;t 2Eexc 0:145(0:017)  0:130(0:017)  0:132(0:018)
| Dbust  0:072 (0:026)  0:081 (0:027)  0:080 (0:027)
Pop  0:139(0:018) 0:001 (0:007)  0:006 (0:009)
| Dbust 0:332(0:027) 0:007 (0:012) 0:007 (0:013)
Slope 0:142(0:011)  0:024 (0:016)
| Dbust  0:061(0:015)  0:006 (0:022)
|  Pop 10:058(0:495) 0:496 (0:325)
| DbustPop  7:548(0:735) 0:048 (0:481)
maxEt 1 0:159(0:007) 0:170(0:010)
| Dbust  0:033(0:010)  0:031 (0:014)
|  Pop 0:163 (0:132)  0:031 (0:188)
| DbustPop 0:673(0:200) 0:627 (0:286)
adj. R2 0:316 0:308 0:308
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. N = 98,471. y signiﬁcant at p < :10;
p < :05; p < :01; p < :001. This set of regression is based on
(4.6). The change in ﬁtted values in the index surfaceEt Et 1 is regressed
against the change one period before (Et 1   Et 2), the diﬀerence in ﬁt-
tedvalues (‘vertical distance’) to thenearest localmaximum(Emax Et 1),
and the ‘slope’ (Emax Et 1)/distancemax to thenearest localmaximum.
t 1;t 2Eexc is the change in the diﬀerence between the index estimate of
point i and the average index value within a circle of 1000m. Pop are an-
nual changes in the resident population at municipality level. All variables
are interactedwith the bust-period dummy to allow for changes in the coef-
ﬁcients across boom and bust periods.
Table4.7: Regression results on changes in index surface during boom
and bust, alternative speciﬁcation (4.7)
Eexc;i;t 1 2 3
Intercept  0:000 (0:000)  0:000 (0:000) 0:002 (0:000)
Dbust  0:000 (0:000)  0:000 (0:000)  0:002 (0:000)
Eexc;i;t 1 0:420 (0:005) 0:410 (0:005) 0:416 (0:005)
| Dbust  0:036 (0:007)  0:032 (0:007)  0:027 (0:007)
Pop  0:001 (0:002)  0:000 (0:002)  0:000 (0:002)
| Dbust  0:011 (0:002)  0:011 (0:002)  0:011 (0:002)
Slope 0:008 (0:002) 0:028 (0:003) 0:029 (0:003)
| Dbust 0:005y (0:003)  0:004 (0:004)  0:004 (0:004)
|  Pop  0:049 (0:042) 0:045 (0:060) 0:043 (0:060)
| DbustPop 0:389 (0:062) 0:251 (0:088) 0:232 (0:088)
maxEt 1  0:018 (0:002)  0:017 (0:002)
| Dbust 0:008 (0:003) 0:006 (0:003)
|  Pop  0:088 (0:035)  0:086 (0:034)
| DbustPop 0:133 (0:053) 0:141 (0:052)
Et 1   Et 2  0:005 (0:001)
| Dbust  0:007 (0:001)
adj. R2 0:147 0:149 0:151
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. N = 88,849.
y signiﬁcant at p < :10; p < :05; p < :01; p < :001
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diﬀerential to this maximum (high values for Slope) have
higher price appreciation in the boom phase (coeﬃcient of
0.142 for Slope) than points where price diﬀerences are less
pronounced. During the bust, these gentrifying neighbor-
hoods still perform better than peers bordering lower-price
areas (the sum of the coeﬃcients is still positive). The eﬀect
is conﬁrmed in (4.7). These ﬁndings support hypothesisH1
and are in line with the results from Guerrieri et al. (2010).
H2 cannot be conﬁrmed, though.
The moderating eﬀect of population growth is conﬁrmed
by the positive coeﬃcient of 10.058 for the interaction term
SlopePop in (4.6). Theeﬀectpersists during thebustphase,
but only at a quarter of the boom’s rate (10.058-7.548 = 2.51).
For (4.7) the moderating role is prominent in the bust phase
only (coeﬃcients of 0.232 to 0.389). Overall, these results
supportH3.
Prices in already expensive neighborhoods underperform
more aﬀordable locations during boom times. The coeﬃ-
cient estimate on the position relative to the closest local
maximum max;t 1E is signiﬁcant and positive (0.159 and
0.170): the bigger the vertical distance of a location to a lo-
cal peak, the bigger the gain in the boom period. The coeﬃ-
cient for population-growth interaction term is not signiﬁ-
cant. Thus,H4 cannot be rejected.
Statistically, the convergence eﬀect is weakened in the
bust phase as the coeﬃcient for the interaction term is -
0.033. Economically, this drop is only 21 percent. Demo-
graphic trends again interfere: When population growth
rates turn negative and home values decline, the 0.627 or
0.673 coeﬃcientwill turn negative. Economically, this eﬀect
is non-negligible, as a quick back-of-an-envelope calculation
reveals. The ﬁrst quartile in the latest three-year population
growth distribution of Dutch municipalities is -0.4 percent.
Multiplying the coeﬃcient and this number gives growth
rates for local minima that are 25 basis points below the cor-
responding rates of maxima, which are just a few hundred
meters away. Forminima that are located in the 25 percent of
municipalities whose population grew with at least 1.5 per-
cent, the price gap to maxima will narrow down due to a 1
percent higher growth rate. H5 andH6 cannot be rejected.
4.6 Discussion
This paper researches within-city home price dynamics in
bullish and bearish residential real estate markets. It con-
tributes to the literature addressing the urban layout of
cities by formulating and empirically testing hypotheses on
changes in the price gradients across neighborhoods under
diﬀerent market regimes and demographic conditions.
First, the existing concept on endogenous house price dy-
namics is extended by the notion of the moderating role
of demographics. New residents ﬂocking into the city will
speed up the sorting process as the wealthy settle close to
each other and the poor prefer the aﬀordable homes in
poorer quarters. Indeed, the empirics show that higher in-
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tensities of endogenous gentriﬁcation can be found in areas
with robust population growth.
Second, this paper discusses how a decline in a city’s pop-
ulation and a simultaneous negative shock to home values
lead to a home value polarization within cities. Under such
a scenario, the price gap betweenwealthy and poor areas in-
creases. Falling prices allow households to move up in the
housing ladder since they receive ‘more house’ for the same
money. This eﬀect is estimated to be economically signiﬁ-
cant for Dutch neighborhoods.
Third, evidence for momentum in house prices at the
neighborhood-level is presented. A cross-sectional analysis
of growth rates suggests a mild mean reversion in the trend.
Changes to levels, however, are sticky. Themagnitude in the
mean reversion in the trends depends on themarket regime,
so in case one tries to exploit this potential market ineﬃ-
ciency, a good understanding of market trends is warranted.
Fourth, a new level of spatial detailedness is achieved by
analyzing a high-quality data-set for The Netherlands. The
data comprise of 1.8million single family home transactions
and 0.8 million apartments sold by members of the Dutch
Realtor Association (NVM). Previous studies have worked
with American data, so this paper oﬀers an international
perspective. These data are geocoded and matched with de-
mographic information throughmeans of GIS analysis.
Fifth, to fully exploit this ﬁnely-grained data, a spatial es-
timation technique is borrowed from the geoscience domain.
This gives results thatwere out of reachwhen relying on tra-
ditional hedonic regressions. This is the ﬁrst paper that esti-
mates home price index surfaces for an entire country based
on a spatial error model (SER).
The results of this study are not only relevant from a real
estate ﬁnance point of view. Case et al. (2001) and others
(Carroll et al. , 2006; Bostic et al. , 2009) link housing wealth
to consumption. They ﬁnd that households’ consumption is
more sensitive to changes in housingwealth than to changes
inwealth fromholdingstocks–at theaggregate level. If these
ﬁndings hold at the neighborhood level as well, a relative
shift in the housing wealth within a city will change non-
housing consumption levels across neighborhoods.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Housing markets are like the weather, sports, or politics:
They are one of the truly big topics almost everybody has an
opinion about. Often, when being introduced at a partywith
“This is Thies. He is currently writing a dissertation in finance…” the
ﬁrst reaction was an unconvincing “Oh really? How interest-
ing — ”, followed by awkward silence and an uneasy search
for excuses to leave. A quickly uttered “My research is on house
prices…” usually saved the moment. Smooth and pleasant
small-talk directly evolved, fuelled by an endless supply of
housing-related anecdotes and personal experiences shared
bymy newly-found friends.
Leaving behind party chit-chat, serious discussions soon
sprung up. People were looking for answers to questions
they were facing: Should they buy that house down the road
now or would it be better to wait one more year? Where are
prices in this city heading to? Will they be able to sell their
home once they retire? Is this a stable neighborhood? Is it a
good idea to buy a second home and to rent it out? Themag-
nitude of a household’s investment in housing and the direct
impactofhousing choiceson theevery-dayqualityof life for-
bade answers that were too easy.
This dissertation researches four aspects of housing mar-
kets. First, it examines the long run relation between prices
and rents for houses inAmsterdam from 1650 through 2005.
Spanning 355 years, this study probably holds the world
record for analyzing the longest time series in the asset pric-
ing literature ingeneral, not to speakof residential real estate
research in particular. Chapter 1 shows that, in the long run,
house prices can be explained by a theoretical fundamental
value calculated fromrents and interest rates. The rent-price
rationot onlydisplays an impressivepersistence throughout
the centuries (Figure 1.5) but also reverts back to this theoret-
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ical basis (Figure 1.6).
If houses are over- or undervalued compared to the rental
streams they produce, will either prices adjust or rents? Ta-
ble 1.4 presents the results from an error correction model
which indicates that the ‘balance’ is achievedmainly through
price changes. Rents are more sticky and respond to a
smaller extend.
Based on these results, can an investor make money by
betting on corrections? In principle, yes. Such an investor,
however, needs deep pockets and a long life as the correction
back to equilibrium can take decades. Throughout the sec-
ond half of the 19th century, for instance prices of Amster-
dam’s houses remained overvalued for more than 50 years.
This result is a warning for those who read the massive de-
cline of Berlin’s single family homes during the last 15 years
(Figure 2.3) as a soon-reverting deviation from the long run
mean. Berlin’s homes seem to be aﬀordable right now. Still,
they are a risky bet, since there is no guarantee that prices
will move up again in the near future.
Second, the dissertation is the ﬁrst to estimate how house
prices volatility is aﬀected by so-called real options. An ex-
ample of a real option is the possibility to extend the size of
an existing home by adding more rooms or by taking down
the existing structure and building a bigger new house. Real
options carry value since they give the owners of a building
ﬂexibility. When markets develop favorably and the value
for additional space increases, the owner can ‘execute’ the
option and start building. In case additional space is not
in demand, he/she can just postpone any new development.
Chapter 2 measures the value of the option to extend in dif-
ferent market climates. It incorporates this real option in a
standard hedonic regression model and shows how neigh-
borhoods and houses with unrealized renovation potential
can be identiﬁed.
The study uses an unexplored dataset of housing transac-
tions inWest Berlin, covering thirty years between 1978 and
2007. West Berlin is an ideal test environment for this type
of study because it oﬀers detailed data on themaximum size
allowed under current zoning for each building sold. In ad-
dition, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 stirred-up hous-
ing markets. A clear division in a tranquil ‘walled-in’ phase
(1978-1989), a ‘big bang’ periodwith high house price growth
directly after thewall camedown (1990-1995) and a long ‘cool
down’ phase (1996-2007) gives the opportunity to compare
the value of this real option in diﬀerent market regimes.
The empirical results show that house value has an elastic-
ity of about 0.15with respect to development potential,mea-
sured by the ratio between the maximum square meters al-
lowed by zoning and the existing house size. For high option
value properties the elasticity increases to 0.23 (Table 2.4).
The evidencepresented suggests that the ‘big bang’ boompe-
riod between 1989 and 1994was associatedwith a signiﬁcant
increase in option value for the properties with substantial
redevelopment potential; about 40 percent of the boomwas
due to increase in option value. During the 10 year bust af-
ter 1994, about 50 percent of the declinewas due to change in
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option value. Volatility of thismagnitude applies to about 10
percent of all properties soldduring the sampleperiod. More
than 68 percent of all sales have increased volatility over the
cycle due to unrealized option value.
The history of home values in Amsterdam also motivated
research on a third aspect of housing markets in this dis-
sertation. The crisis years of 1781-1814 were the only time
in Amsterdam’s history when the city’s population numbers
declined substantially. In these 22 years, home values fell by
on average 3 percent annually. This massive loss in hous-
ing wealth indicates a strong link between demographics
and housing markets (and the general economy, of course).
Chapter 3 aims to investigate how demographics determine
the amount and the quality of housing services demanded.
Based on a very detailed 2001 cross-section of English
households, it ﬁnds that human capital is a key driver for
housing demand. Variables that are positively related to hu-
man capital increase the demand for housing. For instance,
each additional level of education a household has achieved,
drives up its reservation prices for the housing services con-
sumed. On the other hand, factors like chronic illnesses that
impair human capital have a negative impact on housing
consumption. Since each generation is better educated than
the generations before, an aging society will demand more
housing on an aggregated level, even if the total number of
households stops growing. A scenario analysis with diﬀer-
ent population forecasts shows that the upward sloping par-
tial age derivative is supporting demand in an ageing society
(Figure 3.4).
These ﬁndings are very relevant for other European coun-
tries beside England. Despite the cultural and economic het-
erogeneitywithinEurope, theupward-slopingage-demand-
relationship observed in England should be a reasonable
proxy for other European nations, even in case of diﬀer-
ent demographic proﬁles. Today, Europe is facing an un-
precedented demographic change: The entire area reaching
from Germany in the west, to Russia in the east, and to the
Balkans in the south is losing population already today – and
this development is expected to gain momentum in the next
decades (United Nations Population Division, 2007).
A last point to take-away from this study is that regional
housing markets with unattractive economic perspectives
and living conditions face a double challenge: not only does
the total number of households decline, but households hav-
ing enjoyed a better education are more likely to leave for
more prosperous regions than lower educated households.
Without the younger generation being better educated and
more wealthy than the generations before, the pressure on
housing demand caused by population shrinkage cannot be
oﬀ-set.
The fourth chapter researches how the distribution of
housing wealth within a city is changing once average prices
change for the city in general. This study was motivated
by the observation that some neighborhoods in Berlin like
Prenzlauer Berg, Friedrichshain or Mitte ﬂourished in the
last years while Berlin as a city experienced strong losses in
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housing wealth. Data availability let me conduct this study
on all of The Netherlands instead of the city of Berlin,1 but
the question remained the same: How do within-city home
price dynamics change in bullish andbearish residential real
estate markets? What is the role of demographics in this
process? It contributes to the literature addressing the ur-
ban layout of cities by formulating and empirically testing
hypotheses on changes in the price gradients across neigh-
borhoods under diﬀerent market regimes and demographic
conditions.
This study ﬁnds that a decline in a city’s population and a
simultaneous negative shock to home values lead to a home
value polarization within cities. Under such a scenario, the
price gap between wealthy and poor areas increases. Falling
prices allow households to move up in the housing ladder
since they receive ‘more house’ for the same money. This
eﬀect is estimated to be economically signiﬁcant for Dutch
neighborhoods.
Furthermore, evidence for momentum in house prices at
1Chapter 4 achieves a unprecedented level of spatial detailedness by analyz-
ing a high-quality data-set for The Netherlands. The data comprise of 1.8
million single familyhome transactions and0.8millionapartments soldby
members of theDutchRealtor Association (NVM). These data are geocoded
andmatched with demographic information throughmeans of GIS analy-
sis. To fully exploit this ﬁnely-grained data, a spatial estimation technique
is borrowed from the geoscience domain. This gives results that were out
of reach when relying on traditional hedonic regressions. This is the ﬁrst
paper that estimates home price index surfaces for an entire country based
on a spatial error model (SER).
the neighborhood-level is presented. A cross-sectional anal-
ysis of growth rates suggests a mild mean reversion in the
trend. Changes to levels, however, are sticky. Themagnitude
in the mean reversion in the trends depends on the market
regime, so in case an investor tries to exploit this potential
market ineﬃciency, a good understanding of market trends
is warranted.
Earlier papers have developed a closed form model that
predicts endogenous home price dynamics. Very casually
speaking, they predict that rich households beneﬁt from
and prefer to have other well-oﬀ people as neighbors. This
preference leads to a segmentation of cities in rich and
poor neighborhoods, endogenously linked to home values
in these areas. Chapter 4 extends this literature by the no-
tion of the moderating role of demographics. New residents
ﬂocking into the city will speed up the sorting process as
the wealthy settle close to each other and the poor prefer
the aﬀordable homes in poorer quarters. Indeed, the empir-
ics show that higher intensities of endogenous gentriﬁcation
can be found in areas with robust population growth.
The essence of this dissertation is that housing markets
are more risky than they appear to be. When I started my
research in 2007, residential real estate seemed to be a safe
asset class, characterized by steady positive returns and low
risk. The following years proved this perception to be wrong
– and so doesmy research. Mispricings occur often and per-
sist for longperiods of time. Real options amplify thesedevi-
ations from fundamentals and thereby increase house price
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volatility. Demographics ultimately determine the demand
for housing services. Against common belief, an aging soci-
ety does not necessarily demand less housing. Human capi-
tal is the key demand factor, not age. Finally, drops in aggre-
gate house prices increase the inequalities within cities with
falling population numbers, which is a discomforting result,
given Europe’s challenging demographic outlook.
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Nederlandse Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Housing matters. Voor geïndustrialiseerde landen zijn
woningen het grootste onderdeel van de private consump-
tie. Het Amerikaanse Bureau of Labor Statistics schat dat
woningbezitters in de Verenigde Staten ongeveer 24 pro-
cent van hun totale bestedingen in 2010 aan wonen uit-
gaven. Het kopen van een woning is voor de meeste
huishoudens de grootste investering van hun leven. In
Nederland zit voor de gemiddelde woningbezitter ruim 60
procent van zijn totale kapitaal vast in de woning. En
woningen domineren niet alleen de bezittingen, maar ook
de schulden van huishoudens: voor het gemiddelde Neder-
landse huishouden vertegenwoordigt de woninghypotheek
zo’n 33 procent van het totale kapitaal. De woningmarkt
is groot genoeg om een indrukwekkende invloed op de al-
gemene economie te hebben. De waarde van het Ned-
erlandse eigen-woningbezit (dus exclusief huurwoningen)
wordt geschat op €1.7 biljoen (!) in 2009. Dit is meer dan
twee keer ons nationale Bruto Nationaal Product en oversti-
jgt ruimschoots de totale marktkapitalisatie van alle bedri-
jven genoteerd op de AEX. Het totaal van uitstaande won-
inghypotheken in de Verenigde Staten is ruim driekwart van
het Amerikaanse Bruto Nationaal Product.
Tijdens de laatste jaren vanhet “tijdperkGreenspan” stim-
uleerde de Verenigde Staten de woningmarkt door goed-
koop krediet om zowel de dot-com crisis als de economis-
che schok na de aanslagen op 9/11 te verzachten. Woningpri-
jzen lekenoneindig te kunnengroeien. Tussen2000en2006
nam de Case/Shiller huizenprijsindex voor de 20 grootste
Amerikaanse steden toe met 105 procent. Deze prijsstijging
leidde tot oververhitting voor de rest van de economie en
inmiddels kennen wij het einde van deze sage: ineenstor-
tende woningprijzen in de Verenigde Staten luidden het be-
gin in van een wereldwijde economische crisis die de ﬁnan-
ciële industrie verlamde, en leidde tot “TheGreat Recession”.
Deze crisis heeft op een pijnlijke manier duidelijk gemaakt
dat kennis vandedynamiekvanwoningmarktenonontbeer-
lijk is.
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt risico’s op de woningmarkt
vanuit vier verschillende perspectieven. Allereerst gaan wij
nader in op de lange termijn relatie tussen huren en pri-
jzen van woningen in Amsterdam – van 1650 tot 2005. Met
een periode van 355 jaar kan dit onderzoek waarschijnlijk
het wereldrecord claimen voor het analyseren van de lang-
ste tijdreeks in de literuur over de waardering van ﬁnanciële
activa (om over de vastgoedliteratuur maar niet te spreken).
Hoofdstuk 1 laat zien dat woningprijzen op de lange ter-
mijn verklaard kunnen worden door een theoretische fun-
damentele waarde, berekend op basis van huren en rente
niveaus. De huur-prijs verhouding laat over de eeuwen heen
niet alleen een indrukwekkende stabiliteit zien, maar keert
ook telkens terug naar een theoretische basis. Maar, in-
dien woningen over- of ondergewaardeerd zijn in vergelijk-
ing met de huurstromen die ze genereren, dan is de vraag
of de prijzen zich aanpassen, of juist de huren. De resul-
taten van een error-correctie model tonen aan dat het even-
wicht voornamelijk hersteld wordt doordat woningprijzen
veranderen. Huurstromen zijn stabieler en minder gevoelig
voor marktveranderingen. Echter, het evenwichtsherstel
kan tientallen jaren duren. Gedurende de tweede helft van
de negentiende eeuw bleven woningen bijvoorbeeld overge-
waardeerd voormeer dan vijftig jaar.
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift is een eerste, unieke
verkenning indewetenschappelijke literatuurnaarde relatie
tussen de volatiliteit van woningprijzen en de waardeveran-
deringen van zogenoemde reële opties (“real options”). Een
voorbeeld van een reële optie is de mogelijkheid om de om-
vang of inhoud van een bestaande woning te vergroten door
het toevoegen van een aanbouw, of door de bestaande won-
ing af te breken en een grotere woning te bouwen. Reële op-
ties hebben ﬁnanciële waarde omdat deze de eigenaar van
een woning een bepaalde ﬂexibiliteit geven. Op het moment
dat de woningmarkt aantrekt en de vraag naar additionele
ruimte of grotere woningen toeneemt, kan de eigenaar zijn
optie uitoefenen en gaan bouwen. In het geval dat de vraag
naar (grotere) woningen beperkt is, kan de eigenaar de in-
vestering simpelweg uitstellen.
Hoofdstuk 2 meet de waarde van de reële optie in de
woningmarkt tijdens verschillende marktomstandigheden.
De reële optie wordt meegenomen in een standaard he-
donisch regressiemodel om wijken en woningen met on-
gerealiseerd waardepotentieel te kunnen identiﬁceren. De
studie gebruikt een nog niet onderzochte steekproef van
woningtransacties inWest-Berlijn van 1978 tot enmet 2007.
West-Berlijn biedt een ideale onderzoeksituatie, omdat daar
gedetailleerde data over de maximale woningomvang (als
gedeﬁnieerd in het bestemmingsplan) voor iedere woning-
transactie beschikbaar zijn. Daarnaast leent de dynamis-
che historie van de stad Berlijn zich uitstekend voor de
vergelijking van de optiewaarde ten tijde van zeer diverse
– positieve en negatieve – marktomstandigheden. De em-
pirische resultaten tonen een elasticiteit van woningprijzen
ten opzichte van ontwikkelingspotentieel van 0.15, waar on-
twikkelingspotentieel gemeten wordt door de verhouding
tussen het maximale aantal vierkante meters als toegestaan
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in het bestemmingsplan en het huidige aantal vierkanteme-
ters in dewoning. Voorwoningenmet een hoge optiewaarde
neemt de elasticiteit toe tot 0.23. De resultaten suggereren
dat Berlijn’s bloeiperiode – van 1989 tot 1994 – voor wonin-
gen met een substantieel ontwikkelingspotentieel tot een
signiﬁcante toename van optiewaarde leidde; zo’n veertig
procent van de waardevermeerding in de woningmarkt kan
worden verklaard door optiewaarde. Er is echter ook een
keerzijde: gedurende de tien jaar malaise op de woning-
markt na 1994 was ongeveer vijftig procent van de prijsdal-
ing te wijten aan optiewaarde. Volatiliteit van deze omvang
geldt voorongeveer tienprocentvandeverkochtewoningen,
maargedurendedevastgoedcyclusheeft ruim68procentvan
alle woningtransacties een toegenomen volatiliteit door on-
gerealiseerde optiewaarde.
Hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift heeft tot doel om de in-
vloed van demograﬁe op kwantiteit en kwaliteit van won-
ingvraag te onderzoeken. Gebaseerd op een zeer gede-
tailleerde cross-sectie vanBritsehuishoudens laat dit hoofd-
stuk zien datmenselijk kapitaal (“human capital”) een bepal-
ende factor is voor woningvraag. Variabelen die posi-
tief gecorreleerd zijn met menselijk kapitaal leiden tot
een toenemende vraag naar woningen. Met iedere stap
dat bijvoorbeeld het scholingsniveau van een huishouden
toeneemt, vermeerderd de betalingsbereidheid voor won-
ingvraag. Echter, factoren die menselijk kapitaal beperken,
zoals bijvoorbeeld chronische ziekten, hebben een negatieve
impact op de consumptie van woningen. Het hoofdstuk laat
zien dat, aangezien iedere generatie beter is opgeleid dan de
voorgaande, vergrijzing een toenemende totale vraag naar
woningen tot eﬀect zal hebben, zelfs als de omvang van
het aantal huishoudens stabiliseert. Een scenario analyse
aan de hand van verschillende oﬃciële bevolkingsprojecties
demonstreert dit eﬀect: zelfs in het meest negatieve ver-
grijzingscenario zal de totale vraag naar woningen blijven
groeien, er vanuit gaande dat inkomen en kapitaal van de
vergrijzende leeftijdscohorten niet afneemt.
Het vierde empirische hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift
bestudeert hoe de verdeling van woningkapitaal binnen een
stad veranderd op het moment dat de woningwaarde van de
stad als geheel veranderd. Deze studie vindt zijn grondslag
in de anekdotische observatie dat bepaaldewijken in Berlijn,
zoals Prenzlauer Berg, Friedrichshain enMitte, de afgelopen
jaren ﬂoreerden, terwijl de stad Berlijn als geheel te maken
hadmet substantiële vermindering van het woningkapitaal.
De beschikbaarheid van data veranderde de geograﬁsche fo-
cus van deze studie naar Nederland. Echter, de vraagstelling
bleef hetzelfde: hoe verandert de dynamiek van woningpri-
jzen binnen een stad in opwaartse en neerwaartse markten?
Enwat is de rol van demograﬁe in dit proces?
Dit hoofdstuk draagt bij aan de literatuur over stadsindel-
ing door het theoretisch onderbouwen en empirisch testen
vanhypothesen betreﬀendeprijscurven in verschillendewi-
jken, in verschillende marktomstandigheden en onder ver-
schillende demograﬁsche condities. De resultaten laten zien
dat een neergang in de bevolkingsomvang van een stad,
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gecombineerd met een negatieve, externe schok op woning-
prijzen, tot een polarisatie van woningwaarden in een stad
leidt. In een dergelijk scenario neemt het verschil in won-
ingprijzen tussen arme en rijke wijken toe. Een neerwaartse
prijsspiraal staat huishoudens toe om op te klimmen op de
woningmarkt, omdat zij “meer woning” voor hetzelfde geld
krijgen, waardoor de armewijken afglijden tot verval.
Eerdere onderzoeken ontwikkelden een gesloten model
dat een vicieuze cirkel voor woningprijsontwikkelingen
voorspelt. Dit impliceert simpelweg dat rijke huishoudens
gelijkgestelde buren prefereren en hiervan proﬁteren. Deze
voorkeur leidt tot een zichzelf versterkende segmentatie van
steden in arme en rijke wijken, hetgeen een groot eﬀect
heeft op woningprijzen in de deze wijken. Hoofdstuk 4
borduurt voort op deze literatuur door de modererende rol
van demograﬁe in ogenschouw te nemen. Nieuwe inwon-
ers in een stad versnellen het segmentatie-eﬀect, omdat de
welgestelden dicht bij elkaar gaan wonen en de minder be-
deelden kiezen voor meer betaalbare woningen in de arme
wijken. De resultaten laten zien dat gebiedsverbetering en -
verslechteringvooralplaatsvinden ingebiedenmeteenmeer
robuuste bevolkingsgroei.
De belangrijkste boodschap van dit proefschrift is dat
woningmarkten risicovoller zijn dan ze op het eerste gezicht
lijken. Toen ik mijn onderzoek in 2007 begon werden
woningmarkten als een veilige belegging ervaren, gekarak-
teriseerd door consistente, positieve rendementen en een
laag risico. De daarop volgende jaren weerlegden deze per-
ceptie, net als dit proefschrift. Incorrecte waarderingen
zijn aan de orde van de dag en zetten vaak voor een lan-
gere periode door. Reële opties versterken deze afwijkingen
van de fundamentele waarde en daardoor de volatiliteit van
woningprijzen. Demograﬁe bepaalt uiteindelijk de vraag
naar het product “woning”. Geheel tegen algemene veron-
derstellingen in hoeft een vergrijzende maatschappij niet
per deﬁnitie een afnemende vraag naar woningen te im-
pliceren. Menselijk kapitaal is de bepalende factor, niet
leeftijd. Tenslotte heeft een woningmarkt gekarakteriseerd
door prijsdalingen een toename in ongelijkheid binnen ste-
den met een krimpende populatie tot gevolg. Gegeven Eu-
ropa’s uitdagende demograﬁsche vooruitzichten is dit is een
verontrustende bevinding.
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